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درصورتی که می خواهید به 250 هزار سند ویکیلیکس سری بزنید به سایت زیر مراجعه کنید و اسم مورد نظر خود را در موتور جستجوگر این سایت وارد کنید.



london of universityCable reference id: #09LONDON1442
[h2 یکی از دوستان سند چند سند مربوط به سلمان رحیم صفوی برادر فرمانده سابق سپاه را از این اسناد بیرون اورده که در زیر ملاحظه می کنید



Reference id
aka Wikileaks id #212876  ? 




Subject
Iran: Salman Safavi Says Election Precluded By "political Coup," Urges Usg Focus On Human Rights And Political Support For Protestors

Origin
Embassy London (United Kingdom)

Cable time
Thu, 18 Jun 2009 17:50 UTC

Classification
SECRET//NOFORN

Source
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09LONDON1442.html

History
First published on Tue, 15 Feb 2011 13:31 UTC (original)
Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)

Media 



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VZCZCXRO2428 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHLO #1442/01 1691750 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 181750Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2658 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

Hide header S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 001442 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], PINS [National Security], IR [Iran], UK [United Kingdom] SUBJECT: IRAN: SALMAN SAFAVI SAYS ELECTION PRECLUDED BY "POLITICAL COUP," URGES USG FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PROTESTORS REF: 08 LONDON 2691 AND PREVIOUS 1. (S) Summary: Syed Salman Safavi, brother of ex-IRGC commander and the Supreme Leader's military advisor Rehman Safavi, on June 16 told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) and a small group of diplomats that "a majority" of leaders within the government of Iran and the IRGC want the United States, while continuing to avoid interference in Iran, to continue and even strengthen its public messages on human rights, so as to support popular protests in Iran and prevent any consolidation of Ahmedinejad's electoral win. Safavi said "a majority" of the IRGC have split from the Basij and from IRGC commander Jafari over the manipulation and aftermath of the June 12 elections. He added that a person he "cannot name, very close to the Supreme Leader," and "working in the Leader's office," conceived and ordered engineering of the election and of attempted suppression which has followed. Safavi claimed no senior clergy other than Mesbah Yazdi in fact support Ahmedinejad. Safavi offered no compromise solution among contending parties in Iran, and indicated throughout that either Moussavi or Ahmedinejad would be politically vanquished. He explicitly played down the prospect of a "civil war" raised by a European interlocutor. End summary. ¶2. (S) As in the past (ref), Safavi appeared at the invitation of the Next Century Foundation (NCF), a small UK policy forum NGO enjoying occasional Embassy support; Safavi had just arrived in the UK from Tehran late that same day, June 16. The venue was the residence of the German Political Counselor; besides NCF staff, attendees included Mrs. Safavi, the Norwegian, Spanish, and Japanese embassies and a mid-level Whitehall (UK) diplomat. Events of June 12 and Afterwards: "A Political Coup" --------------------------------- ¶3. (S) After warning the group against any leaks of his remarks, Safavi characterized events in Iran since June 12 as a "political coup," and said "the Islamic Republic has never faced such a situation.8 He emphasized it was "not a military coup," since, according to Safavi, there was for the most part no involvement by the great majority of IRGC officers; at the same time, Safavi drew a clear line between the IRGC and the Basij, emphasizing the Basijis' central role in suppression of protestors. ¶4. (S) Asked for an explanation of events since June 12, Safavi gave a tense, extended narrative that closely resembled reformist narratives, which Poloff and other posts have reported. Safavi said ruling circles on June 12 had fully expected that, due to the political chemistry and excitement generated by the Moussavi-Ahmedinejad debate, Moussavi would emerge a clear winner. The indicia of fraud he listed were similar to what Western observers have cited, but centered on implausible proportions of the vote for Ahmedinejad uniformly throughout Iran and an implausibly fast announcement. Safavi spoke at length on the democratizing effects worldwide and in Iran of digital technology and said the deliberate interruption of SMS services had been a key factor in inhibiting opposition candidates' supporters from effectively monitoring vote compilation at polling centers. Safavi's Version of the Views of "Traditional" Insiders ------------------------------ ¶5. (S) Of special interest was Safavi's description of the perceptions of persons inside "traditional revolutionary groups." Safavi said this election, Iran's first failed election "after 40 successful elections since the Revolution," had been unique for its "lack of advance clarity." The Iranian electoral norm, according to Safavi, was that all parties' positions and interests are well defined many months in advance, whereas in this case it had not been clear to insiders, according to Safavi, whether one of the major candidates, Karroubi, would even stand two days before the election. Safavi said this atmosphere created a need for certainty, and represented an opportunity for "those who had done this before" (Safavi did not explain this point to the larger group but see para. 10 below). Speaking elliptically, and without drawing a clear line between his points, Safavi said there were additional elements contributing to insiders' "atmosphere of uncertainty" and the motive and opportunity to "once more" manipulate the June 12 results. He said there were splits for the first time among the conservatives themselves, and not just among reformists, but emphasized strongly that "only a minority (of high-level individuals) supported Ahmedinejad, then and now. Safavi LONDON 00001442 002 OF 004 said the television debates were a very new factor and that the atmosphere, and insiders' "sense of control ....changed completely overnight" after the Moussavi-Ahmedinejad debate; "green appeared everywhere." Where Senior Clerics Stand -------------------------- ¶6. (S) He also said the debates produced "an explosion" among the clergy, directed, according to Safavi, against Ahmedinejad. The late replacement of Interior Minister Pir Mohammadi by Ahmedinejad confederate Mahsouli had also been a worrisome event. Also significant, said Safavi in a distinctly positive tone, had been the candid and electrifying remarks in May on Iranian television of Tehran University political scientist Zeba Qolom, who had candidly criticized the government's rejectionist foreign policy vis a vis the United States. Safavi noted very pointedly that, in his view, there is very little senior clerical support for Ahmedinejad; he said "they remember Ahmedinejad attacked them, and only one -- just one -- in Qom supports him," an apparent reference to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. ¶7. (S) Safavi said the ultimate denouement will be determined by interplay between the Guardian Council as it deliberates on the candidates' petitions for redress, and the Supreme Leader. This deliberation will be set against a background either of acquiescence by the international community and a lessening of the energy behind current protest levels, or of continued pressure and withholding of legitimacy through mass protest and united, sustained international attention. Safavi claimed that opponents of the Ahmedinejad win can settle for nothing less than a "re-vote," that the ballots as cast June 12 are too tainted for a recount now to have value. He said the United States &must not recognize Ahmedinejad.8 Rafsanjani Said To Be Unwilling to Tolerate A "Third Provocation" --------------------------------- ¶8. (S) Safavi repeatedly underlined what he called Rafsanjani's central role in resisting the "coup" and in backing the three aggrieved candidates. He described the June 12 vote manipulation as "a third provocation" against Rafsanjani and the community he represents. Without naming the specific provocateurs, but saying the same ones are behind the current manipulation of election results, Safavi said Rafsanjani had chosen not to respond to the electoral manipulations which had undercut him in the previous (2005) presidential elections and the 2007 Majles elections, but that he and "those whom this figure represents.... do not accept a third provocation;" Safavi repeated the phrase at several points in the evening. Safavi twice during the evening provided a detailed description of the IRGC and the original leaders of the 1979 revolution as being &those who really decide the national interest.8 At one point Safavi declared: &Presidents come and go but we remain and we decide what is the interest of the nation and the interest of the revolution.8 Safavi Picks the Green Folder ----------------------------- ¶9. (S) Poloff, seated next to Safavi during dinner, offered Dr. and Mrs. Safavi one set apiece of Farsi language versions of President Obama's Cairo speech and his June 15 remarks (during Prime Minister Berlusconi's visit) on Iran: the two document sets were packaged in a green and a blue folder. Safavi hesitated and then said he preferred the blue folder, jestingly remarking that blue is candidate Rezai's color, and handing the green folder to his wife with the comment that "she and all my daughters are green - for Moussavi." Safavi shortly afterwards repeated the jest for the benefit of other guests, this time ostentatiously picking the green folder back from his wife, and remarking loudly "actually everyone now is a Moussavi supporter." Safavi Points at Jafari, Basij, and "A Person Very Close to the Leader" ----------------------------------- ¶10. (S) On the margins of the meeting afterwards, speaking to Poloff and to German Political Counselor Hans Best, Safavi said IRGC commander Jafari has been a principal planner and instigator of election manipulations. Asked about the possible role of Mojtaba Khamenei, Safavi said that "yes, we have serious division;" he said he could not name who in the Supreme Leader's Office was involved, but emphasized "the large majority" of IRGC officers and rank and file "oppose LONDON 00001442 003 OF 004 what has happened." Human Rights ------------ ¶11. (S) In response to points Poloff made, drawing from NSC's June 16 public guidance, on USG concern over violence, possible vote fraud, the unchanging nature of international security concerns, and USG respect and noninterference in Iranian affairs, Safavi immediately and in front of the group asked that USG be very careful not to de-emphasize human rights in its public comments on Iran in the coming days. There was then a lengthy segue, not without irony, into the role human rights should play in U.S. foreign policy in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel/Palestine and Central Asia, followed by Safavi's return to a request that the USG keep the human rights and safety of "peaceful Iranian demonstrators" at the center of the USG message. Safavi praised USG public statements on the elections to date, and agreed the principle of noninterference needs to be constantly repeated, but said the human rights component needed to go "somewhat farther." He argued that a failure to establish a strong and clear signal on human rights would legitimate, and thereby empower, security forces to slowly and quietly crush the current resistance. Nuclear Engagement: "Cash for Cash" ------------------- ¶12. (S) Safavi, asked to comment on prospects for nuclear engagement, politely but immediately dismissed the P5 1 offer as being "not business-like," in that it promises in his view "future U.S. action such as light water reactor or friendly security talks" in exchange for "real action by Iran now -- suspension of enrichment." He then made general remarks about the possibility of "a practical solution," but repeated "it must be business-like" with concrete motivations, and he raised anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism as things "which mean something to Iran -- you must make a real offer." He repeated the mantra "cash for cash" at least four times in describing what in the Iranian view constitutes a "business-like" approach to negotiation. Personal Disappointment ----------------------- ¶13. (S/NF) Poloff informed Safavi that, further to Safavi's earlier expressions of interest at traveling to Washington to brief senior U.S. experts and officials (ref), USG officials were aware of his interest in traveling to the United States. As before Poloff offered to support and expedite the application but noted sharp limitations on Poloff's ability to assist; Safavi was visibly disappointed, remarking ruefully he would have to tell people "my Washington connection cannot produce as I wished." Safavi politely noted Poloff's pending departure from post and asked for an introduction to the incoming London Iran Watcher -- Poloff made tentative arrangements for introductions to be made in person on June 30, shortly before Dr. and Mrs Safavi are due to return from the UK to Iran. Comment ------- ¶14. (S) Well-briefed, smooth, and supremely confident as always, Safavi appeared a consummate and effective salesman, sent to make a case. Though he may have intended throughout the evening to mislead as to his true allegiances, Safavi has in the past in this setting consistently and repeatedly expressed deep contempt for Ahmedinejad and his political supporters (ref). Safavi, whom Poloff has observed in a series of similar small group sessions since 2006 (ref), projected his usual smoothly self-confident, dominating presence, but seemed more internally agitated and ill at ease than in previous meetings. As the dinner broke up, his manner with Poloff on the margins in requesting USG public rhetorical support for demonstrators and human rights principles was (not quite but) almost pleading in tone, and far more urgent and solicitous than anything Poloff had previously heard from him. Safavi had the air less of an impassioned campaigner for human rights, and more of a real party in interest, working to maintain composure and self-assurance even as his prize ox is being gored. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LONDON 00001442 004 OF 004


http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09LONDON1745&q=safavi%20salman

Cable reference id: #09LONDON1745
“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

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Reference id
aka Wikileaks id #218777  ? 




Subject
Iran: Ayatollah Safavi Meets Arab Ambassadors In London

Origin
Embassy London (United Kingdom)

Cable time
Thu, 30 Jul 2009 10:30 UTC

Classification
SECRET

Source
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09LONDON1745.html

History
First published on Tue, 15 Feb 2011 13:31 UTC (original)
Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)

Media 



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VZCZCXRO0022 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO DE RUEHLO #1745/01 2111030 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 301030Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3004 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

Hide header S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001745 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation], IR [Iran] SUBJECT: IRAN: AYATOLLAH SAFAVI MEETS ARAB AMBASSADORS IN LONDON REF: LONDON 1561 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Greg Berry, rea sons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S) SUMMARY: London Iran Watcher (poloff) attended a luncheon July 24 hosted by the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UK in honor of Ayatollah Salman Safavi. Also in attendance were the ambassadors of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and Oman, as well as former UK Ambassador to Iran Sir Richard Dalton, William Morris of the Next Century Foundation, Mrs. Safavi, and American businessman Karl Ziegler. Safavi projected a much harder line than he expressed in a previous meeting with poloff (reftel). He declared the nuclear file "closed" and said further sanctions would have no effect on Iran's ability to pursue its nuclear aspirations. He expressed frustration at the "double standard" being applied to Iran and Israel, and railed at the U.S. for not imposing sanctions on Israel for its nuclear weapons program while sanctioning Iran. Almost as an afterthought, Safavi maintained Iran was not pursing nuclear weapons. On the internal political situation in Iran, Safavi asserted the Iranian people continue to support the Islamic Revolution and its system of government, and that any disagreements between the "three political options" represented by Ahmadinejad, Mousavi and Karroubi would be settled within the system. END SUMMARY. Iran's Nuclear Program and Relations with the U.S. ¶2. (S) Safavi welcomed the overtures of the Obama administration toward Iran, but was harshly dismissive of restarting negotations on Iran's nuclear program, declaring the nuclear file "closed." Iran would not agree to suspend its uranium enrichment again, Safavi said, and implied Iran would not provide a substantive response to the P5 1 proposal. Safavi also asserted that "Europe doesn't matter" when it comes to the nuclear issue; the only real interlocutor for Iran on that score is the United States. He said Iran did not fear further sanctions, as those imposed already had had no real effect on Iran's nuclear program. American policies in the region, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, had failed, while Iran's strategy was a success, he stressed. ¶3. (S) Safavi decried the "double standard" applied to Iran and Israel's nuclear programs, asking why there were no sanctions on Israel for its nuclear weapons -- implying that if Israel has the right to have nuclear weapons, so does Iran. When asked to clarify, Safavi stated Iran was not developing nuclear weapons. Sir Richard Dalton, former UK Ambassador to Iran argued that Iran must not miss the opportunity presented by the P5 1 proposal, but Safavi responded with the familiar "when America changes its behavior, so will Iran." Poloff asserted the American approach had changed, and now the onus was on Iran to respond to the U.S. offer of engagement. Safavi was unmoved, and predicted there would be no progress on the nuclear front. Instead, he said the U.S. should "forget" about the nuclear issue and focus on areas of common concern with Iran. Iran Post-Election: The System is Strong ¶4. (S) When asked about the internal political situation in Iran, Safavi glossed over the conflict, asserting several times throughout the luncheon that the Iranian political system is stable and in no danger of collapse. He said the Iranian people wholeheartedly support the Islamic Revolution, and none of the "three political options" (Ahmadinejad, Mousavi and Karroubi) pose a threat to the existing political system; they simply represent different approaches to running the country. Ahmadinejad represents those who seek to distribute wealth to the poorest segments of society and create jobs in the short term. Mousavi and Karroubi, in contrast, were looking at the long term, investing in technology, industry and infrastructure. Safavi said the security services, especially the IRGC, maintained close ties to all camps and were hedging their bets in anticipation of a political compromise. ¶5. (S) On the formation of the new Iranian government, Safavi predicted Mottaki would be ousted as foreign minister because he is not "Ahmadinejad's man." He said Ahmadinejad may try to appoint Mashaei as FM, but the Majlis would surely reject him. While Ahmadinejad is not particularly savvy or polished when it comes to the international arena, Safavi said, the real leaders are elsewhere in the government. He praised Supreme Leader Khamenei's rationalism and experience LONDON 00001745 002 OF 002 and said he didn't believe "radicalism" would have a place in Iran's foreign policy under the new administration. Relations with the Region ¶6. (S) The Egyptian Ambassador asked Safavi about Iranian public opinion on the Iranian government's provision of material and financial support to groups like Hamas and Hizballah. He also asked if the Iranian government was still seeking to export its revolution to other countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. Safavi responded that the goals of the Islamic Revolution had evolved over time. Iran does not seek the overthrow of any government, and wants good relations with its Arab neighbors. Iran supports the Palestinians in their opposition to Israel, but is not seeking to drive a further wedge between Hamas and Fatah. At the same time, while Iran is a friend of Hizballah, it respects the independence of Lebanon. Safavi argued the Iranian government sees providing support to fellow Muslims as an Islamic imperative, and the people of Iran understand the importance of doing so. ¶7. (S) Finally, in what appeared to be a response to Secretary Clinton's statements regarding the security of U.S. allies in the Middle East, Safavi said Iran did not seek armed conflict with any nation, but would not hesitate to retaliate if it is attacked. Iran does not have the capability to attack America directly, but if America attacks Iran, Iran will respond by attacking American interests in the countries of the Middle East. Safavi added the security of the Persian Gulf region is the responsibility of the countries that border the Gulf, not the United States, and called for the departure of the U.S. from the region. Comment ¶8. (S) The tenor of Safavi's statements in this more public environment was noticeably sharper than in a private setting. Many of Safavi's comments seemed to be aimed at warning the assembled Arab ambassadors that the Iranian regime remains strong, stable, and ready to defend its regional interests. Safavi was at his most shrill in defending Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology. He became agitated and launched a tirade against Israel when poloff and Sir Richard Dalton noted Iran must take the next step in improving Iran's relations with the West, including reopening talks on the nuclear issue. Safavi is an inherently contradictory figure -- a devout cleric who vociferously defends the Islamic Revolution, but seems to yearn for acceptance by the outside world, even as he outwardly rejects its values. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom






http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09LONDON566&q=safavi%20salman





Cable reference id: #09LONDON566
“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • WL Central • The magic of WikiLeaks: telling it like it is • PFC Bradley Manning, Conscience & Agency• Manning’s alleged chat logs diff • WikiLeaks and a Truth Revolution







Reference id
aka Wikileaks id #195021  ? 




Subject
Iran: Khamenei Said To Consider Rahim Safavi And To Write Off Qalibaf; Velayati May Have Key Advisory Role

Origin
Embassy London (United Kingdom)

Cable time
Tue, 3 Mar 2009 19:52 UTC

Classification
SECRET//NOFORN

Source
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09LONDON566.html

History
First published on Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07 UTC (original)
Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)

Media 




State Department cables reveal U.S. thirst for all things Iranian | McClatchy

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P 031952Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1616 INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Hide header S E C R E T LONDON 000566 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PROP [Propaganda and Psychological Operations], PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], IR [Iran], UK [United Kingdom] SUBJECT: IRAN: KHAMENEI SAID TO CONSIDER RAHIM SAFAVI AND TO WRITE OFF QALIBAF; VELAYATI MAY HAVE KEY ADVISORY ROLE REF: A. 08 LONDON 2659 AND PREVIOUS B. LONDON 451 ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Expatriate broadcaster Ali Reza Nourizadeh sees Ahmedinejad as the current front-runner, but claimed to London Iran Watcher (Poloff) that Rahim Safavi is under consideration by the Supreme Leader as his own preferred candidate in Iran's June elections; Nourizadeh cited an unspecified regular contact of his within Khamenei's office whom Nourizadeh has previously claimed as a source (ref a). The same claimed source also reportedly told Nourizadeh that Khamenei has, in an elliptical fashion, told Qalibaf he should plan to stay on as Tehran mayor, and that Khamenei will not endorse Qalibaf's presidential bid. Countering an earlier prediction of his own, Nourizadeh argued Khamenei foreign affairs advisor Velayati will play an important advisory role in any engagement with the United States but is now less likely to be endorsed by Khamenei as a presidential candidate. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary (continued) A UK legislator (please protect) is planning to travel soon to Iran to make contact with Velayati and urge him to facilitate contact between the Supreme Leader's office and the USG. End Summary Looking At Safavi ----------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Supreme Leader Khamenei is allegedly looking more closely at his military advisor, ex-IRGC commander Rahim Safavi, despite Safavi's lack of political experience, as a candidate Khamenei might support, expatriate broadcaster Ali Reza Nourizadeh told Poloff; Nourizadeh cited an unnamed source he has referenced before (ref a) and claims to have in Khamenei's office. Nourizadeh said Khamenei trusts few persons outside his immediate family or personal staff, and argued Safavi is the most viable potential candidate among Khamenei's staff or family. He said Khamenei's (alleged) consideration of Safavi is still strictly internal to the Supreme Leader's office; Nourizadeh claimed Safavi's brother, Syed Salman Safavi, is overseeing a website (www.yahyasafavi.com) which Nourizadeh argues is promoting Rahim Safavi's visibility by reporting what Nourizadeh claims are Rahim's recently more numerous public statements and appearances. In a separate conversation, a Tehran-based analyst told Poloff that Salman Safavi will in early March speak at the Caspian Institute, a leading Tehran think tank the analyst said is frequented by Western diplomats accredited to Tehran. Brushing off Qalibaf -------------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Citing the same unnamed source in Khamenei's office, Nourizadeh said Qalibaf had been told by Khamenei that Qalibaf should plan to remain mayor of Tehran for the next five years. Nourizadeh told Poloff his source claimed the Supreme Leader had, when Qalibaf presented Khamenei with a plan for the development of Tehran over the next twelve months, told Qalibaf he "should be making (mayoral) plans for the next five years, not one year." Qalibaf reportedly was visibly downcast after the meeting. Velayati: Uncharismatic as a Candidate, But Still Key Advisor -------------------------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Nourizadeh said his own previous prediction, that former foreign minister Velayati would be tapped, seemed more doubtful now -- Nourizadeh maintained that Khamenei had quietly vetted Velayati but had judged the former foreign minister to be too elderly and too widely perceived by Iranian voters as uncharismatic and corrupt. He noted however that Velayati is still trusted by Khamenei and will in Nourizadeh's view likely be an important representative of and sounding board for Khamenei as the Supreme Leader prepares for direct engagement in some form with the United States. UK Parliamentarian Plans to Meet Velayati, Will Urge That Supreme Leader Open a Channel to USG ------------------------------------ ¶6. (S/NF) In a separate conversation, a member of the UK's House of Commons (please protect), prominent within Parliament on Iran issues, a past visitor to Iran, and himself strongly pro-U.S. (ref b), told Poloff March 3 he is planning to travel soon to Iran to make contact with Velayati. The Member of Parliament (MP) volunteered that while in Iran he will urge Velayati to have Khamenei permit a channel of communication to the USG; the MP commented that Khamenei, not Ahmedinejad, is in his view "the correct return address" for any USG outreach to Iran. The MP's past comments to Poloff on Iran tend to closely track FCO estimates, that the West has a narrow window for effective diplomatic action on Iran. Poloff reminded the MP that during USG's ongoing senior level policy review, U.S. officials cannot comment or speculate publicly or privately on possible future courses of U.S. policy on Iran. Comment ------- ¶7. (S/NF) Although continuing to claim Khamenei is examining other figures in conservative circles as possible candidates, Nourizadeh's singling out Safavi may reflect his own over-reliance on his claimed source within Khamenei's office. Nourizadeh, nevertheless, still believes Ahmedinejad, despite his dismal economic record, has the inside track, and is the candidate at this point most likely to win. Nourizadeh attributes Ahmedinejad's electoral strength to his control of voting processes, to his popularity in Iran arising from his handling of the nuclear issue, and to his continuing populist, "every-man" image. Nourizadeh believes Ahmedinejad has no lasting interest in improved relations and argues the United States in any direct engagement with Iran should either delay outreach until after the elections so as to minimize the chances of boosting Ahmedinejad's prestige or, if acting before June, should use channels controlled by the Supreme Leader, not by Ahmedinejad. ¶8. (S/NF) The British MP contemplating the Velayati-focused visit to Iran has in the past been a source for Poloff of insights and information on Iran and on Iranians visiting the UK. The MP's above comments however, were the first indication Poloff has had that this (or any other) MP or other British official intends advocating with Iranian officials for direct U.S.-IRIG contact; the MP's specific objective, of promoting a USG channel to the Supreme Leader's office, is likewise new information to Poloff. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LEBARON





http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08LONDON2169&q=safavi%20salman





Cable reference id: #08LONDON2169
“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • WL Central • The magic of WikiLeaks: telling it like it is • PFC Bradley Manning, Conscience & Agency• Manning’s alleged chat logs diff • WikiLeaks and a Truth Revolution







Reference id
aka Wikileaks id #166880  ? 




Subject
Iran: Expat Source's Information And Views On Mojtaba Khamenei, And This Source's Pitch For Usg Funds

Origin
Embassy London (United Kingdom)

Cable time
Thu, 21 Aug 2008 15:10 UTC

Classification
SECRET//NOFORN

Source
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08LONDON2169.html

History
First published on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01 UTC (original)
Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)

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VZCZCXRO5844 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHLO #2169/01 2341510 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 211510Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9558 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

Hide header S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 002169 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018 TAGS: PINR [Intelligence], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], PHUM [Human Rights], IR [Iran], UK [United Kingdom] SUBJECT: IRAN: EXPAT SOURCE'S INFORMATION AND VIEWS ON MOJTABA KHAMENEI, AND THIS SOURCE'S PITCH FOR USG FUNDS REF: A. SECSTATE 83513 B. LONDON 365 AND PREVIOUS C. 07 LONDON 3310 Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reportedly is widely viewed within the regime as a capable and forceful leader and manager who may someday succeed to at least a share of national leadership; his father may also see him in that light. A close ally of Tehran Mayor Qalibaf, Mojtaba is seen by many as second only to Golpayegani within the Office of the Supreme Leader. Mojtaba is close to and well briefed by IRGC senior leaders. He is well aware of the distinct limitations his own relative youth imposes on him in the political culture of the Islamic Republic. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary cont. This view of Mojtaba Khamenei was given by UK-based Iranian expatriate broadcaster Ali Reza Nourizadeh, who provided input in conjunction with his own plans to move to the United States and to apply for a USG grant to create an Iran "information bank." Nourizadeh will soon visit Washington and will try to promote his idea to Department and other USG officials. Nourizadeh claims a senior Iranian official has recently tried to bribe him to halt his broadcasts, and also claims HMG security officials have told him he may be in some physical danger in the UK. End summary. ¶3. (S) In response to Department's request (ref a) for information on Mojtaba Khamenei, son of and deputy to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, London Iran Watcher (Poloff) queried UK-based Iranian area experts and bloggers, but received few useful replies beyond rhetorical responses, information available in media, or derivations of recent work by respected U.S.-based scholars Mehdi Khalaji and Karim Sadjadpour. ¶4. (S/NF) In contrast, VOA contract Iranian expatriate broadcaster Ali Reza Nourizadeh (ref b) provided a detailed, nuanced response, attributing his information, described in paras. 8-16, to various sources in Iran, including an unspecified regular contact of his in the Supreme Leader's office, and to what he called "fairly common knowledge" among observers in Iran. Embassy Comment --------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Nourizadeh offered the below account (paras. 8-16) of Mojtaba Khamenei to stir USG interest and possible support for his own USG grant application (discussed paras 17-19 and 24). Nourizadeh's information, views, and conjecture on Mojtaba Khamenei should be evaluated in that light, as possibly tailored to the needs and predilections of a USG audience. Mojtaba: Marital Details ------------------------ ¶8. (S) Mojtaba Khamenei is approximately forty-one years old. His marriage, to the daughter of former Majles Speaker Hadad Adel, followed two "temporary marriages" (available under Iranian law) and occurred relatively late in life, reportedly due to an impotency problem treated and eventually resolved during three extended visits to the UK, at Wellington and Cromwell Hospitals, London. Mojtaba was expected by his family to produce children quickly, but needed a fourth visit to the UK for medical treatment; after a stay of two months, his wife became pregnant. Back in Iran, a healthy boy (now about one year old) was born, named Ali for his paternal grandfather. Mojtaba: Talented, Connected, and Coming ---------------------------------------- ¶9. (S) Within the Supreme Leader's office, Mojtaba works in his father's shadow and in strong partnership with, and under the tutelage of, one of the Supreme Leader's leading deputies, Asghar Hejazi. Mojtaba is reportedly considered by informed observers and regime officials to rank second within the office behind Office Director Golpayegani; he is seen as an intelligent manager and a strong, capable leader with a forceful personality. His father-in-law Ghulam Hahdad-Adel reportedly is an influence on Mojtaba. ¶10. (S) Mojtaba is said to have a fair degree of control over access to his father and stays very close to him, including during the Supreme Leader's travels in Iran. LONDON 00002169 002 OF 004 ¶11. (S) Though there has been no formal announcement nor any internal acknowledgment of succession plans or expectations, Ali Khamenei is reportedly seen by some within the Leader's Office as treating and consulting Mojtaba as he would an eventual successor to his responsibilities, rather than purely as an advisor. Mojtaba also reportedly has a leading, central oversight role for "all" political and security matters handled by the Supreme Leader's Office. ¶12. (S) Mojtaba is reportedly extremely well-informed, his principal sources including IRGC general officer Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr and IRGC commander Mohammed Ali Jafari. ¶13. (S) Mojtaba reportedly has long maintained a very close relationship with Tehran Mayor and presidential hopeful Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf; Mojtaba was reportedly the "backbone" of Qalibaf's past and continuing election campaigns. Mojtaba is said to help Qalibaf as an advisor, financier, and provider of senior-level political support. His support for and closeness to Qalibaf reportedly remains undiminished. But Too Young to Go It Alone ---------------------------- ¶14. (S) Mojtaba is reportedly widely regarded in regime circles as possessing formidable and growing power and political stature, but is also seen as still much too young, by Islamic Republic norms, to aspire to the mantle of national leadership by himself. Another limiting factor is Mojtaba's limited level of clerical training and achievement: he is reportedly not expected ever to achieve by his own scholarship the status of "mujtahid," far less that of ayatollah. Mojtaba reportedly is quite aware of his own limitations and does not appear to harbor an expectation of becoming sole Supreme Leader in his own right. Mojtaba As Part of a Triumvirate? --------------------------------- ¶15. (S) Mojtaba is, however, due to his skills, wealth, and unmatched alliances, reportedly seen by a number of regime insiders as a plausible candidate for shared leadership of Iran upon his father's demise, whether that demise is soon or years in the future. Observers reportedly reason that the additions of Rafsanjani, whose wealth and experience keep him in play but whose age and corrupt image disqualify him for sole rule, and of a third, reliably conservative stakeholder, such as judiciary head Shahrudi, would provide a balanced triumvirate. Some insiders reportedly see Shahrudi as unworkable since he is originally Iraqi; they reportedly propose the late Ruhollah Khomeini's grandson Hassan Khomeini, despite his current marginal role in governing, as a possible third, junior leg of a hypothetical triumvirate, along with Rafsanjani and Mojtaba Khamenei. ¶16. (S) Reportedly, neither Larijani nor Ahmedinejad, and least of all Khatami, figure into insider debates over a workable future Supreme Leadership structure. Source Nourizadeh Would Be "Info Bank" on Iran, Seeks USG Funding, Fears For Safety ----------------------------------------- ¶17. (S/NF) Nourizadeh, a UK citizen, has previously stated a growing desire to work in the United States due to Iranian threats to his security in the UK (ref c). He told Poloff he has near-term plans to move to Washington, D.C., where he claims he could be a ready reference and "information bank" for USG on Iranian personalities and events. He intends soon to submit to the State Department a proposal, under the newly restructured Support for Civil Society/Rule of Law in Iran Program, for funding an NGO with such a capability, which he would head. Nourizadeh claims he seeks "less than three hundred thousand" dollars for a year's operations; he would continue his VOA and other broadcasts, keep his present London premises and staff (of two), hire "from five to eight" more clerical and research staff for London, Washington, and Tehran to field the calls and e-mails from Iran that his broadcasts generate. Poloff told Nourizadeh he could make no promises or estimates about USG ability to support his arguably unorthodox funding proposal; Poloff also noted USG funds cannot now be spent in Iran. ¶18. (S/NF) Nourizadeh told Poloff he has received U.S. private sector offers, but claims to prefer no association with the political "branding" he feels Western NGOs and think tanks carry. Nourizadeh, who periodically complains in private to Poloff about his contractual difficulties with LONDON 00002169 003 OF 004 VOA, also hints he will be unable for financial reasons, apart from security considerations, to continue his present London operation for long. ¶19. (S/NF) Finally, Nourizadeh stated he has been visited recently by HMG security and intelligence officials, of long-standing acquaintance, who allegedly detailed for him, as they reportedly have in the past, their belief he has been targeted by Iranian operatives and may be in danger. The HMG officials reportedly reviewed his home and office security practices. Nourizadeh told Poloff he is under increasing pressure from his family to move to the United States, at least temporarily, for his own safety. Poloff has not attempted independently to verify these alleged threats to Nourizadeh. Poloff likewise has not encouraged Nourizadeh's desire to re-locate to the U.S.; that desire appears to have grown in response to Nourizadeh's family's fears for his safety. Nourizadeh's Views/Credentials -------------------------------- ¶20. (S/NF) Nourizadeh is an ardent Iranian nationalist and supports constitutional democracy for Iran, and non-violent regime change from within. He is, according to Poloff contacts ranging from regime supporters to regime change activists, generally seen by Iranian experts, and trusted by Iranian citizens, as one of the better-informed, more balanced (though not non-partisan) commentators on Iran's politics. Listeners seem to respond to his humane but nationalistic sentiments, and his time is in constant demand. Fairly widely published in Farsi and Arabic on Iranian and Lebanese history, Nourizadeh appears to owe his wide connections in Iran to his broadcasts and to pre-1979 family and professional connections (ref b). The breadth of his contacts is reflected in Embassy reporting, and in the meetings Nourizadeh has offered which Poloff has declined (from ex-President Khatami to IRGC confidant Salman Safavi to the Supreme Leader's UK representative to Crown Prince Pahlavi). ¶21. (S/NF) Nourizadeh, as previously reported, claims his broadcasts, particularly recent ones about corruption among Ali Khamenei's family and associates, are the subject of close regular attention by senior regime figures. Nourizadeh told Poloff he was recently visited by Supreme Leader Khamenei's UK representative (based in the Islamic Center Edgeware Road, London), whom he claimed offered him a sizable payment (current value of his family's properties confiscated in the Revolution: several hundred thousand pounds sterling) to cease or moderate his broadcasts, an offer Nourizadeh claims to have declined. Upcoming Washington, DC Visit ----------------------------- ¶22. (S/NF) Nourizadeh, a regular visitor to USG officials in Washington, D.C., and to expats in Southern California, will visit Washington again reportedly beginning in the second week of September. As on previous Washington visits, Nourizadeh will likely seek appointments with any USG officials interested in discussing personalities or conditions in Iran, including the substance of this report. Poloff expects Nourizadeh will also raise his "Iran info bank" proposal. Nourizadeh does not, due to his already well-known support for USG policy, see USG financial support as compromising his present public credibility. ¶23. (S/NF) Nourizadeh complains of the logistical limitations of his current broadcast and research operation, at the tiny Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies in London. He claims he can monitor only part of the information flow from Iran his broadcasts generate, and argues any significant information he has given Embassy to date is "a fraction" of what he probably possesses but is unable to process. Comment ------- ¶24. (S/NF) Poloff is inclined, based on observation of Nourizadeh's office operations, to credit his claim about the volume of information he may potentially have available; the information's quality, however, can perhaps only be validated by a fluent reader of Farsi with ample time to sample Nourizadeh's files and publications. Nourizadeh's personal apprehensions about his physical safety in the UK appear to be genuine and growing, as does his stated intention to move to the U.S. Department may in any case wish to consider ways to sustain and leverage Nourizadeh's deep Iran contacts and knowledge in the near and medium term. LONDON 00002169 004 OF 004 Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom










http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07LONDON3923&q=safavi%20salman





Cable reference id: #07LONDON3923
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Reference id
aka Wikileaks id #125654  ? 




Subject
Iranian Academic Safavi Argues Time Is Ripe For West To Make An Offer

Origin
Embassy London (United Kingdom)

Cable time
Fri, 12 Oct 2007 16:44 UTC

Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Source
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07LONDON3923.html

History
First published on Tue, 15 Feb 2011 13:31 UTC (original)
Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)

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Hide header C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 003923 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], IR [Iran], UK [United Kingdom] SUBJECT: IRANIAN ACADEMIC SAFAVI ARGUES TIME IS RIPE FOR WEST TO MAKE AN OFFER REF: LONDON 03175 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Syed Salman Safavi, a cleric and academic who heads a small Iranian policy think tank in Qom, told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) that Islamic republic of Iran decision-makers lack the confidence to initiate an offer to the West to soften Iran's nuclear or regional posture, but are now, due to internal political conditions, hoping for a Western-initiated proposal on these issues. Safavi argued a Western offer could be crafted to satisfy both Iranian and western security needs and could, properly packaged, entail no public retreat on core issues for either side. Interestingly, Safavi, while reiterating the IRI's oft-heard insistence there will be no IRI suspension of enrichment, in the same breath said Iran can "walk away" from its military nuclear program if the Iranian public perceives that the regime has been unyielding and has won recognition of "its international rights" to peaceful nuclear development. ¶2. (C) Safavi seemlessly combined bravado and posturing with an apparently sincere desire for U.S.-Iranian dialogue, even partnership: he again emphasized Iran's regional asymmetric warfare capacities, dismissed Ahmedinejad's importance within the IRI, said the USG should address its concerns and outreach efforts to Khamenei vice Ahmedinejad, argued for a strategic partnership with the West, and said Iran can &resist sanctions indefinitely.8 Referencing an earlier, August conversation on Iraq security, Safavi appeared to dismiss Poloff's description of IRI-supported attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan as an issue of great concern to the USG; Safavi made no new predictions on the levels of future Iraq attacks but again intimated IRI central control over its security services is frequently weak. Safavi said his brother, former IRGC commander Rahim Safavi, is now in Supreme Leader Khamenei's office. End summary. Iranians Prefer Personal Communications ------------------------ ¶3. (C) Safavi, with whom Poloff has engaged before (reftel), spoke one-on-one with Poloff on October 1 on the margins of a small private dinner attended by spouses, including Mrs. Safavi, at the Next Century Foundation, the London NGO described in reftel. No other Iranians or other foreign officials were present. The dinner was requested, via NCF, only a few days in advance, at the request of Safavi, who had just arrived from Tehran. Affable and beturbaned, with a neatly trimmed beard, Safavi told the assembled dinner guests that he was visiting the UK to oversee living arangements for his three children now studying in UK universities or graduate schools. Similar to how he ended his August encounter with Poloff, Safavi made no specific suggestion for follow-up meetings. He did, however, ask that Poloff send any e-mails from Poloff's private e-mail account to Safavi's private e-mail address, vice Safavi's IRI-provided e-mail address (Comment: Safavi's furtiveness may reflect personal security concerns, or the characteristically Iranian preference for personalized communication and distrust of official settings, including their own, or both. End comment). Safavi's Think Tank: Small -------------------------- ¶4. (C) Safavi told Poloff the period since his mid-August discussion with Poloff (reftel) had been hectic at the small Qom think tank (the Islamic Institute of Strategic Studies) he directs. Without providing details, Safavi said there has been a tremendous debate among experts and advisors in Qom and Tehran on the wisest geopolitical course for Iran to pursue with the United States and other Western governments. Safavi referred to his think tank with deliberate irony by LONDON 00003923 002 OF 005 its acronym "IISS," being familiar with the UK's pre-eminent International Institute of Strategic Studies. He repeated that his institution is "small and independent," was established in early 2007, and is intended to provide advice and policy support to the Supreme Leader's Office and to senior members of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) (Comment: another London contact well acquainted with Safavi believes his IISS "think tank" amounts to only Safavi and several clerks, and that Safavi is looking for alternate employment in the IRI in the wake of his brother's removal as IRGC commander. End comment). Ex-IRGC Head Rahim Safavi: Enjoying New Work -------------------------- ¶5. (C) Asked about the current activities of his brother Rahim, who since Syed Salman's last talk with Poloff had been replaced as IRGC commander by General Jafari, Syed Salman told Poloff, somewhat evasively, that Rahim Safavi is now in Tehran and "working in a position in the Office of the Supreme Leader." Salman said that new IRGC commander Jafari is well known as a superior field commander, and that the personnel move had been part of Iran's "preparation for defense." Safavi Claims IRI Leaders "Confident," but Deadlocked --------------------------- ¶6. (C) Without prompting by Poloff, Safavi spoke at length on what he called Iran's "confident and strong" regional posture, from Lebanon to Afghanistan, and on the degree of "domestic control (i.e., crackdowns on civil and human rights) which we have established" in Iran itself. He also said the approach of March 2008 "majlis" elections was the kind of "new circumstance" that would alter the balance of political forces within Iran in unpredictable ways. He repeated his claim that IRI receptivity to a Western negotiation offer is higher now than it is likely to be for "a long time in the future." Safavi veered back and forth between the themes of regional strength and domestic control, closely linking the two and repeatedly saying IRI leaders "feel very strong now." At the same time, and declining to discuss names or factions, Safavi said repeatedly there is, in his view, a "perfect balance" among major political groupings, but at the same time near-universal uncertainty on what Iran's next steps with the West on regional and nuclear issues should be. He explained this "balance" makes all groups "afraid" of proposing any new idea or initiative, and that the charge of being an appeaser of the West sticks to anyone appearing to back compromise on Iran's nuclear program or its claim to regional preeminence. Safavi added there is "no possibility" the Supreme Leader will intervene on his own initiative to provide a new foreign policy direction; Khamenei, according to Safavi, prefers to react to events and to suggestions rather than to put forward new ideas. In response to Poloff questions, Safavi agreed "deadlock" would be a more accurate English term to describe rival groups' posture on foreign policy. IRGC and Khamenei Matter, Not Ahmedinejad ------------------------- ¶7. (C) Safavi, an IRGC fighter and loyalist from the early days of the IRI, repeatedly emphasized how broad is the control that "we" (the IRGC) have achieved, and went out of his way to minimize Ahmedinejad's importance within the IRI power structure: "in his office there is Ahmedinejad, Jannati, Mesbah Yazdi -- perhaps 10 persons, all with no base of their own -- they are nobody." Safavi spoke animatedly on what he said were the linked twin themes of respect for Iran and need for the West to focus on the Supreme Leader, whom he said is both the center of gravity within the IRI and also is President Bush's natural counterpart, rather than Ahmedinejad. Safavi said the title "president" appears to LONDON 00003923 003 OF 005 confuse Western goverments, who, according to Safavi, erroneously analogize Iran's government to their own. In the same vein, he argued Ahmedinejad's "useless" rhetoric, on Israel and nuclear power, is "meaningless" within Iran, due to what Safavi called Ahmedinejad's politically unimportant role within the IRI. Safavi did not try to argue the holocaust denial issue arises from mistranslations from Farsi. IRI's Overriding Priority: Public Respect -------------------------- ¶8. (C) Arguing President Bush was right not to reply to Ahmedinejad's letter in December 2006, Safavi said that, were President Bush to write to Khamenei using phrases similar to past Presidential speeches expressing respect for Iran, Khamenei and the IRI security apparatus would take such a White House missive as, in effect, a security guarantee. They would then, Safavi argued, see themselves as having achieved their main political goals -- regime survival and regional prestige -- at which, he said, the Iranian nuclear program is aimed. Pressed by Poloff on how such a far-flung scenario could translate into actual progress on America's very concrete priorities of suspension and regional behavior, Safavi argued engagement would come down to manageable issues of face-saving, in which the West would need to assist, for the IRI on enrichment, centered on an international "recognition of Iran's nuclear rights." In reponse to Poloff's questions, Safavi said such recognition would not, in substance, have to go beyond rights "already laid out" in internationally agreed documents; he said suspension could, under the domestic political cover which international recognition would provide, be embraced by the IRI "as a (political) victory." When Poloff commented that most elements of recognition of non-military nuclear rights, coupled to verifiable transparency, have been in these public documents, and on offer by the P5 1 for almost two years, Safavi agreed enthusiastically, and wryly noted "no one (inside Iran) knows what is really in these documents -- it is rhetoric which is politically important." Make Us An Offer So We Can Respond ----------------- ¶9. (C) Safavi went on to urge that the current confluence of regional and domestic conditions make Iranian leaders confident enough to consider an innovative, comprehensive offer by the United States and its allies on nuclear and regional issues (Comment: Safavi never appeared willing to discuss one issue in isolation from the other. End comment). Poloff reviewed for Safavi the P5 1 offer to negotiate which has been on the table since June 2006, and explained that this approach is reiterated in the result of the P5 1 meetings in New York; when Poloff offered Safavi a hard copy of the September 28 P5 1 Political Directors' Public Statement, Safavi, in lightning fashion, swept it out of Poloff's hand and under his clerical robes. Poloff told Safavi that, if Iran does not suspend enrichment and satisfy Solana and Larijani by November as to progress on the nuclear issue, it can expect additional UN sanctions to be voted on soon thereafter. Creative Ways for IRI to Declare Victory ------------------------ ¶10. (C) Poloff reminded Safavi that the West has been prepared to support peaceful nuclear development in Iran for some time, with the missing element being transparency on Iran's part, but that the common perception inside Iran, based on IRI disinformation, seems to be that the West wants to deny any nuclear development at all. Safavi took issue with none of this, simply reiterating, in a somewhat mechanical fashion, that Iran "will never suspend." In literally the next breath, however, Safavi said U.S. nuclear LONDON 00003923 004 OF 005 concerns could be addressed. If a Western public statement of Iran's present nuclear rights, as the West now understands them to be, were presented in a way that appeared to the Iranian public to involve new flexibility by the West and as well as indicate a successful outcome for the IRI of their nuclear efforts, U.S. concerns on a weapon "can be met." Asked if this meant Iran "could walk away from" its military program, including enrichment, with full verification of transparency, Safavi said "yes, walk away." At the same time Safavi noted "we could not say we agree to suspension," but could say work could be halted, and transparency addressed, without a bomb as the final result. Safavi offered no further specifics, and PolOff suggested none, instead referring Safavi back to the Political Directors' statement as a basis for any engagement. Sanctions: "We Can Resist Indefinitely." ------------------------- ¶11. (C) Safavi discounted the effect international sanctions are having on Iran's economy or politics, pointing to Iranian merchants' traditional ability to improvise, the ample supply of consumer goods in Iran even with sanctions, Iranians' familiarity with deprivation, and, above all, high oil prices and revenues. He referred to gasoline rationing as a long-planned IRI measure to prepare for the eventuality of oil sanctions. Iraq Security, Afghanistan Arms ------------------------------- ¶12. (C) When Safavi referred to his August 15 exchange with Poloff on Iraq security, Poloff noted that: neither the American public nor government, can tolerate actions which shed the blood of American soldiers; the USG still must have "proof on the ground" of improved Iranian behavior in Iraq; and it is now clearer than ever the IRGC is sending arms to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Safavi gave no direct reply, and did not say whether he sees levels of violence in Iraq as having gone up or down since August. ¶13. (C) Instead, Safavi related a personal anecdote; he claimed that, as one of the early founders and leaders of the IRGC, he had led the first contingent of Revolutionary Guards to go into South Lebanon, in 1982, supposedly in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Safavi said that as his unit was preparing to leave Iran for Lebanon there were high-level objections from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs to the IRGC operation and mission. Safavi said he went to the ministries himself and told objecting officials "you have nothing to say about it, we are going," and then left for Lebanon. Safavi commented to Poloff that the same dynamic between many Quds Force leaders and IRI policy makers still applies today. Poloff asked whether Safavi meant by this that Quds Force operational level personnel are independent enough to be able to ship weapons to Afghanistan without authorization, or even in defiance of higher echelon orders to the contrary; Safavi confirmed this was his point. Poloff replied that all governments are held responsible for the actions of their armed defenders; Iranian decision-makers must understand killing U.S. soldiers is something Americans cannot tolerate, and that American authorities will always act to protect American soldiers. Safavi appeared to brush the point aside. Comment: A Confusing, Very Unwestern Approach ----------------------- ¶14. (C) Safavi was, as in his August meeting with Poloff, affable in front of other dinner guests but in private tightly focused on the matter at hand. He was, as before, impassioned but soft-spoken and deliberate. His anecdote, of having led IRGC troops to Lebanon in defiance of IRI authorities, came in response to Poloff comments and appeared spontaneous and unrehearsed; Poloff deliberately did not ask LONDON 00003923 005 OF 005 Safavi what role or prior knowledge he may have had in the 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Safavi, like many other Iranians, both those "westernized" as well as those more "revolutionary" in orientation, has some characteristics which appeal to many U.S. interlocutors, including personal warmth, strong focus on family, and a professed respect for compassion, piety, and honesty. In the political sphere, however, some Iranian sensitivities produce results more difficult for an American mentality to fathom. One example recurs regularly in PolOff's experience with respect to regional security: Iranians of various political stripes, Safavi included, appear impervious to U.S. concern for the safety of individual American soldiers; they exhibit little or no affect or understanding when attacks on U.S. troops are described as a potential "casus belli," their indifference appearing to arise not from defiance but, rather, from incomprehension. Regime Survival Is the Goal --------------------------- ¶15. (C) In speaking of IRI leadership and paralysis, Safavi appeared to be describing not strength and confidence among IRI leaders, but weakness: a generalized sense of political vulnerability and uncertainty, which has as its public face rejectionist rhetoric, a defiant posture on enrichment, and a siege mentality on domestic threats. The core objective of IRI decision makers, as Safavi describes them, is the symbolic attainment of status, respect, and legitimacy co-equal with the United States, an elusive and ill-defined goal. Safavi in effect describes an Iranian bomb, or some symbolically equivalent capability, as a means of achieving the real IRI goal, of legitimacy and survival, for which "respect" is the shorthand. Not A "Capo" but Still "Connected]" -------------------

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