CANADA
AHMADINEJAD’S IRAN: A THREAT TO PEACE,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Development
Dean Allison, MP
Chair
Subcommittee on International Human Rights
Scott Reid, MP
Chair
DECEMBER 2010
40th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION
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AHMADINEJAD’S IRAN: A THREAT TO PEACE,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Development
Dean Allison, MP
Chair
Subcommittee on International Human Rights
Scott Reid, MP
Chair
DECEMBER 2010
40th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

iii
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIR
Dean Allison
VICE-CHAIRS
Bernard Patry
Jean Dorion
MEMBERS
Hon. Jim Abbott Johanne Deschamps
Paul Dewar Peter Goldring
James Lunney Deepak Obhrai
Glen Douglas Pearson Hon. Bob Rae
Dave Van Kesteren
CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE
Carmen DePape
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT
Parliamentary Information and Research Service
James Lee, Analyst
Allison Goody, Analyst

v
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
CHAIR
Scott Reid
VICE-CHAIRS
Mario Silva
Johanne Deschamps
MEMBERS
Hon. Irwin Cotler Russ Hiebert
Wayne Marston David Sweet
OTHER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT WHO PARTICIPATED
Jean Dorion
OTHER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE
40TH PARLIAMENT, 2ND SESSION
Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac
CLERKS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
Julie Pelletier
Julie Lalande Prud'homme
Jacques Maziade
Roger Préfontaine
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT
Parliamentary Information and Research Service
Melissa Radford, Analyst
Allison Goody, Analyst
Christine Kostiuk, Analyst
Robert Dufresne, Analyst

vii
THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
has the honour to present its
THIRD REPORT
Pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee has studied
human rights in Iran and has agreed to report the following:

ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 1
AHMADINEJAD’S IRAN: A THREAT TO PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ................................................................................................... 9
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 9
I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE ....................................... 12
1. The treatment of religious minorities ............................................................... 14
i. Bahá’ís ..................................................................................................... 14
ii. People of the Book: Christians and Jews................................................ 16
iii. Other religious minorities ....................................................................... 17
iv. Within the Shia Majority ......................................................................... 19
2. The treatment of ethnic minorities .................................................................. 19
3. The treatment of activists, students, journalists and dissidents ...................... 21
4. The treatment of women ................................................................................. 24
5. Persecution based on sexual orientation ........................................................ 25
6. The death penalty for juveniles ....................................................................... 26
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: THE SUBCOMMITTEE’S OBSERVATIONS ............ 27
1. Iran’s human rights obligations toward its population ..................................... 27
i. Iran’s Treaty Obligations .......................................................................... 27
ii. Iran’s Obligation to Respect, Protect and Promote
Human Rights ......................................................................................... 28
a) Failure of the obligation to respect human rights .............................. 29
b) Failure of the obligation to protect human rights—a record
of impunity ...................................................................................... 29
c) Failure of the obligation to promote human rights ............................. 30
iii. The Iranian Government’s Responsibility ............................................... 30
2. Canada’s Role in Engaging Iran on its Human Rights Violations ................... 32
i. Continue to Support Iranians in their Pursuit of an Open and
Just Iran .................................................................................................. 34
ii. Target The Individuals Responsible For Human Rights Abuses ............. 36
iii. Use a Multilateral Approach ................................................................... 39
iv. End State Immunity for Individuals Responsible for Crimes Against
Humanity ................................................................................................ 40
x
III. IRAN AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: SUMMARY OF
EVIDENCE ...................................................................................................... 44
1. Iran’s Sponsorship of Terrorist Groups ........................................................... 44
2. Incitement to Genocide ................................................................................... 48
i. The Eight Stages of Genocide ................................................................ 50
ii. Canadian Policy and The Genocide Convention .................................... 51
3. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions ................................................................................. 53
i. The Rationale Behind Iran’s Nuclear Program ....................................... 54
ii. Timeline .................................................................................................. 55
4. The Possible Consequences of a Nuclear Iran: The Connection
between Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities and International Human Rights ....... 56
i. The potential for Iran to act on its genocidal rhetoric .............................. 56
ii. A potentially destabilising force regionally and internationally ................ 57
IV. IRAN AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: THE
SUBCOMMITTEE’S OBSERVATIONS ............................................................ 58
1. Iran’s International Peace and Security Obligations ....................................... 58
i. Iran’s Treaty Obligations .......................................................................... 58
ii. Iran’s Non-Treaty Obligations ................................................................. 60
2. Implications for Canada .................................................................................. 61
i. The Responsibility to Protect and Prevent .............................................. 61
ii. Addressing Iran’s Nuclear Program ....................................................... 61
iii. Linking Iran’s Nuclear Program with its Genocidal Intentions ................ 65
iv. Canada’s Bilateral and Multilateral Options ........................................... 66
V. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN POST-ELECTION IRAN:
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE ............................................................................. 69
1. The current political and human rights situation in Iran .................................. 69
2. The response from the international community and Canada ........................ 74
VI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN POST-ELECTION IRAN:
THE SUBCOMMITTEE’S OBSERVATIONS ................................................... 76
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................. 79
APPENDIX A: LIST OF WITNESSES ........................................................................... 85
APPENDIX B: LIST OF BRIEFS ................................................................................... 89
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS ..................................................................................... 91
REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ............................................................. 93
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the summer of 2009, Canadians and the rest of the international community
looked on with concern as Iranian security forces cracked down on protestors in the wake
of that country’s June 12 presidential election. In many respects, this development was
another high profile example of the Iranian authorities’ poor record with respect to human
rights. The events surrounding the contested election also offered a rare glimpse of the
internal tensions present in the country.
The dramatic protests in Iran last summer, the response of the Iranian authorities,
and the reaction of the international community served to sharpen the focus of a study by
the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (hereinafter the
Subcommittee). The Subcommittee had begun to examine Iran’s record with respect to
international human rights in the 39th Parliament, when it held hearings and prepared a
report on the Bahá'í community in Iran. The report was subsequently adopted by the
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (hereinafter the
Committee) and tabled in the House of Commons on March 5, 2009.
Concerned about what seemed to be the deteriorating human rights situation in
Iran, the Subcommittee decided to undertake a broader study into the mistreatment of the

Iranian population by the governing regime, and also into the Iranian government’s role
regionally and internationally with respect to human rights and violations of international
law. With regard to its international role, the Subcommittee is particularly concerned about
the Iranian leadership’s aggressive rhetoric and its role in supporting terrorist
organizations, both of which are targeted against the state and people of Israel. Even more
alarming is the mistrust the Iranian government has created around its nuclear program
and the potentially lethal consequences if a military application of this nuclear program
were to become a reality.
Between March 10 and October 29, 2009, the Subcommittee held sixteen hearings
on these subjects. It heard from expert witnesses, human rights activists representing nongovernmental
organizations, academics, and lawyers. In light of this testimony, the
Subcommittee makes the following assessments:
• The Iranian regime has a long history of systemic and widespread human
rights violations against its own people. These abuses violate its
population’s right to life, freedom from discrimination based on religion,
sex, ethnicity, language, sexual orientation and political opinions. Often
times, these abuses violate Iran’s own domestic laws.
• Recording and reporting these violations has been problematic as
domestic human rights organizations are often shut down by government
officials, and journalists and activists are regularly harassed. Those who
attempt to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its actions are often
subject to arbitrary arrest under the guise of national security — some,
2
including juveniles, are tortured and killed. As well, international human
rights organizations have not been allowed to enter Iranian territory for
several years.
• Iranians who are arrested are not afforded due process under law.
The judicial system in Iran remains very weak in practice, with executive
authorities regularly interfering in the judicial process.
• The June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran and the regime’s violent
crackdown on those protesting the official results are further proof of the
regime’s heavy handed approach to quelling dissent among its population.
In fact, protestors were angry that even the modicum of democracy that is
afforded to them in their Constitution was not respected by the hardline
elements of the regime in their attempt to hold onto power.
• The Subcommittee recognises the emergence of a grassroots, civil
movement born out of the Iranian population’s disillusionment with its
government following the June 2009 election. The Subcommittee also has
faith in the youth of Iran, who are increasingly educated and technologysavvy.
They are the future of Iran and are willing to continue to fight for
their rights and for democracy.
• The Iranian regime supports terrorist organizations such as Hamas and
Hezbollah, who are responsible for mass atrocities against Jewish people
all over the world.
• The Iranian leadership’s inflammatory rhetoric constitutes incitement to
genocide, in violation of the prohibition against incitement in Article 3 of
the Genocide Convention.
• The Subcommittee believes that the Iranian regime is already acting on its
genocidal rhetoric against the state and people of Israel by arming and
financing terrorist organizations and is therefore particularly concerned
about the possibility of the regime acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
• The Subcommittee also believes that the nuclear issue is continually
distracting the international community from the Iranian regime’s assault
on the rights of its own people. Therefore, the regime must be discussed
in the context of three converging dynamics: the rights-violating, the
genocidal and the nuclear. All dialogue with the Iranian regime must
include human rights at the forefront.
In conclusion, the Subcommittee firmly believes that the Iranian regime’s policies
and activities within its territory and those it projects internationally constitute gross
violations of its obligations under international law. Canada has a number of bilateral and
multilateral tools at its disposal to express its condemnation of the Iranian regime’s policies
3
and actions, and must take action by implementing the Subcommittee’s following
recommendations.
Human Rights in Iran: List of Recommendations
Recommendation 1
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to provide moral support and should increase, if possible, its
financial support for Canadian and Iranian civil society organizations
and other human rights groups that document and report on human
rights abuses committed by the Iranian regime.
Recommendation 2
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
provide moral and diplomatic support to the democratic movement in
Iran.
Recommendation 3
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
demand, at every appropriate opportunity, that the Iranian government
grant access to international human rights organizations within its
borders and allow domestic human rights organizations to operate
without restriction or harassment.
Recommendation 4
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
consider funding a research chair at a Canadian university dedicated
to the study of Canadian-Iranian relations, including the human rights
situation in Iran.
Recommendation 5
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
encourage Radio Canada International to consider programming in
Farsi over its worldwide shortwave service, over conventional AM/FM
broadcasting in the Gulf region, and over the Internet.
Recommendation 6
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada take
appropriate action to ensure that Iranian foreign offices, bureaus or
media outlets in Canada are not used by the Iranian regime as a source
of threat and intimidation of the Iranian Diaspora in Canada.
4
Recommendation 7
The Subcommittee recommends that, in communicating its
condemnation of the human rights violations of the Iranian regime
against its own people, the Government of Canada:
• Use all available tools, already authorized under Canada’s
existing immigration and visa legislation, to ensure that highranking
members of the regime are not able to access direct or
indirect support from within Canadian territory.
• Reduce high-level interaction with Iranian Government
officials and make any invitations extended to Iranian officials
conditional upon effective actions taken by the Iranian
government to improve the human rights situation in Iran.
Recommendation 8
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, in
communicating its condemnation of the human rights violations
perpetrated by members of Iran’s state security agencies against the
Iranian people, use all available tools, authorized by existing
immigration and visa policies and legislation, to deny entry to Canada
to members of Iran’s security agencies, including members of Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia.
Recommendation 9
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
ensure sufficient resources are available to the Department of Justice,
the Canada Border Services Agency, the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to
ensure that they are able to make accurate decisions related to
recommendations 7 and 8.
Recommendation 10
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
institute targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes,
against those individuals within the Iranian government and state
security forces who are known to have committed human rights
violations.
Recommendation 11
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to display public disapproval of the Iranian regime and its
leadership and continue to make active interventions during any
bilateral meetings with Iranian government officials as well as at the
United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations General
5
Assembly and other international organisations regarding Iran’s poor
human rights record.
Recommendation 12
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada work
multilaterally with other member states of the United Nations Human
Rights Council to re-establish a position for a country-specific
rapporteur on human rights in Iran.
Recommendation 13
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
completely remove immunity for foreign government officials in cases
of gross violations of international human rights law, including torture,
from the State Immunity Act allowing Canadians who are victims of
such human rights violations judicial remedy within Canada’s
domestic legal system.
Iran and International Peace and Security: List of Recommendations
Recommendation 14
The Subcommittee recommends that, as a member of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Government of Canada should use
every opportunity to encourage the IAEA to continue its efforts to
inspect Iranian nuclear production facilities.
Recommendation 15
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to work with the United Nations and members of the
international community to add sanctions to those already imposed
against Iran. In particular, the Subcommittee recommends that the
Government of Canada move in concert with its international partners
to implement the necessary regulations under the Special Economic
Measures Act (SEMA) and/or Export and Import Permits Act to impose:
• A ban on all goods exported from Canada to Iran, excepting
humanitarian goods such as food and medicine, and a ban on
all goods imported from Iran to Canada;
• A ban on businesses or their subsidiaries operating in Canada
from exporting gasoline and other refined petroleum products
to Iran or facilitating such export (i.e. the shipping and
insurance industries);
• A ban on new investment in Iran or the introduction of
incentives to prevent such investments, particularly with
regards to Iran’s energy infrastructure, by Canadian persons
6
and companies (as well as foreign companies or their
subsidiaries operating in Canada) and including related
industries such as shipping, insurance and construction
companies;
• A prohibition on the provision of financial services to and from
Iran, particularly regarding any transactions with the Iranian
Central Bank, by businesses or their subsidiaries operating in
Canada;
• A prohibition on the export of any technologies to Iran,
particularly those that enable the Iranian regime to violate the
human rights of its own people (including but not limited to
surveillance equipment);
• A prohibition on Canadian-registered ships from docking in
Iran and on Iranian-registered ships from docking in Canada
and passing through Canadian waters

Recommendation 16
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada call
upon United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to refer the
matter of Iran’s genocidal incitement to the Security Council pursuant
to Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis that Iran
poses a threat to international peace and security.
Recommendation 17
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
include Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a listed entity for
its role in supporting international terrorist organizations in
accordance with Canadian law.
Recommendation 18
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada assist
with the enforcement of standing international arrest warrants that
have been filed against Iranian government officials.
Recommendation 19
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
initiate an inter-state complaint against the Government of Iran before
the International Court of Justice, under Article 9 of the Genocide
Convention, calling Iran to account for its violations of the Convention,
including its failure to punish the incitement to genocide perpetrated
by its officials.
7
Recommendation 20
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, in
accordance with Canada’s responsibilities under Article 1 of the
Genocide Convention and the prohibition against incitement to
genocide in Article 3 of the Convention, invite the United Nations
Security Council to consider referring to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court the case of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and those Iranian leaders participating with him in direct
and public incitement to genocide, for investigation and prospective
prosecution.
Recommendation 21
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
petition the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with
Canada’s responsibilities under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention
and the prohibition against incitement to genocide in Article 3 of the
Convention, to take appropriate action and to hold Iran to account.
The Human Rights Situation in Post-Election Iran: List of Recommendations
Recommendation 22
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
encourage the governments of the P5 plus 1 (the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) to include a
discussion of human rights issues in their negotiations with the Iranian
government regarding that country’s nuclear programs.
Recommendation 23
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to fund the work of the Iran Human Rights Documentation
Centre and encourage the Centre to open an office in Canada.
Recommendation 24
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
ensure that when federal grants and other assistance are made to
educational and other institutions that this assistance be contingent
on these institutions not accepting money from Iranian sources.

9
AHMADINEJAD’S IRAN: A THREAT TO PEACE,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2009, Canadians and the rest of the international community
looked on with concern and a sense of déjà vu as Iranian security forces cracked down on
protestors in the wake of that country‘s June 12 presidential election. In many respects,
this development was another high profile example of the Iranian authorities‘ poor record
with respect to human rights. The events surrounding the contested election also offered a
rare glimpse of the internal tensions present inside the country. In September, veteran
Canadian diplomat Jeremy Kinsman commented on these tensions, remarking that: ―The
Iranian drama this summer has been simultaneously inspiring, depressing, illuminating
and humbling. Iran is front and centre.‖1 While Subcommittee Members and all Canadians
hope that these events will eventually lead to positive changes for Iranian society over the
long-term, at present there continue to be serious abuses within the country and the
Iranian regime continues to pursue policies which are dangerous and, in some cases
destabilising and illegal. Illegal policies include the regime‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons
and its state-sanctioned incitement to genocide. All of these issues will be addressed in
the body of this report.
The dramatic protests in Iran this summer, the response of the Iranian authorities,
and the reaction of the international community have all served to sharpen the focus of a
study that had been underway by the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Development. This Subcommittee had begun to examine Iran‘s record with respect to
international human rights beginning in 2008 continuing from the meeting of the
Subcommittee on March 27, 2007 in the 1st Session of the 39th Parliament. In 2008, the
Subcommittee held two hearings on the specific topic of the treatment of the Bahá'í
minority in Iran. A report on the Bahá'í community in Iran, prepared and moved by
Subcommittee Member Mr. Mario Silva, was unanimously approved in the Subcommittee
and was subsequently adopted by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Development, also unanimously, and tabled in the House of Commons on
March 5, 2009. Together, Mr. Silva and the Honourable Irwin Cotler, another Member of
this Subcommittee, moved that the report be concurred in the House of Commons on
March 30, 2009.
Then, concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran, the
Subcommittee decided to undertake a broader study on not only the domestic human
rights abuses within Iran, but also the regional and international implications of that
1 Jeremy Kinsman, ―Mulling the Mullahs: Prelude to the Next Iranian Revolution?‖, Policy Options, September
2009, p. 40.
10
country‘s pursuit of nuclear weapons and a delivery mechanism, and the regime‘s
incitement to genocide.2 Between March 10 and October 29 2009, the Subcommittee held
sixteen hearings on these subjects. It heard from select expert witnesses, including
individuals testifying on their own behalf, human rights activists representing nongovernmental
organizations, academics, and lawyers.
Although the majority of the testimony that was gathered dealt with activities that
took place before the June presidential election, the Subcommittee strongly believes that
all of its findings will be relevant in the coming months as the Canadian government and
the international community work to shape their policies towards Iran. The signs of a
regime that systematically and pervasively violates the human rights of its citizens, which
were highlighted by witnesses in Subcommittee meetings before the June 12 presidential
election, remain valid observations today. However, the troubling undertone of the
evidence received by the Subcommittee in its testimony gathered in the post-election
context indicates that these trends of human rights abuses have been worsened by the
circumstances surrounding the election, as the governing regime cracks down on the
domestic dissent that has arisen against its policies. Dr. Abbas Milani, Director of Iranian
Studies at Stanford University, reinforced this view in describing a regime that ―is in
constant breach of human rights against the people of Iran.‖ He suggested that since the
June election ―these breaches have increased. The regime feels more isolated, the regime
feels weaker, as is always the case when these kinds of regimes are frightened, they show
their more brutal side.‖3 Consequently, the Subcommittee concludes that there is
convincing evidence of a further escalation of human rights abuses because of the
tenuous legitimacy of President Ahmadinejad‘s mandate in the wake of the presidential
election. We have serious concerns about the circumstances surrounding the election
process. President Ahmadinejad and the regime face a delicate political landscape
including questions of domestic and international legitimacy and must govern a country rife
with internal tensions.
While it is still perhaps too early to make any conclusions regarding how the events
of last summer will affect Iran‘s international relations, they may present an opening for a
renewed diplomatic activity and leadership on behalf of the Canadian government and the
wider international community with Iran over key areas of concern. Many witnesses who
appeared before the Subcommittee expressed hope for change in Iran, especially through
the vibrancy of the country‘s youth.
However, diplomatic initiatives are extremely unlikely to succeed without
comprehensive, calibrated and consequential sanctions as recommended by the
Subcommittee in this report, given Iran‘s hostile response to the good-faith engagement of
the international community on the nuclear front and the extent of Iran‘s massive domestic
human rights violations unmasked by the June 12, 2009 election. On the eve of Iran‘s
2 Evidence, Meeting No. 2, February 24, 2009 and Minutes of Proceedings, Meeting No.11, April 2, 2009.
3 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
11
presidential election, Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari, an Iranian-Canadian who is Head of the
Politics and Economics Department at the Royal Military College of Canada, appeared
before the Subcommittee and explained to Members that:
The issue of respect for human rights has always been a source of tension between the
Iranian state and Iranian society... That is nothing new in Iran; it was going on before the
revolution. It has been going on for hundreds of years.
4
It was pointed out to the Subcommittee that following the election of
President Khatami in 1997, some observers were arguing that Iran appeared to be
entering a more reformist or moderate stage. However, following the 2005 presidential
election, the situation deteriorated again, and it appeared that hardliners within the regime
acted to sideline the more moderate elements. Indeed, one of the troubling arguments put
forward by many of the witnesses was that while Iran‘s human rights record has been
problematic over the decades, abuses have actually grown more severe since President
Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005.
Indeed, witnesses informed Members of the Subcommittee that in the lead up to
the June 2009 election there had been a rise in the arrests of journalists, political activists,
students and academics—all in the name of ―national security‖5. Unfortunately for the
people of Iran, many of the pre-election concerns expressed by witnesses turned out to be
prescient. In its October meetings, some four months after the electoral results were
announced, witnesses described the government‘s crackdown on protestors, and the
violence committed by regime agents against street demonstrators. Witnesses also
reminded Subcommittee Members of the number of those who were detained, and
according to allegations, in certain cases even raped, tortured, and murdered. In
commenting on these events, Professor Payam Akhavan, professor of international law at
McGill University, stated: ―I think it‘s important that we don‘t reduce the issue to
abstractions and statistics in order to understand the horrible brutality with which the
Iranian government has confronted what is essentially a peaceful, non-violent movement
to call for basic human rights and democracy.‖6
Throughout its hearings, other concerns about the policies of Iran‘s governing
regime were expressed when witnesses discussed the external dimensions of Iran‘s
human rights-related policies, notably its support for various terrorist organizations, its
belligerent stance towards Israel, and the intentions of its nuclear program.
The report is divided into six parts. The first part summarises the evidence
presented to the Subcommittee regarding systemic human rights abuses that have been
perpetrated against specific groups within Iranian society. The Subcommittee‘s
4 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
5 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
6 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
12
observations are described in part two, which explain Iran‘s obligations towards its citizens
under international law and the manner in which Canada should engage Iran on its human
rights record. The third part reviews evidence received by the Subcommittee on Iran‘s role
in exporting violence to other countries through the sponsorship of terrorism, inciting
genocide towards Israel and/or Jewish people, and pursuing a nuclear program with the
potential for military application. The Subcommittee‘s observations are described in part
four, which also explains Iran‘s obligations with regard to the preservation of international
peace and security, and the manner in which Canada should engage Iran on these
obligations. The fifth section summarizes the evidence received by the Subcommittee
regarding the human rights situation in Iran in the months following the presidential
election of June 12 2009. The report concludes with the Subcommittee‘s observations on
the post-election context.
Based on the testimony it received and on publicly-available information, the
Subcommittee agrees to report the following findings and recommendations to the House
of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
One of the challenging aspects of studying the human rights situation in Iran is that
accurate and comprehensive reporting is fairly difficult to obtain, for a number of reasons.
According to witnesses, activists in Iran are routinely harassed and intimidated. The risks
of arrest, expulsion and even death are high. Human rights organizations and independent
newspapers within the country are often shut down. International human rights
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have not been able to enter Iran for a
number of years to conduct research. There are also many instances where information
on arrests and executions has not been released publicly by the government.
The international community must therefore often rely on activists and journalists in
Iran who, under dangerous circumstances, record the abuses and follow-up on the cases,
while calling on the Iranian government to be more open, transparent and just. Through
their perseverance, this crucial information is disseminated to their colleagues all over the
world, international media outlets, and into the living rooms of ordinary Canadians.
Mrs. Renee Redman, the Executive Director of the Iran Human Rights Documentation
Center, pointed to these difficulties affecting the work of organizations like hers that are
trying to establish a comprehensive and evidence-based account of the government‘s
actions in the post-June 12 election period. She said, ―Foreign journalists are essentially
barred from operating within Iran. Domestic journalists are being arrested, and we have
received word that many are on their way out of the country. Some have already managed
to leave the country. This is not a good sign.‖7
In the meetings held before the June 12 presidential election, the Subcommittee
heard divergent views as to whether or not the human rights situation in Iran had improved
7 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
13
in the decades following the revolution in 1979 and the creation of the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
Dr. Hassan-Yari‘s historical and comparative perspective was somewhat optimistic.
He argued that,
If we take an overall look at Iranian society since 1979, we see that there has been some
progress, despite the repression and everything we hear about in the news and in stories.
That is a very encouraging picture of a society that is trying to return to the values of the
revolution: independence, freedom and its role as a source of legitimacy.
Obviously, in no way does that mean that there is no repression. There is. If we compare
the Iranian revolution of 1979 to 2009 to the most famous revolutions in history such as
the Soviet revolution of 1917 in Russia and the French Revolution, often called the
mother of all revolutions, to the situation in Nicaragua in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
and to the events in the Philippines when Marcos left power, we can see that during the
30 years of the Iranian revolution, Iran has made great strides that the French and
Russians did not achieve for more than 70 years.
We need only compare the situation today, including the state of human rights, with the
excesses that immediately followed the revolution. That means that there is a constant
struggle between civil society and those in power. In my view, those in power are backing
down. In other words, they are yielding to the advancements of civil society. And that is
why I am relatively optimistic about the evolution of Iranian society.
8
Moreover, according to the assessments presented by a number of witnesses,
there have been both upward and downward trends in relation to specific types of human
rights violations in Iran over the years. Dr. Milani argued that over the last thirty years in
Iran, ―there have been moments of respite and moments of true revolutionary terror.‖
As perhaps the darkest moment in the history of the Islamic Republic, he and other
witnesses singled out the 1988 execution of an estimated 4,000 prisoners ―who were
serving time for other crimes,‖ in order to cleanse the prisons of ―potential opponents‖.9
Overall, however, the predominant view expressed to the Subcommittee was that
the human rights situation in Iran has once again deteriorated in the past few years.
Evidence collected by the Subcommittee suggested that serious and systemic human
rights violations in Iran had reached a level that was both worrying and unacceptable.
Further, the testimony suggests that these violations are often committed with impunity if
not encouragement by the Government of Iran and/or its agents. Whatever micro-trends or
specific indices can be identified, the aggregate and long-term picture merits concern.
The government‘s actions in the wake of the demonstrations against the announced result
in the June 12 presidential election have only served to underscore these observations.
It also bears noting that the more positive assessments of the human rights situation in
Iran were provided in the meetings held before the June presidential election.
8 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
9 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
14
Members of the Subcommittee were told of the severity, range and systemic
dimension of human rights violations in Iran. This includes the mistreatment of religious
minorities, ethnic minorities, women, activists, students, journalists, labour union leaders
and dissidents; and, the mistreatment of persons based on their sexual orientation.
Violations have also included state execution of juveniles. The Subcommittee was also
made aware of the added difficulties facing those who belong to more than one of these
groups. Overall, Dr. Milani summarized human rights abuses in Iran as being carried out
according to two different methods, both of which deserve attention: ―One is the overt kind
of violence that this regime engages in, such as imprisoning people or executing a minor
for a crime that he committed when he was only 15 years old.‖ The second, according to
Dr. Milani, ―is the slow grind of the daily abuses and inequities that are forced on the
Iranian society, on the Iranian youth.‖10
1. The treatment of religious minorities
In Iran, clerical authorities, backed by Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
exercise much power and influence within the government. This structure has contributed
to conditions where religious minorities in Iran do not always enjoy full and equal respect
and protections. Although some are, in theory, recognized by the Iranian constitution as
legitimate religious minorities with legally protected rights, others, such as the Bahá'í, have
no protection at all. The Subcommittee has heard numerous testimonies detailing
problems with religious freedom in Iran and patterns of discrimination (exclusion from
access to higher education or to public sector employment), restrictions in the practice of
faith, language, and cultural expression, and even direct repression (arrests, attacks,
convictions, and executions).
i. Bahá’ís
Iran‘s Bahá'ís form a community of approximately 300,000 people.11 The Bahá'í are
subjected to particular persecution given that under the Iranian legal system they are
afforded no protections.12 Article 13 of Iran‘s constitution recognizes as legitimate certain
religious minorities and grants them rights.13 Consequently, members of certain religious
faiths are granted legal status and the enjoyment of related rights. While ―People of the
Book‖—i.e. Christians, Jews, and by special dispensation Zoroastrians—qualify as official
religious minorities, the Baha‘i do not. Professor Akhavan told the Subcommittee that:

according to the hardline elements within the Islamic republic, the Iranian Bahá'ís are
10 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22,, 2009.
11 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26 2009.
12 Ibid.
13 An unofficial translation of Article 13 reads: Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized
religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies,
and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education. See
http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-1.html.
15
unprotected infidels who are beyond the pale of legal protection.‖14 Officials from the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) also pointed to the
entrenched discrimination faced by the Bahá'í community in Iran. Mr. Jeffrey McLaren, the
Director of Gulf and Maghreb Relations, stated that, ―Their situation in Iran is probably as
bad as any identifiable group in Iran. Even Iranians who are of the reformist bent and who
believe their country needs to correct its policies have a blind spot towards the Bahá'í.‖15
Without official protection under the law, the Subcommittee was told that the Bahá'í
are actively and systematically victimized by Iranian authorities. Witnesses also described
how, in the 1980s, a significant number of Bahá'í leaders were executed. More recently,
however, other means of marginalizing the Bahá'í within Iran have been used.
These methods were described as follows:
The consequence in more recent times has been a more subtle form of repression that
aims to bring about a civil death for Bahá'ís. Bahá'ís are systematically eliminated from
economic activities: the right to education, the right to pensions, the right to employment
in the public sector. All of these forms of repression are a different means of achieving
the same end that the government had tried to achieve in the 1980s through systematic
execution. The documents that have been leaked from within the ranks of the Iranian
government indicate very clearly that the stated objective of the government is to
eradicate the Bahá'í religious minority.
16
The Subcommittee was told that the stigmatization of the Bahá'ís is actively
promoted by Iranian authorities. Mr. McLaren (DFAIT) told Subcommittee Members that,
―they are called apostates and they are viewed as threatening Islamic society. All of this,
as we all know, is just nonsense. They are very loyal citizens to whatever country they live
in.‖17 He also commented on their lack of access to university education in Iran.
Ms. Suzanne Tamas, of the Bahá'í Community of Canada, read the translated version of
two documents as evidence of such practices. First, a 2008 petition posted outside a
mosque in which Ayatollah Khamenei was preaching, and which worshippers were
encouraged to sign, read as follows:
Bahá'ísm is an organized sect, with its leadership residing under the protective shade of
the militantly aggressive occupier of Jerusalem, and has established its foundation by
spreading lies against Islam and Iran and by openly and fearlessly advancing the
political, cultural, and economic aims of global Zionism. This Zionist Bahá'í organization
not only has targeted Islam for its cowardly attacks, but is negligent of humanity and its
principal needs. We the undersigned, in carrying out our Islamic and human duty, request
the country's esteemed Attorney General to confront all elements of this organization and
dissolve its administration.
18
14 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
15 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
16 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
17 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
18 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
16
Second, Ms. Tamas presented to the Subcommittee a piece of correspondence
between Iran‘s Prosecutor General and the Minister of Intelligence which contained the
following excerpt:
The administration of the misguided Bahá'í sect at all levels is unlawful and banned, and
their ties to Israel and their opposition to Islam and the Islamic regime are clear. The
danger they pose to national security is documented and proven, and therefore it is
necessary that any substitute administration that acts as a replacement for the original be
confronted through the law.
19
Not only is there a clear attempt by Iranian authorities to demonize the Bahá'í,
witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee testified that such activities have
intensified.20 Discrimination against the Bahá'í community is compounded by the fact that
they are prevented from accessing media sources or forming their own media outlets.
Therefore Bahá'ís have no means of challenging the official state discourse.21
According to the same witness, Ms. Tamas, charges that have been issued by the
Iranian state against members of the Bahá'í faith have included: ―espionage on behalf of
Israel‖, ―insult to the sacredness of Islam‖, and ―propaganda against the regime‖, with
execution having been adopted as a possible form of punishment for such crimes.22
Professor Akhavan suggested that such stigmatization is being used by Iranian
authorities as one means of deflecting attention away from pressing social issues that are
causing Iran‘s society to question the legitimacy of the regime.23
ii. People of the Book: Christians and Jews
It was pointed out that people of the book enjoy a different legal standing from the
Bahá'í, as they are subject to a form of constitutional legitimacy according to Article 13 of
the Iranian Constitution. These groups therefore enjoy some degree of legal protection
and their daily religious activities are often tolerated by the governing regime. Moreover,
Christians and Zoroastrians do not appear to be targeted to the same extent as the
Bahá'ís with active persecution.
Mr. McLaren (DFAIT) told Subcommittee Members that Iran‘s Jewish population is
the largest such population in the Middle East region outside of Israel. He explained that
as an official religious minority, ―The community is allowed to function. It is allowed to carry
out its religious services. Its members are allowed to hold jobs in the community in ways
that the Bahá'ís, for instance, are not. That being said, they are a minority in a population
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
17
that does not always treat its minorities well.‖ He described past incidents in which ―the
Jewish community has faced a number of charges and arrests for allegedly spying for
Israel. Some of its members [had] been put in jail for that‖ in earlier parts of the decade.
Overall, Mr. McLaren provided the assessment that Jewish people in Iran are not afforded
the same treatment in practice by state agents and the broader Iranian society as are
members of the Muslim population. He acknowledged the additional pressures against the
rights of Jewish people in Iran, given their minority status in the country, noting that ―many
of the community leave.‖ Nevertheless, Mr. McLaren also pointed out that ―they are
allowed to operate their synagogues and to carry out their duties and religious activities.
It‘s not easy to be Jewish in Iran. There is a certain level of discrimination, or difficult times,
but they are not facing the same kinds of pressures the Bahá'í community is facing.‖24
Despite the fact members of the Jewish and Christian faith are not targeted for
mistreatment to the same degree as members of the Bahá'í faith, the Subcommittee was
told, that these groups do not enjoy comprehensive protections. Three issues were
brought to the attention of the Subcommittee. First, some Christians have been arrested,
apparently on grounds linked to their faith.25 Second, discriminatory treatment has been
noted as being commonplace. Professor Gregory Stanton, President of Genocide Watch,
stated:
It is true that there is a Jewish community in Iran. There's also a Christian community.
However, to characterize them as having equal rights, for instance, with the Shiite
community in Iran is inaccurate. The truth is that Jews and Christians both are
discriminated against in Iran in jobs, in the legal sphere, and in many other domains of
life. It is not true that they have equal rights.
26
Third, certain witnesses argued that Jews, not unlike the Bahá'í, are targets of an
active vilification and de-humanization campaign. This report, which will also deal with
incitement to genocide, highlights what some witnesses have described as insidious
rhetoric used by Iran‘s highest authorities in relation to Jewish people, Israel and/or
Zionists. Although the genocidal rhetoric appears mostly framed in a way that targets
Israeli Jews, Jews within Iran are still affected by this inflammatory discourse. Finally, as
hinted by Professor Stanton in his testimony, the fact that most Iranian Jews have left their
country is indicative of the manner in which they were treated.27
iii. Other religious minorities
Witnesses told the Subcommittee that other religious groups in Iran face barriers to
the practice of their faith.
24 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
25 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
26 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
27 Ibid.
18
The Subcommittee heard that Sunni clerics in Iran have been targeted for
harassment and arrest.28 According to Mr. Sharif Behruz, a member of the Democratic
Party of Iranian Kurdistan, ―... the establishment and creation of Shia Muslim mosques is
heavily promoted and encouraged in non-Shia areas, like the Kurdish areas. However, the
creation and building of Sunni Muslim mosques, especially in a city like Tehran, with a
population of a million Sunnis, is prohibited in Iran‖.29
A terrorist attack was launched in Iran‘s southeastern Sistan - Baluchistan Province
on the October 18, 2009, an attack which was condemned by the Canadian government.
The two bombings were reported to have left five commanders of Iran‘s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps dead as well as injuring dozens more individuals.
The insurgent group, Jundallah, claimed responsibility for the bombings. The Sistan-
Baluchistan province is compromised of a majority ethnic Sunni population—Baluchis—
who are a minority group in the wider country.
While all witnesses condemned this political violence, some pointed to the event as
symptomatic of the deep frustrations caused by the regime‘s ongoing mistreatment of
religious and ethnic minorities. Dr. Milani stated: ―Some of the more radical elements of
Shiism would not mind triggering or reopening old wounds in terms of Shiite-Sunni
tensions.‖ However, he also commented that this treatment was not exclusive to the
Baluchi minority, but is also evident in the governing regime‘s treatment of Iran‘s ethnic
Kurdish population, its Turks, Turkomans, and Arabic-speaking members of the Iranian
population, ―who are all minorities living in Iran‘s periphery, who have had their rights
ignored in one way or another. Their fair share of the government budget, their right to
celebrate their local culture, and their right to teach in their language have all been
ignored.‖ Dr. Milani remarked that ―this combination of being an ethnic ―other‖ and a
religious ―other‖, has made it so that these areas of the periphery are both ignored and
now under virtual military clampdown by Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
particularly the Baluchistan region.‖30
In commenting on these tensions over the treatment of ethnic and religious
minorities, Professor Akhavan drew a direct link between the failings in Iran‘s governance
structures and the treatment of these groups by the government, pointing as well to the
role of Iran‘s current governance practices in fomenting recent tensions between the
minority groups in Iran and the majority. He argued that Iran (and the Persian Empire
before it) had been a country that has tolerated a variety of religious faiths for hundreds
and thousands of years, noting that the Jewish community is 4,000 years old, and that a
democratic Iran would likely tolerate this mosaic of religious faiths and practices again.
He stated that ―it‘s the politicization of identity which creates these problems. A democratic
Iran would not politicize identity. The Kurdish people, who are Sunni, want a democratic
28 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
29 Evidence, Meeting No. 12, April 21, 2009.
30 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
19
Iran. The Baluch, who are in the border with Pakistan who are also Sunni, want a
democratic Iran. Once one creates that separation of state and religion and puts an end to
authoritarian rule and the use of hate-mongering as an instrument of power, many of these
issues will be resolved.‖31
Finally, Mr. Ahmed Batebi, Spokesperson for Human Rights Activists in Iran,
testified as to the mistreatment of Darveshes, better known as Sufis, in the following terms:
The other case is about the darvesh. I don't know whether you are familiar with this or
not. Darvesh refers to the Sufis. One hundred and three Sufis have been arrested, and
19 of them have been tried and have received an execution verdict.
32
iv. Within the Shia Majority
Even religious figures belonging to the dominant Shiite Muslim faith have faced
arrest and judicial proceedings when they have questioned official views and state
authority. Describing the problem, Professor Akhavan stated:
There are more ayatollahs in prison today in Iran than there ever were under the secular
government of the Shah. A special court was established in 1987 for the specific purpose
of prosecuting dissident clergy. Ayatollah Montazeri, referred to by Ms. Tamas, who had
issued a fatwa saying that the Bahá'ís had the rights of every other Iranian citizen, was
supposed to be the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini. He's been under house arrest for
the past 20 years.
33
2. The treatment of ethnic minorities
As previously mentioned, Iran contains a genuine mosaic of various ethnic groups.
Of a total population of approximately 70 million (Iran‘s 2006 census), Persians form the
largest ethnic group, representing half of the country‘s population. The Azeris, Baluchis,
and Kurds are among the largest ethnic groups considered to be minorities in Iran.
According to witnesses, the constitution of Iran protects certain rights of ethnic
minorities and/or its members. Article 15 of the constitution states that the official language
of Iran is Persian but provides that ―the use of regional and tribal languages in the press
and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition
to Persian‖. Moreover, Article 19 protects the rights of Iranians ―whatever the ethnic group
or tribe to which they belong‖ to enjoy equal rights.34
31 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
32 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
33 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
34 Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iraninfo/
government/constitution.html.
20
In practice, however, the level of enjoyment of such rights has been questioned by
witnesses in their appearances before the Subcommittee. Mr. Behruz summed up the
situation as follows: ―Despite the façade of constitutional guarantees of equality and Iran‘s
deceptive international legal commitments, discrimination and repression continue for
minority communities, who have been demanding greater respect for their cultural and
political rights.‖35
As previously discussed, the Subcommittee heard testimony on the difficulties
experienced by Azeris, Baluchis and Kurds living in Iran. According to Mr. Joe Stork,
Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa section of Human Rights Watch,
ethnic minorities face discrimination, restraints on cultural and political activities, and, in
some instances, persecution and prosecution on charges of threatening national
security.36
With respect to specific minority groups, Mrs. Fakteh Zamani, President of the
Association for Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran, told the Subcommittee
that Azeris face the following denial of their rights, despite being such a numerically
prominent group, about 24% of Iran‘s population37: they are denied education in their own
language and denied access to means of transmission of their community‘s cultural
traditions and history.38 Moreover, Mrs. Zamani described various instances of arrest,
detention, sentencing and at least one occurrence of torture of Azerbaijanis who, through
various peaceful activities, sought to defend and assert their linguistic rights.39
On the specific case of the Baluchis, Mrs. Zamani testified to the following:
What I have heard from Baluchis is that there is a special judge appointed by the
government to try these cases. Confessions have been obtained under severe torture,
and these people are tried in 10 to 15 minutes in their cells, without a prosecutor or a
defence lawyer present. Just because of the special Baluchi situation, a judge shows up
and asks a few questions of this tortured individual and sentences them to death. There
are hundreds of Baluchis on death row.
40
Further, echoing Dr. Milani‘s sentiment about the marginalization of minorities in
Iran‘s periphery who are treated as ethnic and religious ―others‖, Mrs. Zamani told
Subcommittee Members that many human rights violations against people who are ethnic
35 Evidence, Meeting No. 12, April 21, 2009.
36 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
37 CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.
38 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
21
minorities in Iran, especially those who do not live in central areas such as Tehran, go
unreported and therefore, unnoticed. Resources are low and access to media is limited.41
Regarding Iran‘s Kurdish population, which constitutes approximately 7% of the
population42 and lives mainly in the west and northwest part of the country, the
Subcommittee heard the following:
The eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s and the emergency rule in the Kurdish areas in
the last three decades has resulted in extrajudicial killings, forced evictions,
resettlements, and destruction of homes and cities. Parents are banned from registering
their babies with certain Kurdish names, while Persian and Islamic names are suggested
and forced upon parents. The use of the Kurdish language and other national languages
in the education system is prohibited.
read more...
The discriminatory gozinesh, or screening system, a selection procedure that requires
prospective state officials, employees, and students to demonstrate allegiance to Islam
and the Islamic Republic of Iran, denies Kurds equality in employment, education, and
political participation.
43
3. The treatment of activists, students, journalists and dissidents
While there are many centres of power in Iran, it seems all societal actors who may
pose a threat to the existing regime are treated with deep suspicion by Iranian authorities.
Civil society and its various voices are regarded as such threats. Consequently, institutions
and leaders of civil society are targets of various forms of governmental control, some of
which clearly constitute human rights violations, especially civil and political rights.
Students, journalists, dissidents, labour union leaders and other activists are denied
the right to freedom of association and freedom of expression. Again, ―national security‖ is
used as a justification for silencing dissent.44
Statistics and stories about specific instances of such human rights violations have
been provided to the Subcommittee. Regarding journalists and newspapers, Mr. Batebi
said:
First, let's talk about closing down the newspapers. In the last year, there were 29 cases.
There were 16 cases of the firing of reporters, 26 cases of reporters who have been tried,
73 cases of reporters who were called to court or summoned, 21 cases of journalists who
were tried and found guilty, and 17 cases of arrests of journalists and reporters.
45
41 Ibid.
42 CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.
43 Evidence, Meeting No. 12, April 21, 2009.
44 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
45 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
22
The Subcommittee considered the disturbing case of Mrs. Zahra Kazemi to
highlight how journalists can be mistreated in the hands of Iranian authorities. Her case
also underscored the direct relevance of Iran‘s human rights policies and practices to
Canada‘s foreign and consular policies. Mrs. Kazemi‘s son, Mr. Stephen Kazemi who
testified before the Subcommittee stated: ―My mother was a professional photojournalist.
Through her art, she wanted to inform, connect with and educate people. She gave a
voice to the people of those countries she focused on—she even gave them hope.‖46
Mrs. Kazemi was a dual citizen of Iran and Canada. For the simple act of pursuing her job
as a photojournalist, she was arrested by Iranian authorities and accused of being a spy
following her attempt to document a protest in front of an Iranian jail. Mrs. Kazemi died in
Iranian custody under suspicious circumstances. It was soon revealed that she had died
as a result of torture. To date, no member or agent of the Iranian government has been
charged for her murder.47
Regarding conditions facing students in Iran, the following figures were provided to
the Subcommittee:
In 2007 there were more than 600 summons either to courts or to the university
disciplinary committees for students who have used their right to freedom of expression,
have written, have protested, or have presented grievances. So far this year there have
been 155 arrests, 26 summons to courts, and 17 cases of imprisonment. In universities,
there were 164 cases of summons, 76 expulsions, and 70 suspensions.
48
It appears that the Iranian state‘s intolerance for group protests is so acute that it
intervenes even in instances where protestors are actually demonstrating in support of
government actions. Mr. Keith Rimstad, a campaigner for Amnesty International, stated
that:
In one particular case in January, when students were protesting Israel's attacks against
Gaza, one would assume that the government would not be opposed to this, but they in
fact were because it was an independent action by students. The police came in, broke
up the demonstration, and arrested a number of the students.
49
Mr. Rimstad further explained:
46 Evidence, Meeting No. 15, April 30, 2009.
47 Ibid.
48 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, June 9, 2009.
49 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
23
So even though it's on an issue one would think the Government of Iran would be

sympathetic to, they do act. That's specifically because any independent action in Iran by
any part of civil society is seen to be a threat.
50
The Subcommittee also heard from Mr. Batebi who described his personal
experience as a student activist protesting peacefully against Iran‘s government.
The Subcommittee considers his story to be both a telling example of the kind of
repression existing in Iran and an inspiring story of resistance against such repression.
Mr. Batebi described what he endured in the following way:
I was kept for 17 months in a small room by myself, and that room was no more than a
washroom. This situation caused health problems. They took me twice for execution. In
one case, I was taken for execution with a group of others. Of course, I was not
executed. I was in the middle, with one man on the left and another on the right. They
blindfolded us and forced us to stand on top of a chair, as if to hang us. They pulled my
blindfold aside a bit so I could see what was happening to the other two. These were
people who were imprisoned next to me in small cells. I saw their execution.
Once, for 72 hours they didn't let me sleep. They cut me and put salt in my wounds.
51
The Subcommittee also heard stories of mistreatment of labour rights activists.
Mr. Jared Genser, a law lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania, reported the following
incident:
Finally, on February 18, 2009, two Iranian women labour rights activists, Sousan Azadi
and Shiva Kheirabadi, were flogged inside the central prison of Sanandaj, the capital of
the Iranian Kurdistan province, after having been convicted of participating in May Day
celebrations. Azadi received 70 lashes and Kheirabadi 15 lashes. Iranian workers are
struggling to form independent labour unions but face continuous state repression. The
government and the judiciary have regularly abused the justice system to imprison and
silence labour activists. These rights are guaranteed under article 22 of the ICCPR, and
as a member of the International Labour Organization, Iran is obligated to respect and
implement these rights.
52
Finally, one last account illustrates the Iranian government‘s systemic policy of
silencing civil society activists. Dr. Roya Boroumand, the Executive Director of the
Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, told the Subcommittee about the situation of Nobel
Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, who had come before the Subcommittee to testify in
2008. Dr. Boroumand stated:
You may also have heard about the closure of the office of the Nobel Peace Prize winner
Shirin Ebadi, but what you may not know is that Ebadi and lawyers in her NGO were part
of a committee for healthy, free, and fair elections who had called in November 2008 for
electoral reforms underlining the incompatibility of Iranian laws and practices with
50 Ibid.
51 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
52 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
24
international standards. The government's particular sensitivity regarding those who
criticize the electoral laws or promote the boycott of the elections doesn't always get the
attention it deserves. That is why very few knew that the young Kurd, Shivan Qaderi, who
was killed by the security forces, had actively promoted the boycott of the 2005
presidential elections. Similarly, scores of students punished for criticizing electoral laws
and calling for boycotts or a referendum on the constitution are rarely mentioned, let
alone supported.
53
4. The treatment of women
The situation regarding women‘s rights in Iran was also the subject of much
discussion by witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee. The overall portrait
given by various witnesses suggests that the role of women in Iranian civil society has
been evolving, but the attitude of the regime towards women has not. Iranian women were
described as being increasingly active in the public sphere and as working towards greater
respect for their rights and freedoms, notably the right to equality, which is a positive trend.
However, both the way in which the legal system currently treats women and the response
from the Iranian government to the Iranian women‘s rights movement are matters of
serious concern.
According to Mr. Rimstad, women‘s rights have improved somewhat in recent
years, but there is significant room for progress. He stated:
... since the Islamic revolution, the number of women in universities, for instance, has
grown; certain laws, particularly discriminatory ones, have been changed—they still
remain discriminatory, but they have improved—and, I would want to emphasize
particularly, women activists themselves very bravely continue to press the government
and the authorities, as well as men generally, to achieve greater rights.
We're still a long way from seeing a situation in which women's rights in Iran are good,
but there is hope from the women's movement that as long as space is available, they
can achieve better improvements over time. For instance, right now a petition campaign
is going on to achieve a million signatures to remove further discriminatory laws. In such
a context as Iran, it's an extremely brave thing for women activists to go out. Having said
that, those who are leading the campaign find themselves being arrested and suppressed
in a variety of ways. So I don't want to leave the illusion at all that the situation is good,
but I don't want to not acknowledge the fact that there has been some improvement.
54
There are still systemic obstacles preventing gender equality. According to
Mr. Genser:
Women are denied equal rights in marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
Evidence given by a woman in court is only worth half that given by a man, and a girl
under the age of 13 can be forced to marry a much older man if her father permits.
55
53 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, June 9, 2009.
54 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
55 Ibid.
25
Dr. Milani also commented on the dismantling of women‘s rights that occurred in
the wake of the 1979 revolution, as Islamic law began to be applied to women. Similar to
the other witnesses, he pointed out that in the subsequent decades women have not
enjoyed the right to divorce, while men are permitted to have more than one wife.
Moreover, custody laws pertaining to children were geared to be ―more or less, in favour of
men,‖ as were inheritance laws.56 When Mrs. Ebadi appeared before the Subcommittee
she noted similar concerns regarding women‘s rights in Iran. She stated that, in Iran ―the
value of a woman‘s life is half of the value of a man‘s life.‖57
On the positive side, Dr. Milani also described how women in Iran have not
accepted all of these abuses and changes, and have bravely challenged the status quo,
standing up against these ―structural inequalities‖ and certain elements of their treatment
under legal and societal rules. One example he enumerated of women fighting and
pushing back against infringements against their human rights concerned the age of
marriage, which had been dropped to nine years of age for girls. The latter was eventually
increased to fourteen. Dr. Milani stated that, ―When the history of Iranian democracy and
the Iranian human rights movement is written, I think we will realize and conclude that
women were the most relentless champions. It was, to a great extent, the women‘s social
networks created in the campaign for a million signatures that were used by the
democratic opposition during the election to organize those massive, incredibly wellorganized
demonstrations, when three million came out.‖58
As stated by Mr. Rimstad however, other witnesses confirmed that leaders of
women‘s rights NGOs have been arrested, and some have been summoned before courts
and/or found guilty for exercising their rights to express themselves and organize.59
The Subcommittee was told:
In 2008 the government escalated its crackdown very significantly and visibly, subjecting
dozens of women to arbitrary detention, travel bans, and harassment.
60
5. Persecution based on sexual orientation
Mrs. Ebadi explained the situation facing gays and lesbians in Iran as follows:
It is a criminal act under our law to be gay or lesbian. If someone just mentions that they
are a gay or lesbian, that is not against the law. They have to be considered to be acting
as a lesbian or gay for it to be considered a criminal act. It is a very heavy punishment,
56 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
57 Evidence, Meeting No. 2 (39-2), March 6, 2008.
58 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
59 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
60 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
26
especially for men, if they are gay. The penalty is execution. For women it is much less; it
is one hundred lashes.61
In response to a question posed by Mr. Silva, Member of the Subcommittee,
regarding public perceptions of the hanging of two young gay men in Iran Mrs. Ebadi
responded that ―in principle, the people of Iran are not in favour of this kind of reaction by
the government.‖
In a document presented to the Subcommittee by the Abdorrahman Boroumand
Foundation entitled ―Addressing Homophobia in Iran‖, it notes that official statements
made by the Iranian leadership publicly denying the existence of homosexuals in Iran ―only
exacerbate[s] the problems faced by Iranians with a non-conforming sexual orientation or
gender identity.‖ 62 Further, the document states:
The authorities‘ efforts to address the issue by providing certificates of mental disorder or
encouraging sex change operations are neither a sign of tolerance nor helpful. While the
state assistance to sex change operations is reserved to transsexuals, many
homosexuals may resort to sex change operations in search of acceptance and to
escape violence.
63
In this document, the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation calls on the Iranian
government to decriminalize homosexuality completely and provide equality of rights to
sexual minorities as guaranteed under the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, to which Iran is party.64
6. The death penalty for juveniles
The final type of systemic human rights violations that was described to the
Subcommittee involves the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. Mr. Stork
explained how the Iranian legal system deals with this issue:
Iranian law allows the death penalty for persons who have reached the age of puberty,
which is defined as 15 for boys and nine for girls. In 2008 a known total of six persons
were executed for crimes allegedly committed while under the age of 18, and since
January 2005, Iran has been responsible for 26 of the 32 known executions of juvenile
offenders worldwide.
These sentences, it should be noted, typically followed unfair trials, and the executions
themselves often violated Iranian law, such as the failure to notify families and lawyers
48 hours in advance of the execution.
65
61 Evidence, Meeting No. 2 (39-2), March 6, 2008.
62 ―Addressing Homophobia in Iran‖, The Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, May 15, 2008.
63 Ibid
64 Ibid.
65 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
27
Similar figures, though not exactly the same ones, were offered by other
witnesses.66 In addition, Mr. Batebi stated that there are eight other persons convicted of
criminal offences as juveniles who are currently on death row.67 When updating the
Subcommittee on the post-June 12 election crackdown by government agents on street
demonstrators, Mrs. Redman also referred to the issue of the treatment of juvenile
offenders by the Iranian government. She noted in broad terms that Iran has the second
highest rate of administration of the death penalty against convicted prisoners in the world,
behind only China. More specifically, she told members that in early October 2009 ―a
young man was executed for a crime that he committed when he was under the age of 18.
He was reportedly actually hung by the mother of the young man whom he had killed in a
street fight.‖68
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: THE SUBCOMMITTEE’S OBSERVATIONS
1. Iran’s human rights obligations toward its population
i. Iran’s Treaty Obligations
According to witness testimony, the issue is not that new laws are required in Iran, it
is that the laws that are already in place are not being respected. Many of Iran‘s human
rights abuses violate its own laws and Constitution. Further, all of the witnesses agreed
that Iran is bound by a series of international treaties.69 Iran is a party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), having ratified both treaties on
June 24 1975. Examples of the rights that are guaranteed under the two treaties are: the
right to freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19 ICCPR); the right to life and the right
not to be arbitrarily deprived thereof (Art. 6(1) ICCPR); the right of peaceful assembly
(Art. 21 ICCPR); the right to freedom of association, ―including the right to form and join
trade unions for the protection of his interests‖ (Art. 22 ICCPR); the right of equality before
the law and to enjoy the protection of the law without any discrimination ―on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status‖ (Art. 26 ICCPR); and the right not to be subjected to
―torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖ (Art. 7 ICCPR)—to
name just a few.
Iran has also ratified other international human rights treaties that deal with more
specific issues. It ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) on August 29 1968. This treaty prohibits State Parties from undertaking any act or
practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and
66 Ibid.
67 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 10, 2009.
68 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
69 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
28
seeks to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall
act in conformity with this obligation (Art. 2(1) (a)).
In addition, Iran ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1994.
However, in ratifying the CRC, Iran made the following reservation: "The Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right not to apply any provisions or articles of the
Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international legislation in
effect."70 The Subcommittee notes that Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Italy objected to the validity of this
reservation, notably on the grounds of it being too broad and contrary to the spirit and
purpose of the CRC.
The Subcommittee notes that human rights violations for which Iran bears
responsibility involve social, economic and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.
Without giving more importance to one group of rights than the other, the Subcommittee
stresses that violations of rights belonging to the latter category seem particularly
widespread in Iran. Among the major categories of human rights abuses, the
Subcommittee takes note in particular of repeated and widespread violations of the right to
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of religion, the right to be free
from torture and other mistreatments, procedural guarantees of fairness in judicial
proceedings, and the right not to be discriminated against on various grounds.
By comparing the list of human rights guarantees that Iran has agreed to protect
through international treaties and domestic law against the evidence the Subcommittee
received during its hearings, it is clear that the Iranian government is violating many of its
international and domestic obligations.
ii. Iran’s Obligation to Respect, Protect and Promote Human Rights
There are three forms of obligations in relation to human rights that are generally
considered to be international customary law. They include a state‘s obligation to respect,
to protect, and to promote human rights. According to the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights:
The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing
the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect
individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that
States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.
71
70 United Nations Treaty Collection, ―Convention on the Rights of the Child: New York, November 20, 1989,‖
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.
71 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ―What are Human Rights?‖
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.
29
The previous section and the extensive reporting documented by a variety of
sources including NGOs, journalists, academics, and national governments show that
human rights violations in Iran are serious, pervasive and systemic. Moreover, they display
violations of the three levels of obligations just described. Iran‘s government and state
agencies are often involved directly in the commission of human rights violations, thereby
violating their obligation to respect human rights. They often respond to human rights
violations through inaction or mock inquiries, thereby creating a climate of impunity, which
constitutes a failure to protect human rights. They also fail to actively facilitate a culture of
respect for human rights in the country, thereby violating Iran‘s obligation to promote
human rights.
a) Failure of the obligation to respect human rights
Violations of the rights of freedom, of assembly and association, and due process
under the law, and the right not to be subjected to torture are all primarily committed
through the activities of state agencies, as they control the apparatus of government and
the use of force in society. Moreover, state agencies are involved in the violation of the
right to a fair trial, the right to counsel, the right not to be discriminated against, the right to
freedom of religion, and collective rights of a cultural or linguistic nature. Mr. Batebi
elaborated on this issue in his appearance before the Subcommittee, by stating that:
The violation of human rights in Iran is systematically done by the government. The
problem is not only the violation of human rights, but the laws that support the violation
are also a huge problem. Since the Iranian judicial system uses sharia laws and Islamic
rules, the violation of human rights is embedded within the law and within the
constitution.
72
When violations are committed by state agents, Iran‘s government bears direct
responsibility for such violations. In certain cases, it is also likely that personal
responsibility—criminal, civil or both—could be invoked.
b) Failure of the obligation to protect human rights—a record of
impunity
Iran fails to live up to its obligation to protect in two regards. First, because Iran‘s
state agencies are so often involved in the human rights violations described above, Iran
fails to protect the human rights of its citizens.
Second, Iran has failed to provide a satisfactory response to human rights abuses,
either through correction of the practice in question or through sanction of the abuser.
Throughout the Subcommittee‘s hearings, it became clear that human rights violations in
Iran often take place with impunity. Such impunity has two forms. For certain types of
violations, the practices in question are permitted under domestic law. In other words, the
law actually allows for such practices. Moreover, in other instances, while the practice may
72 Evidence, Meeting No. 8, March 24, 2009.
30
not be permitted under the law and/or is expressly prohibited, the state institutions and
mechanisms of accountability that are in place are too weak to provide a genuine remedy
to victims or sanction for abusers. Mr. Rimstad explained this to the Subcommittee in his
own terms

Impunity for human rights violations is almost absolute. Amnesty's concerns go right back
to the beginning of the Islamic Republic, particularly the period in 1988 when thousands
of political prisoners were executed and prisons were cleared. These were people who
were arrested in the early years of the Islamic Republic. Of course, in the case of Zahra
Kazemi, although we did see some progress in that at least charges were filed against
lower-level officials, the end result was that one person eventually faced court and he
was found not guilty.
73
c) Failure of the obligation to promote human rights
When a government fails to respond to violations of human rights in an appropriate
manner, and in fact repeatedly participates in or condones such human rights violations it
becomes difficult to imagine that it would have discharged its obligation to promote a
general culture of respect for human rights throughout the country.
iii. The Iranian Government’s Responsibility
All witnesses before the Subcommittee have argued that the government
leadership in Iran and its agents are responsible for violating the human rights of its
citizenry. However, questions remain as to which specific actors or bodies within the
Iranian leadership circle are ultimately responsible.
Iran‘s political structure is both complex and unique, combining elected and nonelected
officials under the close supervisor of the clerical leadership.74 Dr. Mojtaba
Mahdavi, a political science professor at the University of Alberta, explained to the
Subcommittee that, ―It‘s a combination of totalitarian and authoritarian, with some quasidemocratic
elements in it.‖75 At the apex of the structure is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. 76 He has the authority to appoint key figures, such as the head of the
judiciary, six members of the Guardian Council, the commanders of all the armed forces,
Friday prayer leaders and the head of the state-run radio and TV. He is chosen by the
Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader also has decision-making authority and
extensive influence on security, defence and important foreign affairs issues, and he
controls the armed forces.
73 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
74 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/.
75 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
76 Ibid.
31
The President is prominent, but not supreme. The President heads the executive
branch of government and presides over the cabinet. Although candidates for presidential
office do campaign against each other in national elections, it should be noted that even
opposition candidates are strictly vetted by the Guardian Council before they are allowed
to enter the race. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Council ―is able to
reject without right of appeal those it deems to be unqualified or of unsuitable character.
This power allows conservatives enormous influence in elections.‖77 It is the opinion of the
Subcommittee that despite the exercise of holding contested elections, one could hardly
say that any part of Iran‘s totalitarian regime is genuinely democratic.
Given their positions of authority in Iranian society and government, Iran‘s highest
officials—especially its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and its Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, and increasingly Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps share
responsibility for the human rights situation in Iran, having contributed to the creation of a
climate in which human rights have been sacrificed to political expediency and one in
which abuses go unpunished.
As previously mentioned, another key institution is the Guardian Council. It is a
mixed institution, made up of six Islamic clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader, and six
lay jurists who are designated by the judiciary and confirmed by Parliament. Its powers are
important: ―The council has to approve all bills passed by parliament and has the power to
veto them if it considers them inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law.
The council can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, the
presidency and the Assembly of Experts.‖78
While Iran‘s judiciary is an institution in which more moderate figures have been
able to find a place79, it remains one of Iran‘s weakest institutions. Even though the
separation of powers exists on paper, it is not applied in practice. According to
Dr. Hassan-Yari, the judiciary is financially dependent on the executive and legislative
authorities. This puts judges under extreme external pressure, denying Iranian citizens an
independent judiciary as a result. There is also constant interference by members of the
executive authority in the legal system, in such forms as allowing police to exert more
power than what is accorded them under the law.80
Iran‘s state security agencies are also extremely important societal institutions, both
in terms of their responsibilities and connections within government, but also in terms of
the expansive scope of their involvement in society, including in the Iranian economy.
Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is separate from the country‘s
regular armed forces, is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader of Iran, presently
77 ―Country Profile 2008: Iran‖, Economist Intelligence Unit.
78 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm.
79 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
80 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
32
Ayatollah Khamenei. The IRGC was formed after the 1979 revolution in order to safeguard
the revolution, the leaders of the Islamic Republic, and its institutions. They are quite
literally guardians of the status quo system of governance and power distribution in Iranian
society. It is very important to note that the IRGC‘s role is not just a security one, however,
as it has grown to play a prominent economic role, with key holdings. This gives its
members significant influence over most aspects of Iranian society, which gives them
enormous leverage and an expanding power base within the Iranian governing system.
Professor Akhavan told the Subcommittee as much in October, describing how ―the
Revolutionary Guards acquired the telecommunications company in Iran and they
acquired one of the largest iron ore mines in the Middle East.‖ He, therefore, suggested
that Iran is ―moving towards a military state that is dominating all the resources of the
country for its own benefit. They have a network of patronage, which keeps people
happy.‖81
Underneath the control of Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the large
volunteer force known as the Basij, which has played a prominent role in the recent
crackdown against Iranians protesting the result of the June 12 presidential election.
The Basij are a pro-government militia, often described as a ―paramilitary‖ group, and also
a social network with strong ties to the hardline elements of the regime. Professor
Akhavan told Subcommittee Members that, ―The Basij are clearly not a renegade force.
I would compare them to the Nazi Brownshirts. They are a security force composed of
plain-clothes thugs.‖82 Despite the fact that the Basij militia are often described as a
voluntary force, Professor Akhavan said that they are paid by some estimations $200 per
day to conduct such disruptions and intimidation against ordinary Iranians.
It should be noted that witnesses before the Subcommittee did not generally
discuss the allocation of responsibility for the broad based human rights violations that
have been described. Witness testimony on responsibility for abuses has by and large
dealt with the question of incitement to genocide, explored in the next part of this report, as
well as with responsibility for particular incidents, such as the crackdown on post-election
demonstrations, which is addressed in the final section of this report.
2. Canada’s Role in Engaging Iran on its Human Rights Violations
Although diplomatic relations between Canada and the Islamic Republic of Iran
were re-established in 1996, successive Canadian governments have gradually limited
this engagement in reaction to the actions of the Iranian government. Officials from DFAIT
told the Subcommittee that Canada instituted a Controlled Engagement Policy in 1996,
due to the Iranian government‘s opposition at that time to the Middle East Peace Process,
its support for groups engaged in terrorist activities in the region, its poor human rights
record, and its nuclear program. In May 2005, Canada further tightened this policy, ―as a
81 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009. .
82 Ibid.
33
result of Iran‘s failure to address the murder of Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi.‖83
Canada‘s diplomatic contacts with Iran were subsequently limited at first to the discussion
of three issues: the human rights situation in Iran, Iran's nuclear program and the case of
Mrs. Zahra Kazemi, and other consular cases. A fourth topic—regional security issues—
was added in 2008, given Iran‘s important role and activities in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Mr. McLaren from DFAIT explained to Members that
Canada‘s Controlled Engagement Policy means that ―Iran is not permitted to open
consulates in Canada, there are no direct air links to Canada and export controls are
applied to sensitive goods. All programs of cooperation with the Iranian government were
also halted.‖84 Moreover, trade promotion activities in Iran have been terminated including
those undertaken by Export Development Canada.
In their appearance before the Subcommittee, departmental officials expressed
Canada‘s ―serious concerns regarding the state of human rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran‖, and noted that Canada has been a consistent and outspoken proponent for
improvements in the human rights situation in Iran. Mr. McLaren pointed to the example of
Canada‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, leading a walkout
of the Canadian delegation during the September 2009 speech of Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before the United Nations General Assembly, ―in response to his
ongoing and inflammatory denial of the Holocaust, his antagonism and hostility towards
the people of Israel, and his complete disdain for the human rights of the Iranian people.‖85
Mr. McLaren noted that for six consecutive years, Canada has ―spearheaded‖
resolutions on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran which were successfully adopted at
the UN General Assembly. These resolutions have condemned abuses of human rights in
Iran and outlined specific actions to be taken to rectify the situation on the part of the
Iranian government. Canada‘s initiatives, statements, and resolutions at the UN, including
those made in the General Assembly and at the Human Rights Council, have also
advocated the need for Iran to fully respect the rights of its Bahá'í citizens. Although these
resolutions do send a signal to Iran that such violations are of grave concern to the
international community, and ensure that human rights issues are continuously debated by
member states on the international policy agenda while also forcing the Iranian
government to respond to these statements of international opinion, witnesses before the
Subcommittee argued that although these actions are clearly helpful and noble, Canada
could do much more—the Subcommittee agrees.
83 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
34
i. Continue to Support Iranians in their Pursuit of an Open and Just
Iran
The appearance and testimony of Mr. Batebi, who was depicted on the cover of the
July 13 1999 Economist magazine holding up the bloodied shirt of his fallen comrade
during the repression of the Student Uprising in Iran, was striking for Subcommittee
Members. He described the severe beatings, threats, humiliation and mock executions he
had endured while imprisoned. In general, witnesses before the Subcommittee advised
that Canada must continue to support Iranians fighting for their rights and must also hold
Iranian officials accountable for their actions.
Dr. Boroumand first advised the Subcommittee that any kind of Canadian support
for Iranian activists must have a long-term focus. She explained:
Iranians who promote universal values rely on your support. Their advocacy is
undermined and their morale affected if they feel that the human rights community and
democratic governments do not uphold international standards. We do have the same
rights and the same needs.
86
She suggested that Canada focus on the ―lesser-known activists‖ or those who are
in remote regions where their work is more challenging and dangerous.87 Mr. Genser
further advocated the need for Canada, and especially Parliament, to provide financial and
moral support for Iranian-Canadian and Iranian groups that document and report on
human rights abuses committed by the Iranian regime.88 Even reputable international
human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch have been unable to enter Iran and
conduct research. Its representative, Mr. Stork, appeared before the Subcommittee and
recommended that the Government of Canada publicly urge Iran to grant access to
organizations such as his, Amnesty International, and others.89
Dr. Boroumand also stressed the importance of supporting exiled activists and
journalists. According to the witness, Iran has the tendency to exile dissidents in order to
prevent their views from gaining hold within Iranian society. However, by providing these
exiled activists and journalists with the tools they need to continue their work, it will make
their work more effective and hopefully contribute to changes in Iran‘s policies.90
According to Professor Akhavan, the state‘s renewed attempts to crush civil society
have revealed the desperation of Iranian government hardliners who are recognising that
―the demographics of Iranian society are on the side of openness and engagement with
86 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, June 9, 2009.
87 Ibid.
88 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
89 Ibid.
90 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, June 9, 2009.
35
the international community.‖91 Although the Subcommittee heard this specific testimony
from Professor Akhavan during his first appearance in front of the Subcommittee before
the Iranian presidential election, it became clear to Canadians and the international
community as a whole, that government crackdowns were still very much a tool employed
by the state against any uprisings or protests in the country.
Dr. Boroumand insisted that Canada draw attention to these crackdowns as
well as the triggers that caused the protests or dissident activity in the first place.
She recommended that Canada should:
... move the debate to Iran's reason for arresting activists. Focus on laws related to the
right to create association and promote ideas and laws on political parties and elections.
Focus on excluded Iranians, including practising Muslims. Remind the Islamic republic
that the reason for arresting a human rights defender is not due to criminal activities, but
it is an effort to hide their despicable record and the Iranian people's view. Don't let the
Islamic republic call the shots on what the international community can support and what
it cannot.
92
According to Professor Akhavan, actions such as these will help isolate the hardline
elements in the Iranian government. By empowering Iran‘s civil society and supporting
those who want to bring about a democratic transformation in Iran, the message on behalf
of Canada and the international community will be clear—Iran‘s atrocities ―will exact a
price.‖93 However, when officials from DFAIT appeared before the Subcommittee in
October 2009, Mr. McLaren told Members that, ―We do not have active programs working
with civil society in Iran, so we have not worked with women‘s groups and labour groups or
others because we don‘t have resources for that.‖ He noted, however, that Canada does
consistently raise these rights issues in any discussions had with Iranian government
officials.
RECOMMENDATION 1
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to provide moral support and should increase, if possible, its
financial support for Canadian and Iranian civil society organizations
and other human rights groups that document and report on human
rights abuses committed by the Iranian regime.
RECOMMENDATION 2
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
provide moral and diplomatic support to the democratic movement in
Iran.
91 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
92 Evidence, Meeting No. 24, June 9, 2009.
93 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
36
RECOMMENDATION 3
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
demand, at every appropriate opportunity, that the Iranian government
grant access to international human rights organizations within its
borders and allow domestic human rights organizations to operate
without restriction or harassment.
RECOMMENDATION 4
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
consider funding a research chair at a Canadian university dedicated
to the study of Canadian-Iranian relations, including the human rights
situation in Iran.
RECOMMENDATION 5
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
encourage Radio Canada International to consider programming in
Farsi over its worldwide shortwave service, over conventional AM/FM
broadcasting in the Gulf region, and over the Internet.
RECOMMENDATION 6
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada take
appropriate action to ensure that Iranian foreign offices, bureaus or
media outlets in Canada are not used by the Iranian regime as a source
of threat and intimidation of the Iranian Diaspora in Canada.
ii. Target The Individuals Responsible For Human Rights Abuses
One witness in particular suggested that Canada could use the tools available in its
immigration and visa policies as a means to both communicate its condemnation of
human rights violations that are taking place in Iran and to ensure that high-ranking
members of the governing regime and members of its powerful state security agencies are
not able to find direct or indirect support from within this country.
When officials from DFAIT appeared before the Subcommittee, Members
questioned them regarding the former First Vice-President of Iran‘s private visit to Canada
earlier in the year. Members inquired as to why this visit had been permitted, given that
Canada has adopted an official Controlled Engagement Policy in its dealings with the
Iranian government. Mr. McLaren (DFAIT) explained that, ―Iran‘s vice-president applied for
a visa to enter Canada. He qualified under the provisions of entry to Canada. He had no
meetings with any member of the Canadian government. ... He qualified under our entry
rules as any other citizen. There is nothing in the controlled engagement policy that talks
37
about visas or preventing people who have legitimate access to Canada from entering.‖94
Other witnesses suggested, however, that Canada may want to take a closer look at the
granting of visas permitting entry to Canada, even in the case of private visits, when such
visits involve influential members of the Iranian government. Professor Akhavan told
Subcommittee Members that:
We know that the deputy president to Mr. Ahmadinejad, Mr. Mashaei, was in Canada in
March of this year and he met with business leaders in Toronto and other cities. So this is
an important place for Iran, which is also why there are so many informants and agents in
this country, many of whom I‘ve come to know. All of this is to say that we should take
very seriously the leverage that Canada has.95
He went on to suggest that the Government of Canada could also look at possible
changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that would declare members of
Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militia inadmissible to Canada.
He stated that, ―There is no reason that any of the members of these security forces
should be allowed into Canada when they‘ve been responsible for so many crimes.‖96
While such action would require careful research and intelligence gathering to ensure that
innocent Iranians are not incorrectly targeted, the benefit may justify any challenges that
would be encountered in implementation.
In his first appearance before the Subcommittee, Professor Akhavan argued that
Canada can go beyond rhetorical condemnation of the Iranian government's human rights
violations, and move to adopt more coercive policies, including, possibly, targeted
sanctions. He suggested the following approach:
it may be possible for Canada to take the lead in pursuing a policy of targeted sanctions,
whether we're speaking about travel bans, asset freezes, or judicial measures to isolate
those individuals who are resorting to human rights violations in order to remain in power,
so that those elements are isolated without isolating the Iranian people as a whole. For
the most part, they want nothing to do with this sort of hate-mongering.
97
Many witnesses expressed frustration to the Subcommittee that individuals
responsible for the Iranian government‘s nuclear program have had United Nations
Security Council sanctions targeted against them, while those who are responsible for
committing and inciting human rights violations within Iran are not given the same
treatment. There is an overall sentiment among human rights activists that the nuclear
issue has been overshadowing human rights issues in Iran for quite some time. Some
have even argued that this could be the very reason why Iran has been manipulating the
intentions of its nuclear program on the international stage, as a means of distracting the
international community from focusing instead on its internal activities. The Subcommittee
94 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
95 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
96 Ibid.
97 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
38
believes that the two subjects are both extremely important and must be equally and
effectively dealt with by the international community.
However, Dr. Mahdavi articulated the challenges that would be involved in
implementing targeted sanctions against specific individuals and organizations in Iran,
including Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its companies and the financial
resources that support its members. In response to a question on the use of such
sanctions to apply pressure against those who commit or condone human rights abuses in
Iran, he asked, ―What source of reliable information do we have to get this kind of
information and to be really targeted...?‖ Dr. Mahdavi did acknowledge, however, that if
western governments were able to ―find, perhaps, specific names or institutions with really
really reliable information, this might have some sort of positive impact on Iran‘s
democratic movement.‖98
RECOMMENDATION 7
The Subcommittee recommends that, in communicating its
condemnation of the human rights violations of the Iranian regime
against its own people, the Government of Canada:
• Use all available tools, already authorized under Canada’s
existing immigration and visa legislation, to ensure that highranking
members of the regime are not able to access direct or
indirect support from within Canadian territory.
• Reduce high-level interaction with Iranian Government
officials and make any invitations extended to Iranian officials
conditional upon effective actions taken by the Iranian
government to improve the human rights situation in Iran.
RECOMMENDATION 8
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, in
communicating its condemnation of the human rights violations
perpetrated by members of Iran’s state security agencies against the
Iranian people, use all available tools, authorized by existing
immigration and visa policies and legislation, to deny entry to Canada
to members of Iran’s security agencies, including members of Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia.
RECOMMENDATION 9
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
ensure sufficient resources are available to the Department of Justice,
the Canada Border Services Agency, the Canadian Security
98 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
39
Intelligence Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to ensure
that they are able to make accurate decisions related to
recommendations 7 and 8.
RECOMMENDATION 10
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
institute targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes,
against those individuals within the Iranian government and state
security forces who are known to have committed human rights
violations.
iii. Use a Multilateral Approach
According to the witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee, the Iranian
government can still be affected, at least to some degree, by international opinion.
Mr. Stork explained that, ―particularly when a coalition of states can be assembled that
actually manages to pass the [UN] resolution, indeed they care.‖99 Moreover, in the
context of Canadian policies and diplomacy, witnesses argued that because Canada, for
example, is among other things the second largest destination for Iranian emigrants (after
Dubai), Canada itself has ―considerable leverage‖ to apply pressure on the regime.100
Unfortunately, a polarised atmosphere has been created within the international
community with respect to Iran‘s human rights record. This has politicized all discussions
of the issue, and has made most diplomatic engagements towards the country limited and
challenging. Professor Akhavan‘s statement below describes the mindset of one of the
sides of this polarized debate. He stated:
Part of the rhetoric of Iran is that the human rights record of Iran is fine, but that western
countries under the influence of American and Zionist circles are using this as an issue to
denounce the Islamic republic and the sovereignty of the Iranian people.101
Witnesses told the Subcommittee that the current regime in Iran has a surprisingly
large number of supporters in South America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia, and has
even gone so far as to grant smaller countries such as the Solomon Islands aid packages
in order to guarantee a favourable vote at the UN. As Mr. Genser explained, some of the
countries supporting Iran would not usually be considered a part of the ―solidarity of
oppressors‖ as described by Mr. Stork. Mr. Genser used South Africa as an example.
Even though the country has a tremendous recent history of having stood up and achieved
reconciliation after apartheid, its record of supporting other oppressed people since
becoming free has, according to Mr. Genser, been ―pretty terrible.‖102 South Africa, he
99 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
100 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
101 Ibid.
102 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
40
argued, has stood in support of the Burmese junta and Mugabe in Zimbabwe—and this,
he argues, is because of this solidarity among developing countries or more broadly the
global debate over the powerful versus the powerless.
Moreover, a neo-colonialist interpretation has often been used to explain the
international debate on Iran‘s human rights record to domestic audiences, as state figures
in Iran accuse western countries of trying to put ―pressure on Third World and developing
countries‖ to change their systems.103
At the same time, the Subcommittee believes that the human rights situation in Iran
must be kept on the international agenda. Moreover, the Government of Canada should
make active interventions regarding the more egregious violations through diplomatic
activities at the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly, even perhaps at the
Commonwealth Secretariat‘s human rights unit, as suggested by one witness.104
The government could also lobby the Human Rights Council for the return of countryspecific
rapporteurs, a position which has been eliminated.
RECOMMENDATION 11
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to display public disapproval of the Iranian regime and its
leadership and continue to make active interventions during any
bilateral meetings with Iranian government officials as well as at the
United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations General
Assembly and other international organisations regarding Iran’s poor
human rights record.
RECOMMENDATION 12
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada work
multilaterally with other member states of the United Nations Human
Rights Council to re-establish a position for a country-specific
rapporteur on human rights in Iran.
iv. End State Immunity for Individuals Responsible for Crimes Against
Humanity
A number of witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee expressed
frustration regarding cases where Canadian citizens who have been tortured, or who have
loved ones who have been tortured and killed by another state, cannot seek justice
through the Canadian court system. The State Immunity Act is the law that prevents these
cases from being heard and has caused the UN Committee Against Torture, which is
103 Ibid.
104 Evidence, Meeting No. 3, February 26, 2009.
41
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention Against Torture, to find
Canada in breach of its international obligations as a signatory to the Convention.
State immunity is based on state sovereignty, a fundamental principle of
international law and the UN Charter. This principle is meant to prevent states from
interfering in each other‘s internal affairs. As a result, state immunity generally prevents the
courts of one nation from sitting in judgment of another country‘s official or ―sovereign‖
actions.105
When its State Immunity Act was passed in 1982, Canada took a ―restrictive‖
approach to immunity. While it acknowledged that foreign states and officials could not be
immune from everything, this approach was mostly targeted at commercial activities. Mrs.
Jayne Stoyles, Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for International Justice,
explained to the Subcommittee that:
Although the State Immunity Act begins with the presumption that foreign governments
are immune in Canadian courts, the act then sets out exceptions for which immunity will
not be granted. For example, foreign states are not immune from civil liability for
commercial activities, nor are they immune from any death, bodily injury, or property
damage that occurs in Canada. These exceptions apply because the underlying activities
are not deemed to be sovereign in nature.
106
According to the same witness, the international community now considers torture
an ―act that is not appropriate for any sovereign to undertake.‖107 Mrs. Stoyles argued that
under international law, the prevention of torture is paramount and is considered an
international norm, or, binding on all nations. Along with many of the Subcommittee‘s other
witnesses, she stated that under no circumstances should the act of torture be
immunised.108
Having ratified the UN Convention Against Torture, according to Article 14, Canada
shall:
... ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of
torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.109
Witnesses mentioned a few high profile torture cases that have been dismissed by
Canadian courts on the basis of state immunity. In 2004, Mr. Houshang Bouzari accused
Iranian officials of torturing him while he was detained in an Iranian jail for refusing to
105 Evidence, Meeting No. 15, April 30, 2009.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 This Convention is available at: http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html.
42
accept a bribe from the Iranian President‘s brother while working for one of the country‘s
top oil companies. His case was dismissed by Ontario courts on the basis of immunity
even though the case could have been dismissed based on jurisdiction since Mr. Bouzari
was not a resident of Ontario until he fled Iran following his release.110 Still, the dismissal
based on immunity grounds set a precedent.
Following the dismissal of Mr. Bouzari‘s case, the UN Committee Against Torture
conducted a review of Canada‘s compliance with the treaty. According to experts who
appeared before the Subcommittee, this UN Committee rejected Canada‘s argument that
Article 14 is limited to compensation for victims tortured within its own borders. Rather the
UN Committee was clear that Article 14 requires the provision of a civil remedy for all
victims of torture, whether the torture occurred at home or abroad and urged Canada to
reconsider its position. This would mean amending the State Immunity Act.111
Unfortunately, according to witnesses, the dismissal of Mr. Bouzari‘s case set a
precedent for other claims including the case of Mr. Maher Arar. His lawsuits against the
governments of Syria and Jordan were also dismissed on immunity grounds.112
In the case of Mrs Zahra Kazemi, her family took her case to Iran. Iranian
government whistleblowers have revealed that she did die as a result of torture, which
raises serious and troubling questions regarding Iran‘s investigation of what happened in
the prison. However, no one was charged for her murder, which has left the Kazemi family
still searching for justice. The case brought by the Kazemi family is now before Quebec
courts and, according to Mr. Kurt Johnson, a lawyer with Irving Mitchell Kalichman, it will
face no jurisdictional restrictions as Mrs. Kazemi had been a Quebec resident since 1993.
It remains to be seen what the judgement will be. Witnesses who appeared before the
Subcommittee expressed concern that another family will be denied justice due to the
State Immunity Act. Further, if the Kazemi case is dismissed based on immunity grounds,
there is a fear that this will cause Canadian courts to permanently shut down any future
possibility for Canadian survivors of torture to seek redress.113
Mr. Mathieu Bouchard, also a lawyer with Irving Mitchell Kalichman, explained to
the Subcommittee how domestic laws in common-law countries differ from the European
continental legal regime with regards to civil and criminal charges being laid against
foreign officials. These differences subsequently lead to dissimilar domestic applications of
international laws:
We have here the common law system, where in criminal cases the crown prosecutes
the criminals. In the continental legal system, private parties can join the prosecution and
claim civil damages. That's what they call the partie civile in France. So it is possible in
110 Evidence, Meeting No. 15, April 30, 2009.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
43
those European countries for a victim of torture to actually join the prosecution and ask
for compensation against foreign officials, whereas, here, in Britain, and in common law
countries we don't have that possibility.
114
Dr. François Larocque, a Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa, noted that
although the United States has allowed exceptions in its state immunity legislation, this is
not the approach he would recommend for Canada. The U.S. allows for its citizens to file
lawsuits only against foreign officials from the countries on its ―terror list‖ (i.e. state
sponsors of terrorism). According to Dr. Larocque this is both too restrictive and
problematic. For instance, North Korea, Iraq and Libya are no longer on that list since
diplomatic relations have been normalised between both countries. Lawsuits can now only
be brought against officials from the four remaining countries on the list: Iran, Sudan, Syria
and Cuba. At the same time, only U.S. Citizens can make these civil claims, denying
permanent residents the same justice.115
Dr. Larocque and the other expert witnesses who appeared before the
Subcommittee recommended that Canada should completely remove immunity for gross

violations of international law from its State Immunity Act. On the other hand critics of this
recommendation cite the potential damage this could have on Canada‘s bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic and trade relations. They also fear that this course of action would
―open the floodgates‖ allowing victims of torture from around the world to seek refuge in
Canada to enable them to file suits against foreign officials in pursuit of compensation.116
However, as Mrs Stoyles pointed out, in terms of diplomatic relations, the cases
being mentioned here are civil cases between an individual or family in Canada and
foreign officials abroad, not criminal cases with the Government of Canada prosecuting
officials of another country. Moreover, she argued that the Canadian judicial system has
enough checks and balances to sort through cases and follow through with those that
have merit. She stated:
And as I said, there's a two-part test: it has to have a real and substantial connection to
Canada, and in fact this has to be the best forum in which to bring the case.
117
On November 26 2009, Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Irwin Cotler introduced
private member‘s Bill C-483 with the support of members of all parties (seconded by
Conservative member Scott Reid, Bloc Québécois member Francine Lalonde and New
Democratic Party (NDP) member Paul Dewar) that would amend the State Immunity Act
to allow Canadian victims of torture, crimes against humanity and other international
crimes to sue in Canadian courts the foreign governments and officials that perpetrate
these gross human rights violations.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
44
Bill C-483 takes account of the recommendations and concerns of the expert
witness testimony that appeared before the Subcommittee. Accordingly, the Bill includes
significant protection for countries with fair and impartial justice systems requiring that
victims invoke and exhaust all domestic remedies in these countries before filing lawsuits.
Canada therefore respects its international relationships and defers to the judicial systems
of states that provide justice to victims. Moreover, as expert witness Jane Stoyles put it,
the jurisdictional checks and balances of the common-law judicial system already limit the
application of the amendment to those cases with a ―real and substantial connection‖ to
Canada and where Canada is the most convenient forum.118
RECOMMENDATION 13
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
completely remove immunity for foreign governmental officials in
cases of gross violations of international human rights law, including
torture, from the State Immunity Act allowing Canadians who are
victims of such human rights violations judicial remedy within
Canada’s domestic legal system.
III. IRAN AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The Subcommittee heard testimony suggesting that there are external linkages that
can be drawn with respect to Iran‘s record on international human rights. Witnesses
argued that the external dimensions of Iran‘s human rights related policies that merit
further examination include Iran‘s support for various terrorist organizations, its belligerent
stance towards the State of Israel, and the possible intentions of its nuclear program.
1. Iran’s Sponsorship of Terrorist Groups119
The Subcommittee heard from a number of witnesses who spoke candidly about
Iran‘s support for terrorist groups that operate in other countries, most notably Hamas and
118 Ibid.
119 The Subcommittee would like to note that in early November 2009, it was reported in the media that the Israeli
military had intercepted a large shipment of weapons. One of these reports summarized that, ―Israel has said
the cargo ship its troops seized off the coast of Cyprus was carrying 500 tons of Iranian-made weapons for
Lebanese Hezbollah militants. The ship had dozens of containers with Iranian markings on it.‖ The news report
noted that, ―Both Iran and Hezbollah have denied the Israeli claims.‖ It also wrote that, ―Israel says the
confiscated arms cache – the largest it has ever seized – did not include any new types of weapons for
Hezbollah. However, the arms would have given Hezbollah a month‘s worth of firepower in time of war. ...
Among the arms Israel says it found aboard the vessel were 9,000 mortar bombs; 3,000 Katyusha rockets,
3,000 anti-tank shells, 20,000 grenades and more than a half million rounds of small arms ammunition.‖ See,
The Associated Press, ―Israel Shows Documents it Says Link Iran to Arms,‖ The New York Times,
November 11, 2009 (filed at 2:33 p.m. ET).
45
Hezbollah.120 Mr. McLaren (DFAIT), told the Subcommittee that Iran had provided
the initial support that led to the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the conflict years of
the 1980s; therefore, Iran is still ―probably Hezbollah‘s most important international ally‖ in
terms of current day funding and support. In this regard, he articulated the Government of
Canada‘s concerns that ―Iran is playing a troubling role in the wider Middle East.
Its activities in the region, particularly its support for listed terrorist entities such as Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, have long constituted serious obstacles to peace
in the Middle East.‖121
Mr. Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director of Research at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, told Subcommittee Members that this support for terrorist networks may
constitute the gravest threat posed by Iran to its region. He said:
...I personally worry more not about the hateful statements that Iran makes about wiping
Israel off the map but about the hundreds of millions of dollars that Iran is spending to
arm, train, and finance those organizations that are fighting to do exactly that, such as
Hamas.
122
Mr. Clawson went on to tell Subcommittee Members that there have been
disturbing indications that Iran has been smuggling more sophisticated weapons to Hamas
and not just small arms. In illustrating the danger of this, he told the Subcommittee that
Iran had been similarly supporting Hezbollah for a number of years, which has resulted in
Hezbollah, over time, turning into a ―pretty impressive light infantry force.‖123 These
weapons systems include longer-range and more precise rockets, as well as, anti-aircraft
and anti-tank missiles.124 Further, Mr. Genser argued that Iran is a destabilizing force in
the broader Middle East considering its role as a major funder and supporter of terrorist
activities that are directed against the Israeli population.125
Witnesses cited intelligence sources as well as publicly-available information, which
included admissions made by Hamas leaders and Hezbollah. Professor Gregory Gordon,
Director for Human Rights and Genocide Studies at the University of North Dakota, told
the Subcommittee:
120 According to Canada‘s Department of Public Safety, Hamas is a ―radical Sunni terrorist organization that uses
political as well as violent means in pursuit of its goal of establishing a Palestinian State in Israel.‖ Hezbollah is
a ―radical Islamic terrorist organization that uses political and violent means with the intent of removing all
Western influences from the Middle East‖, and ―liberating all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from what it
sees as Israeli occupation.‖ Both organisations have been identified by the Government of Canada as being
associated with terrorism. http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx.
121 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
122 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
46
You don't have to follow a Byzantine money trail. These people have come out and
admitted to their links and their sponsorship and all these things. So it's pretty
compelling.
126
Witnesses told the Subcommittee that Iran has been providing support to groups—
Hamas and Hezbollah—that have used violent tactics not only against the State of Israel
and its population, but also against a variety of other civilians targets for several years.
When asked whether or not Iran could be held legally accountable for this support
and if there have been any precedents to this effect established in international law,
Professor Gordon responded that in terms of crimes against humanity, ―there has to be a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.‖ In his opinion, Iran‘s
sponsorship through funding and training of Hamas and Hezbollah attacks against the
Israeli population fits this criterion.127
According to Professor Gordon, there have been cases where sponsor countries
have been liable for an organization‘s actions when it has been determined that there is a
―direct enough‖ relationship between the country and client organization. He, along with
other witnesses, referenced the case of U.S. v Nicaragua before the International Court of
Justice.128 In this case, the Court, by twelve votes to three, decided that the United States,
by arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging,
supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, had
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of customary international law.129
The latter obliges states not to intervene in the affairs of another state, not to use force
against another state, and not to violate the sovereignty of another state.
Professor of Law Alan Dershowitz advised the Subcommittee that a similar legal
regime to U.S. conspiracy laws could be created at the international level.130
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, otherwise known as the RICO
Act, was enacted by the United States in 1970. It was intended to be used to prosecute
not only members of the mafia and other members of organised crime groups, but more
specifically, the leaders of these groups who may not have personally conducted
―racketeering activities‖, but organised or ordered them. Over the years, the Act has also
been applied to businesses, political protest groups, and terrorist organisations. Therefore,
a person could be criminally prosecuted by the U.S. government under RICO for being the
leader of an enterprise that, for example, engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity—
criminal activities including extortion, illegal drug trading and murder. In addition, a victim
of these criminal activities could also file a suit against the leader of an enterprise in civil
126 Evidence, Meeting No. 10, March 31, 2009.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 See: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=66&case=70&code=nus&p3=5&PHPSESSID=
5a41b319ba8b08ad0da599144e69c2dd.
130 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
47
court with the aim of recovering any economic losses he or she has suffered from the
crime.131
Professor Dershowitz also suggested that Argentina‘s investigation of Iran‘s
complicity in the terrorist attack against the largest Jewish community in Latin America
should be viewed as an example of an international application of conspiracy law.132
In 1994, the bombing of a Jewish community centre left 85 Argentine citizens dead and
hundreds wounded. It was determined that the Iranian regime through its international
proxies, including Hezbollah, conducted the attack. In October 2006, the Argentinean
prosecution unit requested international assistance in apprehending and extraditing eight
Iranians, including the man who had been president of Iran at the time of the attack,
Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.133
Further, in November 2006, Judge Canicoba Corral declared the attack against the
community centre a crime against humanity. He then issued the national and international
arrest orders requested by the Prosecution, and issued a formal request to INTERPOL.
However, it appears that, after 15 years, the accused are still living freely in safe-haven
countries (Saudi Arabia and Syria) and some have even travelled; no attempts were made
to arrest and extradite them.134
Many of the same officials indicted in the Argentine investigation are also the
subject of the international arrest orders of other countries. For example, Iran‘s former
Minister of Intelligence, Ali Fallahian, is currently the subject of two other international
arrest warrants issued by Germany and Switzerland due to his alleged leadership role in
the murder of Iranian dissidents in those two countries.135 As mentioned, to date, no
further legal action has been taken against these senior officials. In fact, many of these
officials remain influential figures within the Iranian leadership circle. For example, Iran has
appointed as its Minister of Defence – overseeing its nuclear program and weapons
development – Ahmad Vahidi, for his role in the Buenos Aires bombing. However, since
the court orders were issued, it appears that these officials have not traveled to European
countries.136
131 Jeffrey E. Grell, ―Rico in a Nutshell‖ http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/nutshell.asp.
132 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
133 The seven other Iranian officials with arrest orders against them are former ministers Alí Fallahijan and Alí
Akbar Veleyati; former military commanders Mohsen Rezai and Ahmad Vahidi; the former head of security for
Hezbollah Imad Fayez Mughniyah (reportedly assassinated in 2008), the former cultural attaché Mohsen
Rabbani and the Third Secretary Reza Ashgari, who were both posted to the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires
at the time.
134 Golnaz Esfandiari, ―Iran: Argentinian Warrants Urge Rafsanjani's, Ex-Officials' Arrests,‖ Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1072648.html.
135 Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre, ―No Safe Haven: Iran‘s Global Assassination Campaign,‖
May 2008, p. 11.
136 Golnaz Esfandiari, ―Iran: Argentinian Warrants Urge Rafsanjani's, Ex-Officials' Arrests,‖ Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1072648.html.
48
2. Incitement to Genocide
Beyond proven support for terrorist organizations that are responsible for human
rights violations and for threatening prospects for peace and security in the Middle East,
certain influential members of the Iranian government have also made statements that can
be viewed as inciting hatred against the State of Israel. Some witnesses who appeared
before the Subcommittee argued that these statements constitute not just hate speech,
but incitement to genocide, which is defined as a crime under international law. Iran‘s
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has made public statements condemning and
threatening the existence of the State of Israel. On this topic, the Subcommittee heard
from academics who are familiar with the Iranian leadership and its policies as well as from
legal scholars.
While the most troubling and widely-reported statement by the Iranian leadership to
date was President Ahmadinejad calling for the State of Israel to be ―wiped off the map‖ at
the 2005 ―World Without Zionism‖ conference in Tehran, witnesses mentioned others that
can be attributed to representatives of the Iranian regime, such as: ―There is only one
solution to the Middle East problem, namely, the annihilation and destruction of the Jewish
state‖; and ―If they [Jews] all gather in Israel, it will save us the trouble of going after them
worldwide‖.137 Mr. Genser noted that on March 4 2009, while the Subcommittee was
studying these very issues:
Supreme Leader Khamenei, again referred to Israel as ―a cancerous tumor‖, exhorting
attendees to ―resistance‖, his euphemism for violence as the only solution. And President
Ahmadinejad repeated his Holocaust denial, stating ―The story of the Holocaust, a nation
without a homeland and a homeland without a nation...are the big lies of our era‖.
138
Further, Professor Dershowitz alerted Subcommittee Members to the extent to
which the Iranian regime would be willing to go to pursue its strategic objectives.
He referred to a statement made by Hashemi Rafsanjani to an American Journalist in
which he ―boasted‖ that:
...an Iranian [nuclear] attack would kill as many as five million Jews, Rafsanjani estimated
that even if Israel retaliated by dropping its own nuclear bombs, Iran would probably lose
only fifteen million people, which he said would be a small ―sacrifice‖ from among the
billion Muslims in the world.139
Members of the Subcommittee asked what many Canadians are no doubt asking
themselves: what do these statements really mean in practice? Does Iran intend to act on
137 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009. For additional evidence of incitement see also the international
petition entitled, The Danger of a Nuclear, Genocidal and Rights-Violating Iran: the Responsibility to Prevent,
as tabled before this Subcommittee in June 2009. An updated version, now endorsed by 60 leading
international law scholars, experts on genocide and survivors, is available at http://content.liberal.ca/fe9cf988-
49a0-42eb-9e11-2a512494abd7/pdf/2010-01-07-r2p-petition.pdf.
138 Ibid.
139 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
49
these threats? Should Canada and the international community be concerned and if so,
what should they do about it?
Professor Gordon told Subcommittee Members: ―There is an ecosystem of hate
against Israel that has been forming and that has already come into existence.‖140 These
statements calling for the destruction of a sovereign country and the death of its people
have been voiced numerous times before various audiences and in full view of the
international community.
Professor Stanton argued that the statements that have been made by Iran‘s
leadership ―advocating the murder of Jews everywhere by Iranian-financed media such as
Palestinian television‖ have had international reach. For example, in 2005, the television
network run by the Palestinian Authority called for the ―butchering of all Jews everywhere‖
in a Friday sermon. Since then, Professor Stanton believes the propaganda against the
Jewish people has intensified.141
On June 18 2009, the Honourable Irwin Cotler, MP, tabled a petition entitled: The
Danger of a Genocidal, Rights-Violating and Nuclear Iran: The Responsibility to Prevent
Petition with the Subcommittee. In his presentation, Professor Cotler explained that the
petition is based on the possible dangers to Israel and the international community
associated with the convergence of three major dynamics emanating from the Iranian
regime: the nuclear, the genocidal, and the rights-violating dimensions. This petition was
initiated and was endorsed by some 50 international law scholars, genocide experts, and
victims of genocide including Madam Justice Louise Arbour, the former United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Salih Mahmoud Osman, a survivor of the conflict in
Darfur, and Nobel Peace laureate Elie Wiesel.142
According to Professor Cotler, the significance of this petition also lies in its outline
of the eight precursors to genocide that he argues have been exhibited in
President Ahmadinejad's Iran, as well as the comprehensive and documented evidence
supporting each precursor.
According to Professor Cotler, this petition and Bill C-412 the Iran Accountability
Act, (a private member‘s bill which he introduced in the House of Commons on June
9 2009), have been organized around a ―particular finding of fact and conclusion of law...
that Iran has already committed the crime of incitement to genocide in violation of the
genocide convention's prohibition.‖143
140 Evidence, Meeting No. 10, March 31, 2009.
141 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
142 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, June 18, 2009.
143 Ibid.
50
i. The Eight Stages of Genocide
Professor Stanton, who is also President of the International Association of
Genocide Scholars, told Subcommittee Members that he has analyzed most of the
genocides that have been perpetrated in recent history and has discovered a predictable
pattern:
Genocide is not an accident. It develops following a predictable process... I call the
process the eight stages of genocide...At this point, every one of the first six stages has
already happened in Iran. The next stage, stage seven, is genocide itself.
144
The following passage is Professor Stanton‘s analysis of what he considers to be
Iran‘s incitement to genocide towards Israel, in his own words:
The eight stages are, in a nutshell, as follows.
The first is classification. Every culture has to distinguish people into us versus them, and
in this case the us versus them is Iranians versus Jews and other groups. In fact, even
within Iranian society certain people are considered to be ―them‖—the Bahá'í, for
instance, the Azeris, and a lot of other groups that are outside the normal political rights
of the society. In the case of Jews, for example, Ahmadinejad has said that Jews, these
―fabricated‖ people, cannot continue to exist. I mean, that's otherness; that is a
declaration that they have no rights. He has said, for instance, that Jews have no roots in
Palestine.
The second stage, symbolization, is the one in which we give names to these
classifications in which symbols may even, in fact, be placed upon the people who
represent the classification. The most famous, of course, is the yellow star used by the
Nazis. This was also done, by the way, in Cambodia. Ben Kiernan and I discovered that
blue and white checked scarves were used to mark the people in the eastern zone before
they were forced and deported out of the eastern zone to their deaths.
In this case the main symbols are, of course, the names—Jews, Zionists, and so forth—
but they are coupled with the third stage, namely dehumanization. In this, the rhetoric of
Ahmadinejad is absolutely replete. He has called Israel a blot, a stain, a cancer, filthy
bacteria, a wild beast. He says that Jews are animals, barbarians, mass murderers.
He has picked up on the language in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, for instance.
This sort of dehumanization is characteristic of genocidal regimes. For instance, Tutsis in
Rwanda were characterized as cockroaches, or Jews were characterized as vermin
during the Holocaust.
The fourth stage, organization, is one in which you develop the organizations to carry out
the genocide. In this case I particularly want to stress agreement with my fellow professor
here on the point that even if the nuclear weapons of Iran are only used as a shield, they
nevertheless would provide a shield for organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and other
terrorists with genocidal ideologies to organize killings and to continue to terrorize Israel.
144 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
51
The fifth stage, polarization, is one in which the extremists drive the groups apart. We see
this in some of the statements by the regime, such as those to the effect that the Zionist
regime cannot continue to exist. This is a statement by Ahmadinejad.
The sixth stage, preparation, is one in which the victims are identified and separated out
because of their ethnic or religious identity. In this case it's Israel, or the Zionists, as he
likes to call them. Then they're attacked by terrorist organizations like Hamas or
Hezbollah or, as in this case, there is an overall pattern of attack that is sponsored and
paid for by the Iranian state.
The seventh stage, extermination, is genocide itself. It's the commencement of the actual
mass killing. Genocide is not an all-or none thing. It can be slow; it can be done very
gradually, as we have seen in Sudan, for example. I believe that is the ultimate longrange
proposal that Iran has for Israel—to wipe them out slowly—but if they don't do that,
they will have the nuclear weapons to do it all at once.
Finally, denial is the eighth and final stage of every genocide. Every genocide is denied
by the people who are committing it, and that stage actually begins right from the start.
The people who are going to commit the genocide will deny that they're about to commit
it, they will deny it while they're committing it, and then they'll deny it after they have
committed it. We've seen all of that in Iran.
145
The testimony provided by Professor Cotler to the Subcommittee supported
Professor Stanton‘s assessment. Even though the United Nations Security Council
condemned President Ahmadinejad‘s incitement towards Israel in 2005, witnesses pointed
out that to date Iran has not renounced these statements. Rather, the incitement has
continued.146 By way of recent example, in March 2010, on a Iranian Press TV,
Ahmadinejad referred to Israel as the ―... most criminal people in the world... stationed ... in
our region with lies and fabricated scenarios... [and] with God‘s grace this regime will be
annihilated.‖147
ii. Canadian Policy and The Genocide Convention
According to Mr. McLaren (DFAIT):
On the issue of incitement to genocide, Canada delivers on its obligations to both prevent
and punish genocide by criminalizing the crime of genocide under domestic law, thus
enabling domestic prosecution in Canadian courts where there is both jurisdiction and
evidence to support such action. Canada is also a supporter of the International Criminal
Court, which deters and punishes perpetrators of genocide.
145 Ibid.
146 By way of illustration, see supra note 139.
147 Available at http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=120579&sectionid=351020101.
52
Canada supported the appointment of a special advisor on the prevention of genocide,
with the mandate to make appropriate recommendations for prevention to the UN
Security Council through the UN Secretary General.148
Further, Mr. McLaren referred the Subcommittee to DFAIT‘s responses to two
inquiries that were submitted in the House of Commons. In its response to an inquiry
dated June 11 2009 from Ms. Kirsty Duncan, MP, the Department stated that the
Government of Canada does recognise that with regards to the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [hereafter the Genocide
Convention], ―actual destruction of a group is not required, rather genocide will be present
when enumerated acts are committed with the specific intent to destroy a group. Specific
intent is thus a critical element of the crime for genocide.‖149
On the other hand, the document also notes that the Genocide Convention ―does
not contain an obligation ‗to intervene and protect‘ populations facing genocidal acts. While
the Convention imposes an obligation on its Contracting Parties to both ‗prevent and
punish‘ the crime of genocide, it does not spell out what a State must do to comply with
this obligation.‖150
On the specific subject of Iran, in its response to an inquiry dated June 17 2009 by
the Honourable Irwin Cotler, the Department stated that, ―Canada and like-minded states
will continue to monitor statements emanating from the Government of Iran, including its
President. Canada ... has publicly condemned President Ahmadinejad‘s egregious and
offensive comments.‖151
Echoing this sentiment, Mr. McLaren stated before the Subcommittee that in
addition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs‘ boycott of President Ahmadinejad‘s speech at
the UN General Assembly in September 2009, the Government of Canada ―takes the
threat of Iran very seriously,‖ it supports Israel and shares ―many of the same concerns
Israel has about the threat posed by Iran‖. 152
The Subcommittee also heard some views suggesting that the threat posed to
Israel by these statements may be more of a rhetorical or symbolic nature than one
constituting a direct military threat. One witness, Dr. Hassan-Yari argued that it is important
to differentiate between members of the Iranian government and broader Iranian society.
He stated ―for that reason, I strongly urge this Subcommittee to take a good look at what is
148 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
149 Inquiry of Ministry, Question no. Q-331 by Ms. Kirsty Duncan, MP (Etobicoke North), June 11, 2009.
150 Ibid.
151 Inquiry of Ministry, Question no. Q-331 by Mr. Irwin Cotler, MP (Mount Royal), June 17, 2009.
152 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
53
happening in Iranian society. Do not react to the inflammatory words of people like
Ahmadinejad.‖153

Mr. McLaren had noted that the intention behind President Ahmadinejad‘s
inflammatory statements may lie in domestic consumption, in the desire to distract the
Iranian populace from their other economic, political and human rights concerns, and to
drum up nationalistic fervour in the country against western governments. Mr. McLaren
noted that while the international community should not dismiss the threats made by
President Ahmadinejad, they should be cognizant that:
... sometimes he‘s trying to whip up domestic support, and saying nasty things about
Israel unfortunately is one way to bolster his credibility in the streets of Iran and in some
parts of the Arab world. We need to take his comments seriously, but also sometimes the
perspective is that it‘s aimed more at the domestic audience. He knows when he says
things like that the western world is going to get angry, and then he can look to his people
as if he‘s standing up to the west. That‘s part of the domestic play on that.154
Mr. McLaren also pointed out that the Iranian President is careful in the statements
mentioned above to refer to the State of Israel, as opposed to Jewish people in more
general terms. Another witness, Dr. Mahdavi stated that President Ahmadinejad may be
using this hateful incitement as another means of distracting the international community
from Iran‘s poor domestic human rights record. Dr. Mahdavi cautioned against focusing
too much on the anti-Israel incitement of the hardline elements in the Iranian regime as,
―They want to shift the focus and attention away from the democratic movement and
human rights to a more nationalistic agenda.‖155
3. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
One witness, Dr. Hassan-Yari, told Subcommittee Members that the three
unsuccessful candidates in Iran‘s presidential election in June 2009 had repeatedly
maintained that Iran is not seeking to become a nuclear power and have denounced the
language mentioned previously that has been used by President Ahmadinejad.156
The majority of witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee, however, do not
believe that the motivations behind Iran‘s nuclear program are non-military in nature and
application. In fact, many witnesses argued that it is not a matter of ―if‖ but ―when‖ Iran will
develop a nuclear weapons capability. Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, Executive Director at the
Transatlantic Institute, explained to the Subcommittee:
The evidence available from open sources is something that should concern us
tremendously... I just want to mention a few things that emerge from documents such as
the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency. First, Iran has aggressively sought
153 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
154 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
155 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
156 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
54
enrichment and the mastery of the nuclear cycle... The second point is that Iran has
aggressively sought to enrich uranium.
157
He further commented that:
Iran has conducted a number of experiments and activities that can only be explained in
the context of a military program, including experiments with high explosives that are
typically used to trigger a nuclear chain reaction in a device. It has experimented on
specific, very special kinds of triggers that are typical of nuclear weapons. It has sought
the plans and technology and has experimented with milling uranium metal and shaping it
in the form of hemispheres, which can only be used in nuclear weapons. All of this is
documented, let alone the fact that much of the technology Iran achieved originally for its
nuclear power comes from the illicit nuclear network run by the Pakistani scientist and
father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. We know a lot of things about the
nuclear program in Iran from that source, which further confirms the concern that this
program has military dimensions.
158
With this in mind, the Subcommittee decided to examine Iran‘s nuclear ambitions in
order to gain a better understanding of the possible rationale behind its desire to become a
nuclear power, a timeline according to which Iran could possibly build a nuclear weapon,
and finally, what a nuclear Iran would mean for the region and the international system.
i. The Rationale Behind Iran’s Nuclear Program
According to Mr. Clawson, there are a number of possible reasons why Iran would
want to become a state with a nuclear weapons capability. At the international level, it
would give Iran greater clout, power and influence by admitting Iran into a select group of
nuclear powers. There is also a prestige element involved in a country‘s acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Dr. Mahdavi made many of these same arguments before the
Subcommittee, when he explained that Iran offers the following arguments and rationale to
support its nuclear ambitions: the country has a legitimate right to pursue a nuclear policy
in order to satisfy national prestige, commensurate with Iran‘s growing power in the Gulf
and Middle East regions; that it needs to establish an alternative source of energy,
considering that Iran currently must import refined oil products; and that it must ensure its
national security and regime survival, given perceptions in Iran of threats to its security
posed by other states in the region (the legacy of the Iran-Iraq war) and further abroad
(statements from the George W. Bush administration in the United States).159 Dr. Mahdavi
also informed the Subcommittee that, ―Almost all the people, even the opposition, support
national rights for having a nuclear capability. No matter whether they are reformists or
157 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
158 Ibid.
159 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
55
hard-liners, or even some of the opposition, they suggest this is a national right and that it
is based on NPT‘s articles.‖160
Mr. Clawson argued that President Ahmadinejad and Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps are pushing to expand Iran‘s influence and want Iran to become the preeminent
power in the Persian Gulf region. Mr. Clawson believes this reinforces Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei‘s utmost domestic preoccupation—regime survival.
The Supreme Leader‘s fears of the West‘s cultural influence and his paranoia over the
possibility of a revolution being orchestrated or abetted by the West is an important
motivation driving his role in Iran‘s nuclear ambitions.161 Mr. Clawson explained:
... it would seem to me that Khamenei's concern is how to use the nuclear program to
force the west to back off and not to provide support for non-governmental
organizations.
162
ii. Timeline
There was much speculation, but no firm prediction expressed by witnesses, as to
how far away Iran is from producing its first nuclear weapon.
Dr. Ottolenghi told Subcommittee Members that:
...we cannot determine the timeline very accurately. Also, this is a very complicated
process that is very dynamic, and it is a process that countries concerned about its
consequences constantly try to disrupt. So when high-placed officials tell you that Iran is
six months or six years away from having nuclear weapons, take those assessments with
a grain of salt, because even the most informed people in the business do not have the
exact, precise, accurate timeline down to the last month or day.
163
Mr. Clawson shared his assessment of Iran‘s capabilities with the Subcommittee:
Iran has enough centrifuges and enough low-enriched uranium that it could, if it threw out
the UN inspectors, probably make a nuclear weapon in a matter of months. Perhaps, if
things went badly, it would take a year. But that would be a pretty primitive weapon,
heavy and big, hard to deliver. It certainly wouldn't fit on a warhead of a missile, and it
would be only one.
164
Mr. Clawson also told the Subcommittee that if Iran did indeed have ―nasty
intentions,‖ it would probably seek to build more than just one missile and one warhead.
Many of these questions remain speculations—however, as Mr. Clawson reiterated, Iran
160 Ibid.
161 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
162 Ibid.
163 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
164 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
56
has been refusing to answer many of the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s questions
on its programs.
Officials from DFAIT told the Subcommittee that there is significant disagreement in
the policy community over the potential timeline and over Iran‘s current technological
capacity. Mr. Shawn Caza, Deputy Director of Nuclear Cooperation and Compliance, said
that ―it‘s very difficult to come up with any timeline that‘s very accurate.‖ He noted that
timelines are dependent on several assumptions and assessments, including whether or
not Iran has first made a ―political decision‖ to develop a nuclear weapons capability, and
also their progress in enriching nuclear material into ―high-level‖ weapons-grade material.
With respect to the latter, Mr. Caza stated that such high-level enrichment activities take
―some amount of time‖ (―at least a year of activity‖ after making the decision revealing their
political intentions) and would either be observed directly by IAEA observers at their
facilities, ―or they would have to kick out the IAEA inspectors, which would set off
significant alarm bells and we think would lead immediately to action at the Security
Council.‖ Finally, Mr. Caza noted that progress towards an actual weapons capability
would depend also on the ability to weaponize the enriched material. He assessed that it is
unclear at this point whether Iran has ―mastered all the proper knowledge to make a
weapon.‖165
4. The Possible Consequences of a Nuclear Iran: The Connection between
Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities and International Human Rights
i. The potential for Iran to act on its genocidal rhetoric
Some witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee expressed their belief
that Iran‘s genocidal declarations against Israel are inextricably linked to its desire for
nuclear weapons. Professor Dershowitz warned Subcommittee Members,
This is the first time we've had the following combination of three factors, maybe four.
One is a genocidal nation bent on inciting genocide. Two, they're soon to be armed with
nuclear weapons. Three, there's a culture of suicide that has an unwillingness to be
deterred. At least with Nazi Germany, the Stalinists, the Soviet Union, and Saddam in
Iraq, they didn't want to die. Their leaders wanted to live. They weren't promised paradise
if they killed so many people. When you have a combination of incitement to genocide,
the capability of inflicting it through nuclear weapons, and a lack of concern with losing
15 million people—all of whom would immediately go to paradise and be treated as
martyrs, at least that's what they believe—that triple combination.... Plus it's coming from
religious leaders with whom you have no right to disagree. That four-way combination is
unprecedented in human history and presents the greatest threat of genocide ever
presented on this planet, in my view.
166
165 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
166 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
57
Professor Stanton also linked Iran‘s nuclear ambitions to its leaders‘ inflammatory
incitement regarding the State of Israel. He stated:
Israel is a small country that can be reached within minutes by Iranian ballistic missiles. It
is densely populated and home to the largest number of Holocaust survivors in the world.
Time is of the essence, and delay could be catastrophic. In fact, President Ahmadinejad
says it's a really good thing that so many Jews have concentrated themselves in the state
of Israel, because it will make wiping them out easier.
167
ii. A potentially destabilising force regionally and internationally
Some of the Subcommittee‘s witnesses pointed out that the broader Middle East
region is already beginning to exhibit signs of an increasing conventional arms race.
Mr. Clawson told Members that countries in the region have ordered more than one
―hundred billion dollars worth of arms in the last three years.‖168 Even more alarming, he
declared:
Many of the countries in the region have expressed interest in starting their own nuclear
programs in response to Iran's advances.
169
Professor Dershowitz echoed the same theory while explaining how a nuclear Iran
would be a threat to international peace and security:
Saudi Arabia has the capacity to buy nuclear weapons. Probably Egypt and Jordan, and
maybe even some of the Emirates, would feel so vulnerable and exposed, because
remember that Ahmadinejad, in his speech at the UN in Geneva last week, directed his
attention not only against Israel but against ―all liberal democracies in the world‖—
Canada, the United States, Western Europe. His goal is to end democracy. He thinks
democracy is a dinosaur and would substitute a kind of religious fundamentalism, backed
by nuclear weapons.
170
Professor Dershowitz also noted that a nuclear Iran would change the balance of
power in the region. He explained, ―...you cannot end a country‘s aggression if it has
nuclear weapons.‖171 Witnesses believed that it is possible that Iran might use its nuclear
weapons to project power both in the region and internationally. Mr. McLaren (DFAIT)
stated that Canada does perceive a threat posed to Israel and other countries in the region
―by Iran and its pursuit of a nuclear capability.‖ He went on to state that while there may be
disagreements over the timelines of Iran‘s potential development of a capability, ―it is a
severe enough matter that all countries are trying to come up with a way to end any
167 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
171 Ibid.
58
chance of Iran having a nuclear weapons capability.‖172 International attempts at
negotiation continue at the UN Security Council, through the IAEA, and in the P-5-plus-1
process (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany).
In analyzing the effect that the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons is having on
Iranian President Ahmadinejad‘s approach to international relations, Mr. Clawson argued
that:
In his mind, the advances in the nuclear program show how Iran has the ability to do
what it wishes, irrespective of complaints by outsiders, so the nuclear program has been
very useful. Even when Iran does not have nuclear weapons, Iran can use this image that
it's making advances on the nuclear front to argue that Iran's position should be listened
to carefully, that the tide of history is with it, and that Iran has every right to voice
whatever opinion it wishes in meetings such as that in Geneva the other day.
173
From the regional perspective, Dr. Ottolenghi told Subcommittee Members that,
Even if the Iranian leadership uses the rhetoric only as a tool for propaganda and in truth
wants nuclear weapons just to somehow strengthen its power and protect itself and its
survival, the meaning of that acquisition is that Iran, in the combination of nuclear
weapons and its ideology, will destabilize the region for decades to come and will make it
impossible for the forces in the region that seek reconciliation among peoples, resolution
of armed conflicts, the defeat of radical ideologies, and the assertion of human rights
across the Middle East to actually triumph.
174
If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Dr. Ottolenghi believes it could possibility
result in scenarios whereby members of the international community would have to
negotiate with Iran, but with little bargaining leverage, meaning that they would ultimately
have to accept necessary compromises on key issues.175
IV. IRAN AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: THE SUBCOMMITTEE’S
OBSERVATIONS
1. Iran’s International Peace and Security Obligations
i. Iran’s Treaty Obligations
As many witnesses before the Subcommittee stated, Iran is party to the Genocide
Convention which ensures the following: states undertake to prevent and punish genocide
(Art. 1); and, beyond the commission of genocide itself, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide is punishable (Art. 3). According to Professor Stanton, Iran‘s open and
172 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
173 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
174 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
175 Ibid.
59
direct declarations of aggressive intentions towards another sovereign UN member state
are also violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Professor Gordon told Subcommittee Members that:
Given the totality of circumstances, legal precedents from the Rwandan genocide
prosecutions teach that Ahmadinejad's urging to liquidate Israel could be charged as a
direct and public incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity.
176
Further, he added:
... to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, it must be proved that the crimes
were related to the attack on a civilian population. I believe the available evidence
suggests that Ahmadinejad's ―eliminate Israel‖ advocacy would be related to the attacks
on Israeli civilians, seemingly sponsored by Ahmadinejad and perpetrated by Hezbollah
and Islamic Jihad.
177
In terms of Iran‘s nuclear ambitions, it should be noted that Iran is a party to the
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Even as a current nonnuclear
state, there are still obligations under the NPT according to which witnesses say
Iran is in violation. Article 2 of the NPT prohibits each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to
the Treaty from undertaking not to receive, transfer, control, manufacture or acquire
directly or indirectly any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices.
The NPT does permit a state‘s inalienable right to research, produce and use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Along these lines, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) is mandated to verify whether or not a non-nuclear state is acquiring
nuclear weapons and/or diverting its nuclear energy from peaceful uses to weapons
applications.
Mr. Clawson argued that Iran is failing to meet these NPT obligations. He said:
Unfortunately, Iran is cooperating less and less with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. It now is probably not even fulfilling the absolute minimum requirements. There's
a dispute between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency about whether or not
Iran is fulfilling the absolute minimum requirements, and I do mean minimum, for these
inspections. Whereas previously Iran better understood that openness did much to dispel
concerns and was leading us towards some confidence that we had a handle on or an
understanding of what Iran's program is like, now there's a lot of concern that Iran may in
fact be trying to hide some covert activities and develop some capabilities similar to what
it did during the 18 years before 2003, when, it is now acknowledged, it was doing things
covertly.
178
176 Evidence, Meeting No. 10, March 31, 2009.
177 Ibid.
178 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
60
RECOMMENDATION 14
The Subcommittee recommends that, as a member of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Government of Canada should use
every opportunity to encourage the IAEA to continue its efforts to
inspect Iranian nuclear production facilities.
ii. Iran’s Non-Treaty Obligations
Iran‘s obligations under international law extend beyond those defined by the
international treaties to which it is a signatory.
In the field of human rights or humanitarian law, customary international law
imposes prohibitions against certain conduct being committed by state authorities and/or
of individuals. These prohibitions are considered to be binding on all states, including the
prohibition of various acts constituting war crimes and/or crimes against humanity.
Second, the Subcommittee was told that the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court gives jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court (ICC), in
certain circumstances, to try persons accused of having committed the most serious forms
of crimes under international law ( i.e. crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide),
even when they involve nationals of non-party states. Therefore, the Rome Statute could
potentially be applicable to some of Iran‘s leaders if they were to commit these crimes
even though that country has not ratified the Rome Statute.
Third, the Subcommittee heard that Iran has been the target of sanctions adopted
by the United Nations Security Council according to its mandate to maintain international
peace and security.179 Under international law, if such resolutions are adopted under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and if they are phrased using mandatory
language, they create legal obligations that are binding on UN member states. Iran, as the
target of such a sanctions regime, is therefore bound by international law to abide by their
terms.
Among other things, these UN resolutions call upon Iran to cooperate with the
IAEA‘s efforts to verify what Iran maintains is the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear
program and to suspend certain proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. They also call
upon other states to ―exercise vigilance and restraint‖ regarding the admittance of a list of
designated individuals into their territory, and the prevention of ―the supply, sale or transfer
directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals‖ of certain categories of items,
materials, equipment goods and technology linked to nuclear activities and weapon
delivery systems.‖ Finally, resolutions have called on states to ―exercise vigilance over the
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran read more... to
179 See the following United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Resolution 1696 (2006); Resolution 1737
(2006); Resolution 1747 (2007); Resolution 1803 (2008); Resolution 1835 (2008).
61
avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities ...‖, and
to inspect relevant cargoes to and from Iran.180
2. Implications for Canada
i. The Responsibility to Protect and Prevent
Witnesses explained to Subcommittee Members that Canada has a moral and
legal responsibility to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. Members were told
that as a party to the Genocide Convention and considering Canada‘s leading role in the
adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine at the United Nations, Canada may call
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the UN
Charter as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 (Art. 8). Canada may also submit
disputes related to the application of the Genocide Convention before the International
Court of Justice (Art. 9).
Professor Stanton told the Subcommittee:
I now want to turn briefly to the responsibility to protect. The ethical principle that needs
to guide international action to prevent genocidal threats is that human life is the most
fundamental human right, because without life there is no other right. Canada has been
the most important leader in creating a newly emerging norm of international law. The
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, sponsored by the
Canadian government, defined what is now called ―the responsibility to protect,‖ which
was affirmed in the Millennium Summit outcome document of 2005. It is based on the
principle that the international obligation to protect human life and well-being overrides
the sovereignty claims of any government whose actions demonstrate genocidal intent.
...
Now I want to turn to another basic principle of genocide prevention, the precautionary
principle... The principle states simply that when there is uncertainty concerning the risk
from a situation with potentially catastrophic effects upon human health and safety, the
risks of inaction far outweigh those of preventive action... Preventive action, of course,
means the obligatory imposition of effective sanctions to prevent Iranian development of
nuclear weapons and includes immediate and continuous IAEA inspections of all Iranian
nuclear facilities as well as confiscation of all technology, equipment, and nuclear
material that could be used by Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons.
181
ii. Addressing Iran’s Nuclear Program
Canada has implemented the binding provisions of the Security Council
Resolutions listed in the previous section. According to Mr. Clawson, these resolutions
have been effective at slowing down Iran‘s nuclear program, however:
180 Ibid.
181 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
62
The Security Council sanctions have really been targeted at the nuclear and missile
program. The council has not done very much about political sanctions designed to press
the Iranian government to come back to the negotiating table.
182
Some witnesses recommended the imposition of economic sanctions, even though
the effectiveness of these types of sanctions remains debatable. Mr. Victor Comras,
lawyer, told Members that:
Let's be clear, the low-impact sanctions now on the table simply will not work. The
sanctions measures adopted so far by the Security Council are clearly insufficient to
motivate Iran to change course. Rather, it seems to me they've conveyed the sense that
the key countries continue to lack the political will necessary to face up to Iran's
challenge to non-proliferation norms. And this signal has been received loud and clear by
the Iranian regime...
183
At the more general level, thus, several witnesses told the Subcommittee that
western states should not focus their energies on considering the imposition of broader
economic sanctions against Iran as such sanctions raise complex issues that can, if
implemented incorrectly, lead to more harm than good. In the testimony received in
October 2009, most witnesses expressed caution, noting in particular the potential
negative side effects of broad-based sanctions that target the country as a whole.
Dr. Mahdavi argued that policy makers in Canada and like-minded states ―should say no
to economic sanctions on Iran, because they would simply be a collective punishment.‖184
Similarly, Professor Akhavan noted that, ―One needs to think very carefully about what
impact sanctions are going to have on those we want to pay the price for the violations.‖185
Dr. Mahdavi also pointed out that ineffective sanctions can serve to bolster the position of
members of the governing elite, who control key sectors of the economy and access to licit
and illicit goods. He argued that ―any kind of economic sanctions would play into the hands
of again, the Revolutionary Guards, because they have already created a kind of mafia
economy, a black market economy.‖ The Guards could, according to Dr. Mahdavi, ―exploit
Iran‘s economic resources and get out of these so-called sanctions.‖186
Witnesses also noted that one has to be realistic regarding the efficacy of economic
sanctions that could be imposed by states such as Canada on an individual basis in
response to human rights violations, given that Iran‘s most significant trading and
investment relationships are with China and neighbouring states in the Gulf Region.
Dr. Milani expressed these geopolitical realities in frank terms, arguing that:
When the regime has $80 billion to $100 billion in oil revenues to play with; when it has
China, Russia, India, the United Arab Emirates, and even some European companies
182 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
183 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
184 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
185 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 29, 2009.
186 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
63
willing to help it; and when the regime has an estimated 40,000 companies based in the
United Arab Emirates whose sole job is to buy embargoed commodities, bring them into
the United Arab Emirates, and then ship them across the channel to Iran, then
embargoes seem to play into the hands of the regime, because they offer an excuse for
its incompetence. They offer an excuse for its absolutely embarrassing corruption and
incompetence.187
Other witnesses pointed out that outside of its important and growing economic
relations with countries like the UAE and China, Iran‘s most statistically important trading
relationships are with European countries. Given these realities, Dr. Milani‘s testimony
suggested that an effective sanctions regime would have to be international in its scope
and universally-applied, involving these key regional and international economic players
and, in the model of the sanctions regime that was imposed against the apartheid-era
governing regime in South Africa, would also have to specifically target Iran‘s sales of oil
and gas, which account for an approximate 70 to 80 percent of the Iranian government‘s
revenue stream. He stated clearly that, ―If the world stops buying oil and gas from Iran, this
government will listen to anything the world has to say.‖188 Dr. Milani, however, expressed
pessimism over the probability that these types of sanctions could ever be agreed to and
implemented by the key states. The prospects of imposing strict international economic
sanctions through the United Nations Security Council is also complicated, given the roles
of Russia and China which are permanent veto-wielding members of the Council. Both of
these states have expressed somewhat cautious attitudes in response to the possibility of
adopting resolutions that would impose strict international economic sanctions against
Iran. Dr. Mahdavi argued that a strategy that does not include the cooperation of Russia
and China ―will be irrelevant‖.189
Although Canada does not have a significant trade relationship with Iran,
Dr. Ottolenghi advised that the Government of Canada should be paying attention to
Iranian companies in Canada that may be a front for illegal procurement activities.
Although he had no evidence to suggest that any such activities were currently being
conducted in Canada, he pointed to an Iranian company with branches across Europe
(and a branch in Canada) that the European Union has planned to ―designate and
sanction because of its illegal activities.‖ In addition, he added that Iran has been known to
acquire technology that is ―ostensibly bought for entirely legitimate purposes‖. However,
―open sources demonstrate conclusively that this technology has been diverted to entities
that are designated by the U.S. Department of Treasury and are sanctioned by the

European Union or the United Nations, and that it's technology that will eventually end up
being used for purposes not for which it was sold.‖190
187 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
188 Ibid.
189 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
190 Evidence, Meeting No. 16, May 5, 2009.
64
Professor Akhavan suggested that certain companies could be boycotted because
their products were sold to the Government of Iran which has allegedly used them in the
violation of human rights. He also suggested that Canada could ―reward certain
companies read more... that have withdrawn from Iran because of their opposition to the current
climate.‖191
Witnesses also stated that because the European Union is a more important
trading partner for Iran than either Canada or the United States, it has more leverage and
tools at its disposable to implement effective economic sanctions against Iran. Therefore,
witnesses suggested that the Government of Canada work with its European allies to
encourage the enactment of these sanctions.
With that in mind, Mr. Comras also suggested the following approach for Canada
and like-minded states:
Europe, Japan, and Canada could also join the United States in cutting off Iran's access
to high-tech items, including potential dual use equipment and expertise. Together, we
could put considerable pressure on the UAE, on Dubai, and the free port of Jebel Ali,
which serves as a trans-shipment point for so many of the items that are not supposed to
be shipped there. Europe, Canada, and Japan might also consider joining with us in
restricting access of Iranian ships to our ports, or refusing to insure or re-insure Iranian
ships or cargoes, or increasing insurance premiums for Iranian merchandise or for ships
carrying such merchandise. We could start imposing travel restrictions. We could cut off
cultural, sporting, and scientific exchanges with Iran. These are examples of measures
that could be threatened or taken to convince Iran that we mean business.
192
In this context, witnesses also reiterated that the position taken by Canada and the
international community towards Iran‘s nuclear program cannot be treated in isolation from
the broader questions on international human rights. Mr. Clawson argued that because of
the limitations described above, a ―political stance of unity‖ by Canada and like-minded
states would likely be more effective in this case and have a greater impact on Iran than
economic sanctions.193
RECOMMENDATION 15
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to work with the United Nations and members of the
international community to add sanctions to those already imposed
against Iran. In particular, the Subcommittee recommends that the
Government of Canada move in concert with its international partners
to implement the necessary regulations under the Special Economic
Measures Act (SEMA) and/or Export and Import Permits Act to impose:
191 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
192 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
193 Evidence, Meeting No. 14, April 23, 2009.
65
• A ban on all goods exported from Canada to Iran, excepting
humanitarian goods such as food and medicine, and a ban on
all goods imported from Iran to Canada;
• A ban on businesses or their subsidiaries operating in Canada
from exporting gasoline and other refined petroleum products
to Iran or facilitating such export (i.e. the shipping and
insurance industries);
• A ban on new investment in Iran or the introduction of
incentives to prevent such investments, particularly with
regards to Iran’s energy infrastructure, by Canadian persons
and companies (as well as foreign companies or their
subsidiaries operating in Canada) and including related
industries such as shipping, insurance and construction
companies;
• A prohibition on the provision of financial services to and from
Iran, particularly regarding any transactions with the Iranian
Central Bank, by businesses or their subsidiaries operating in
Canada;
• A prohibition on the export of any technologies to Iran,
particularly those that enable the Iranian regime to violate the
human rights of its own people (including but not limited to
surveillance equipment);
• A prohibition on Canadian-registered ships from docking in
Iran and on Iranian-registered ships from docking in Canada
and passing through Canadian waters.
iii. Linking Iran’s Nuclear Program with its Genocidal Intentions
A number of the witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee argued that
their most urgent concern was the danger that Iran poses to the international community
because of its leaders‘ genocidal incitement, and the connection that could possibly be
drawn between its nuclear program and its regional ambitions. Professor Cotler argued
that when the international community just focuses on the nuclear, ―there is a danger of
ignoring and sanitizing the genocidal context in which the nuclear takes place and makes
the nuclear so threatening.‖194
According to Professor Dershowitz, the international community needs to take
action against these statements because:
194 Evidence, Meeting No. 27, June 18, 2009.
66
When Ahmadinejad incites genocide, he does so with the full force of the Iranian
government behind him... There is no marketplace of ideas, at least not officially, in
Ahmadinejad's Iran. Accordingly, Ahmadinejad's incitement to genocide is not offered as
an idea to be debated. Instead, it is a direction, an instruction. It is closely analogous to
the incitements to genocide that have been punished in Rwanda by the international
courts.195
Further, he stated:
... the combination of such incitement to genocide and the development of nuclear
weapons presents a clear and present danger of actual genocide to the world in general
and to Israel and the Jewish people in particular.
...
There are those who argue that Ahmadinejad's call to wipe Israel off the map is intended
as a metaphor, or has been translated incorrectly, or is merely a political statement. This
misses the point. Ahmadinejad well knows that his statements will be understood by
many as a call for genocide.
...
These weapons need not be fired from rocket launchers or dropped from planes. They
can be smuggled into a country as dirty bombs by individuals who have been incited by
what they regard as superior orders or religious obligations.196
Professor Gordon expressed similar concerns. He stated before the Subcommittee
that:
I come here today with a certain sense of moral outrage. Since when is it acceptable for a
world leader to advocate the destruction of another country? And in that context, is it not
problematic for that same leader to dehumanize the people of that country? How is it that
we can abide this leader calling for deportation of an entire people from its own country?
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been doing this in relation to the state and people of Israel
since 2005. I am here today to tell you that I believe something must be done about it.197
iv. Canada’s Bilateral and Multilateral Options
A number of the Subcommittee‘s witnesses suggested that Canada take action
against high-ranking members of the Iranian government, notably President Ahmadinejad,
in international legal fora, for what they consider to be his role in inciting genocide against
Israel and Jews and for his role in what may be an illicit nuclear weapons program.
In terms of bilateral actions, a number of witnesses recommended that the
Government of Canada initiate an inter-state complaint against the Government of Iran
195 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
196 Ibid.
197 Evidence, Meeting No. 10, March 31, 2009.
67
before the International Court of Justice, under Article 9 of the Genocide Convention.
According to Professor Gordon, the Australian government has ―spoken seriously about
doing this but has not yet taken action.‖198
Dr. David Matas, Senior Legal Counsel for B‘nai Brith Canada, and other witnesses
suggested that Canada could also move to ban President Ahmadinejad and other Iranian
officials from entering Canada. Canada could also add its voice and assist with the
enforcement of the standing international arrest warrants against various Iranian
officials.199
Finally, at the bilateral level, Canada could also take action to recognise Iran‘s
aforementioned role in regional destabilisation through its support for such listed entities
as Hamas and Hezbollah. Canada could take clear symbolic and legal action by including
Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a listed entity due to its connection to
international terrorism as explained in a previous section of this report.
Another option, according to Mr. Genser, would involve the following multilateral
action:
The obviously very hard, and probably impossible, thing to do, but perhaps the morally
correct thing to do, is to also urge that the UN Security Council, under a chapter 7
resolution, refer the situation of Iran and its incitement to genocide to the International
Criminal Court for investigation and potential prosecution. That would be individual
criminal liability for those involved in the incitement themselves. I think it's unlikely, given
the vetoes in the Security Council and the complicated nature of what's going on, that this
would be successful.
200
The ICC has been pursuing the case of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir for
allegations related to his role in the violence and abuses that occurred in the Darfur region
of that country. Although this case has set a precedent for the indictment of a sitting head
of state, Professor Gordon explained that ―incitement charges have never been filed in the
absence of subsequent mass atrocity, and so it is unlikely they would be filed‖ in the case
of Iran.201 He believes that one of the lessons the international community should draw
from past genocides is that the jurisprudence of ―incitement law should turn its current
focus from post-atrocity prosecution and punishment to pre-atrocity deterrence. That is the
true purpose of the incitement crime. It is not enough to punish it after the mass graves
have been filled.‖202
198 Evidence, Meeting No. 17, May 7, 2009.
199 Evidence, Meeting No. 11, April 2, 2009.
200 Evidence, Meeting No. 6, March 10, 2009.
201 Evidence, Meeting No. 10, March 31, 2009.
202 Ibid.
68
Also at the multilateral level, witnesses before the Subcommittee urged Canada to
continue using the UN Security Council, General Assembly and the Human Rights Council
as venues to send messages to Iran‘s leaders that their incitement and violent actions are
unacceptable.
RECOMMENDATION 16
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada call
upon United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to refer the
matter of Iran’s genocidal incitement to the Security Council pursuant
to Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis that Iran
poses a threat to international peace and security.
RECOMMENDATION 17
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
include Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a listed entity for
its role in supporting international terrorist organizations in
accordance with Canadian law.
RECOMMENDATION 18
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada assist
with the enforcement of standing international arrest warrants that
have been filed against Iranian government officials.
RECOMMENDATION 19
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
initiate an inter-state complaint against the Government of Iran before
the International Court of Justice, under Article 9 of the Genocide
Convention, calling Iran to account for its violations of the Convention,
including its failure to punish the incitement to genocide perpetrated
by its officials.
RECOMMENDATION 20
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, in
accordance with Canada’s responsibilities under Article 1 of the
Genocide Convention and the prohibition against incitement to
genocide in Article 3 of the Convention, invite the United Nations
Security Council to consider referring to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court the case of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and those Iranian leaders participating with him in direct
and public incitement to genocide, for investigation and prospective
prosecution.
69
RECOMMENDATION 21
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
petition the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with
Canada’s responsibilities under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention
and the prohibition against incitement to genocide in Article 3 of the
Convention, to take appropriate action and to hold Iran to account.
V. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN POST-ELECTION IRAN: SUMMARY OF
EVIDENCE
The events following the announced result of the June 2009 presidential election in
Iran have deeply affected the Iranian people and in turn, the Iranian governing regime.
According to Mr. McLaren (DFAIT), the Iranian people thought that their election was
taken from them.203 Perceptions of electoral fraud in the country and the general sense
amongst segments of the Iranian population that the announced electoral victory of
incumbent President Ahmadinejad did not reflect a process that had been entirely free or
fair, led to significant mass public demonstrations and protests, the likes of which had not
been seen in Iran since the 1979 revolution. This public outcry was in turn met by swift
action from government and government-affiliated agents against demonstrators and
outspoken opponents of the ruling regime. Many observers within Iran and those
commenting from around the world have argued that the actions that were taken to break
up street demonstrations and stifle dissent have constituted serious human rights abuses.
According to Mr. McLaren, since the June 2009 election, the ―veneer of democracy
inside Iran‖, where ―the regime would tell their people there‘s a democratic system on top
of the Islamic republic‖ has been shattered.204 It remains to be seen how these events will
affect Iran politically, spiritually and socially. Observers, however, worry that the future may
hold further violent clashes. Observers are also waiting for Canada and the international
community to formulate their policies in response to these human rights violations in Iran,
in the hopes that actions and decisions taken by these pro-―status quo‖ actors in Iran do
not hinder the democratic movement that is gaining in popularity.
1. The current political and human rights situation in Iran
The majority of Iran‘s population is young, and increasingly educated and
technology-savvy, particularly in urban areas. However, the opportunities available to
Iran‘s youth are stifled by severe rates of unemployment. Professor Akhavan captured the
situation well, commenting that, ―The reason we have had millions of people coming onto
the streets of Iran is the desperation of people there.‖205 He noted that in a country where
some 70 percent of the population is under 30 years old, estimates suggest that 25 to 40
203 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
204 Ibid.
205 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
70
percent of the youth is either underemployed or unemployed. The stark realities facing this
young population and their desire for change were expressed by Professor Akhavan who
said that, ―when young people are willing to get murdered in the streets, it‘s not because
they‘re fanatics, it‘s because they have no hope. They‘re desperate. They would rather get
killed than remain silent.‖206
Perhaps the element of the presidential election that served to highlight the heavyhanded
nature of the governing regime‘s response to street demonstrations was the fact
that these ordinary Iranians were not attempting to overthrow their political system through
a new revolution. The demonstrators were simply expressing the desire to ensure that the
political system that exists in Iran is respected. Professor Akhavan made this clear when
he stated, ―… this was not an election, it was a selection… The structure is that the
supreme leader will determine who can run for elections or run for Parliament, and that‘s
the façade of democracy that the regime has created to legitimize itself without actually
having a democracy.‖207 The candidates for presidential office had already been vetted by
the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council before the election took place, to ensure that
all candidates who were permitted to run were more or less supportive of the country‘s
status quo institutions, but differing on policy areas within that overall structure.
Mrs. Redman told the Subcommittee that ―people who are looking for change are not
looking to overthrow the government; they‘re looking for change within the government
structure right now.‖208 Similarly, Dr. Mahdavi explained to the Subcommittee that the new
generation of young people in Iran consists of ―realists‖ who are ―ready to work within the
system‖209:
For this reason, they voted twice for Mohammad Khatami in 1997. We know that
reformists failed to deliver on their promise, thanks to the structure of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
In 2009, they were ready to play within the restricted system. They voted for one of the
candidates of the establishment. None of these four candidates was revolutionary or
radical. They realized that the regime is not going to tolerate even Mr. Mousavi or
Mr. Karoubi.210
Ironically, the regime‘s violent response to the peaceful post-election
demonstrations was a crackdown on people who were largely supporting the status quo,
but who were seeking to ensure that the small democratic space that exists within this
status quo system was respected. Mrs. Redman illustrated the extent of the regime‘s
paranoia with respect to any societal expressions in favour of democratic values.
She referred to the regime‘s use of forced public confessions reflective of its tenuous grip
on power. She told the Subcommittee that in one such show trial ―a document called an
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
71
indictment was read. It wasn't a legal indictment as we or the Iranian judicial system would
recognize, but more of a political statement about their fomenting velvet revolutions and
corresponding with foreign human rights organizations and foreign governments.‖211
Allegations of election fraud, not only by the Iranian population, but also by
members of Iran‘s political and religious elite, have served to delegitimize the authority of
the entire regime, including a loss of confidence in the Supreme Leader who strongly
supported the electoral outcome and called for demonstrations disputing this outcome to
end. As Professor Akhavan stated:
… the supreme leader who for many years was above these kinds of political divisions,
has now become regarded as merely one political faction among others. The Office of the
Supreme Leader has lost its legitimacy in an irreparable way. It‘s impossible for that
institution to ever retrieve the authority that it once had.212
According to a number of witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee, the
response by the Iranian government to the demonstrations and protests can be described
as a ―brutal crackdown.‖ In addition, one of the witnesses, Mrs. Redman, stated that there
is reason to believe that ―the human rights situation has become worse since June and
July.‖213 As Dr. Milani explained:
Unfortunately, since June 12 and what I think was an electoral heist, these breaches [of
human rights] have increased. The regime feels more isolated, the regime feels weaker,
and as is always the case when these kinds of regimes are frightened, they show their
more brutal side.214
Several of these witnesses told Subcommittee Members that these human rights
violations have included mass arrests, imprisonments, and executions. Reports of
prisoners being tortured and forced to confess under duress in televised mass show trials
that do not even conform to Iranian law are also a cause for concern.215 Other troubling
incidents were documented because demonstrators and members of the opposition took
advantage of the Internet and new media to disseminate images and stories of brazen
shootings, stabbings and harassment of civilians, many of whom were only demonstrating
in the streets or looking on as bystanders, by member of the Basij militia, a plain-clothed
terror squad under the auspices of Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who in turn
take direction from the Supreme Leader.216
Unfortunately, the crackdown has also made it difficult to assess the full scope and
severity of these human rights violations due to insufficient access to information and a
211 Ibid.
212 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
213 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
214 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
215 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
216 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
72
general absence of transparency in the country. The threats against domestic journalists
have forced some to leave the country and foreign journalists have been barred from
entering. In addition, human rights organizations in Iran have been shut down.217
Therefore, it is difficult to obtain comprehensive and verifiable information to piece together
exactly what has taken place.218 The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center is
currently in the process of conducting an investigation into the human rights abuses that
followed the June 12, 2009 election. Witnesses praised the Government of Canada, which
put forward $60,000 from DFAIT‘s Glyn Berry program to help the Center with this
investigation.219
Witnesses appearing before the Subcommittee agreed that this crackdown
sanctioned by the Iranian government against opposition groups, journalists, government
critics, demonstrators and others has not achieved the objective of silencing the Iranian
population‘s struggle for democracy. In fact, according to Dr. Mahdavi, what the world is

currently witnessing in Iran is an ―authentic grassroots, bottom-up, social and political
movement for democracy and human rights,‖ not an uprising or foreign-inspired revolution,
but a civil rights movement—an ―unprecedented and unique green movement.‖220
In terms of the regime itself, witnesses described its situation as an unprecedented
crisis, ―not only because it is facing the wrath of the Iranian people, but for the first time, it
is also broken right in the middle in its own ranks.‖221 According to Dr. Milani, not only are
the two surviving key architects of the original 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei and
Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, fighting against each other, but there have also been
indications that some of Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders are not in
line with the leadership‘s call to complete the suppression of the opposition movement.222
This rift in the regime has apparently reached the bureaucracy. For example, many
employees in the intelligence ministry, who do not believe that this democratic movement
is a concoction of the ―West,‖ are being forced out.223
Although some within the senior ranks of Iran‘s regime may disagree with the
institution of further repression, witnesses appearing before the Subcommittee were
concerned that these tensions could result in the further militarization of Iran as elements
within the regime attempt to hold on to their power. Professor Akhavan explained that
217 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
218 Ibid.
219 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
220 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
221 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
73
Iran‘s regime is now a military one since ―key members of the cabinet are now members of
the Sepah-e, the Revolutionary Guards.‖224 Dr. Milani concurred, saying that:
What I fear most, to be honest with you … is that the Revolutionary Guards will take over
in a fashion that will resemble the Myanmar or Pakistan version of a military clampdown. I
think that holding power is so important to the Revolutionary Guards that if they feel they
are losing control, they might do something like Musharraf in Pakistan or the junta in
Myanmar. They would take over and suspend all civil rights and the constitution.225
Still, the overwhelming assessment among the Subcommittee‘s witnesses remains
that a major political and societal shift has occurred. According to Dr. Mahdavi, in 1997
when the reformists came to power in Iran, they soon realized how little power they
actually had under the existing political system to deliver on their promises.226 The June
election further proved to reformists that given the existing structures of power, bringing
change to Iran from within the leadership ranks is very challenging.227 However, witnesses
before the Subcommittee were hopeful that change in Iran can and must come from its
people. As several witnesses told Members, the new generation in Iran, ―the children of
the revolution‖, are ―not happy with the social, economic, and political policies of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.‖228 This new generation is well-educated, worldly, and realistic.
According to Professor Akhavan:
One of the slogans on the streets now is ―Neither Gaza nor Lebanon; I will only sacrifice
my life for Iran‖. What are they saying? They‘re saying they are tired of hate-mongering
and the use of imaginary external enemies as a way of crushing internal dissent and that
they want to live in peace with their neighbours.229
What worries many of the witnesses, however, is how this change will come about
and whether or not violence in Iran will escalate in the process. Violence has already
emerged in certain regions of Iran over the recent months, especially in regions populated
by ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Baluchistan region.230 These regions have
been neglected by the regime and are often the poorest regions in the country.
As previously mentioned, recent talks between Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
commanders and Baluchi elders to dispel some of the tensions were met by a terrorist
bombing. Baluchis, who are Sunni Muslims, are both an ethnic and religious minority.
According to Dr. Milani, ―some of the more radical elements of Shiism would not mind
triggering or reopening old wounds in terms of Shiite-Sunni tensions.‖231 According to the
224 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
225 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
226 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
230 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
231 Ibid.
74
same witness, a peaceful solution to the Baluchi problem is important because if the
situation gets out of hand, there could be a resurgence of Sunni-Shiite sectarian
violence.232
Professor Akhavan stated:
There is a real fear on the part of the non-violent democratic movement that as people in
certain minorities become increasingly desperate, they will resort to violence [… ] My own
sincere hope is that this democratic movement maintains its discipline and succeeds
through non-violence, but one has to also anticipate the possibility that the longer this
situation continues and the longer that the international community helps prop up this
regime, the greater the prospect that some, discouraged by non-violence, will begin to
resort to violent methods. That will be, I think, most unfortunate for the future of Iran and
what kind of regime we will end up with.233
2. The response from the international community and Canada
Witnesses before the Subcommittee repeatedly expressed frustration at the fixation
in the international community, and particularly by the United States, with the nuclear issue
as opposed to the grave breaches of human rights that followed the June 12 election in
Iran. It seems in particular that since Iran‘s recent revelation that it had built an additional
covert enrichment facility and then signalled its on and off willingness to participate in the
P-5 plus 1 talks234 that the issue of human rights in Iran has dropped off the table in favour
of the nuclear talks.
According to Professor Akhavan, it is not a coincidence that soon after the
United States government announced its funding cuts to the Iran Human Rights
Documentation Center and a number of other human rights and democracy programs
aimed to educate Iranians about these issues, President Ahmadinejad suddenly
expressed, at the P-5 plus one talks, his initial willingness to consider cooperation in the
proposal to ship Iran‘s uranium abroad to safe third-party countries for enrichment.235
Witnesses told Subcommittee Members that Iran‘s leadership has been able to manipulate
these issues to its advantage in the past. In their view, it is unlikely that Iran will keep its
promises in the future. In the meantime, the democratic movement in Iran will suffer as a
result of the lack of international attention paid to the county‘s domestic human rights
situation. As Professor Akhavan explained:
The Iranian government is watching and calculating how much it can get away with. If the
message of the international community is that cooperation on the nuclear issue would
mean acquiescence in all manner of atrocities, then the hardliners, as they try to
232 Ibid.
233 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
234 The P5+1 group includes the Permanent five Member-States of the UN Security Council: the United States,
Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France, plus Germany.
235 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
75
consolidate their grip, will execute and torture as many people as they can get away with.
We should have no illusions about their capacity to do that.236
Dr. Milani expressed similar concerns:
Unless human rights and democratic rights are kept part of the discussion, the Iranian
democrats, the Iranian citizens, will think that the west has sold them [out] in return for a
promise on the nuclear issue or oil issue. That would be detrimental to the future of the
democratic movement in Iran. The democratic movement in Iran needs, I think, to know
that the west is aware of its existence and aware of its legitimacy…237
In fact, every witness before the Subcommittee stated that human rights must be
part of every dialogue with Iran, if not representing the first and foremost priority. Despite
the fact that Iran argues it has the sovereign right to develop a nuclear energy capability,
Dr. Mahdavi argues that Iran also has a legitimate obligation ―to enrich democratic values
and institutions‖.238 The two issues cannot be separated, with a negotiated solution to the
nuclear issue overlooking the human rights concerns. One should not be sacrificed for
progress in the other as was done in Libya. According to Dr. Milani, Iranians are very well
aware of the ―Libya syndrome‖: once Libya gave up its nuclear program, its ―egregious
errors and breaches in human rights‖ were forgotten, and its leader was invited to the
capitals of the West instead of being treated like the ―criminal‖ that he was.239
With respect to Canadian policy following the June 12, 2009 election in Iran,
officials from DFAIT stated that:
The post-election situation is deeply troubling for Canada. Canada has maintained that
the allegations of discrepancies in the June 12 presidential elections are serious and
need to be answered. Prime Minister Harper issued two statements condemning the use
of violence in the crackdown on protesters by Iranian security forces. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs also issued statements condemning the use of violence by Iranian
security forces, and has called upon Iran to fully respect all of its human rights
obligations, both in law and practice. He has called on Iran to conduct a thorough and
transparent investigation into the allegations surrounding the elections. Canada also
joined the G-8 on July 8 in expressing its concerns regarding the elections.240
Witnesses were very supportive of Canada‘s role to date. As mentioned earlier,
they welcomed Canadian funding for the ongoing Iran Human Rights Documentation
Center‘s investigation into the human rights abuses in Iran following the presidential
election. Witnesses also encouraged the Government of Canada to maintain its leadership
role regarding the UN General Assembly resolutions which hold ―the Iranian government
236 Ibid.
237 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
238 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
239 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
240 Evidence, Meeting No. 31, October 20, 2009.
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to account for its systemic and persistent human rights violations‖ and ―sets out specific
actions to be taken by Iran to rectify its human rights situation.‖241
VI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN POST-ELECTION IRAN: THE
SUBCOMMITTEE’S OBSERVATIONS
The Subcommittee notes that the witnesses who appeared following the June 12,
2009 election were more or less unified in their recommendations to the Government of
Canada on how it should engage with the Government of Iran. They all agreed that military
action by the international community against Iran is not an option. They also agreed that
blanket economic sanctions would only help the regime. Some witnesses supported
targeted sanctions, although many were skeptical as to how these would work in practice.
All witnesses agreed that any Canadian effort to dialogue with the Government of Iran
must maintain the issue of human rights and democracy at the forefront.
The Subcommittee recognizes this need.
As stressed by Dr. Milani:
Again, I have always been for negotiations with this regime. I have never believed that
not talking to this regime is a policy. Not talking is not a policy; not talking is a failure of
having a policy. My suggestion has been, and still is, that the west must talk to this
regime, but it must talk with this regime with the issues of human rights and the
democratic rights of the people on the table, front and centre.242
The Subcommittee questioned witnesses as to what kind of an impact, realistically,
Canada could have on the political and human rights situation in Iran. As mentioned by
Dr. Mahdavi, Canada and Iran do not have good relations.243 Professor Akhavan stated:
… Canada is extremely important to the Iranian community, both to the democrats and
human rights activists who have made Canada their home and are proud members of
this nation, and also among the elites of the regime who send their children to school
here, who have major investments here, and who are also trying to lobby the members of
this House of Commons for their own business and other interests.244
Dr. Mahdavi, along with all the other witnesses, stressed the importance of giving
moral and spiritual support to the democratic opposition in Iran.245 Professor Akhavan
suggested that in addition to supporting the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center in
its investigation, opening an office in Canada would send a clear symbolic message.246
241 Ibid.
242 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
243 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
244 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
245 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
246 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
77
Multilaterally, the Subcommittee notes that although the Government of Canada
does abide by its international obligations under the UN Security Council Resolutions
1737, 1747, and 1803 (which impose sanctions on specific individuals, arms and goods
with respect to Iran‘s nuclear program), no such resolution exists for individuals in Iran and
companies that are complicit in the regime‘s human rights abuses towards its population.
Dr. Mahdavi stated that Canada should do whatever it can to urge other
governments and the United States that are currently dialoguing with Iran on the nuclear
issue to stand by the democratic movement in Iran and to keep human rights and
democracy as a priority issue.247 In fact, a democratic Iran would solve not only the issue
of human rights but also the nuclear issue. As suggested by Dr. Milani:
It is my hope that the international community, in its understandable eagerness to
engage with the regime on the nuclear issue, will not forget the human rights issue and
the democratic rights of the Iranian people. Ultimately, I think we have to accept, and we
will realize, I think, that the only solution to the nuclear issue is also to have a more
democratic Iran. There is no other solution, I think, to the democratic issue. If we pay
more heed to the human rights abuses and support more vigorously the democratic rights
of the Iranian people, I think we will also be helping to find a structural, strategic solution
to the nagging problem of the nuclear issue.248
In conclusion, the Subcommittee was troubled by the testimony brought forth by
witnesses following the June 2009 presidential election in Iran. It is impossible to predict
what will happen next in Iran, whether there will be more demonstrations and more
violence. In addition, the longer term impact of the government crackdown on Iran‘s
democratic movement that took place following the election remains to be seen.
Still, witnesses appearing before the Subcommittee continued to express their
optimism and faith in the resilience and passion of Iran‘s youth, who continue to fight for
democracy in Iran. Dr. Hassan-Yari argued that although Iranians are clearly living under
repressive conditions, it could also be argued that the long-term trend in Iran is positive
and Canada and other states should pursue dialogue with Iran.‖249
Similarly, Professor Akhavan suggested that despite the pervasive human rights
violations in Iran, there may be some reason to hold out hope for a better future in that
country. He also pointed in particular to Iran‘s youthful population and the grassroots
movement that was born from the recent post-election protests. He stated:
The promise of Iran is that there is now a grassroots social movement calling for
democracy. This is no longer just factional politics. The protestors, the millions in the
streets, may have used the elections as a pretext to come out on the streets, but there
247 Evidence, Meeting No. 33, October 27, 2009.
248 Evidence, Meeting No. 32, October 22, 2009.
249 Evidence, Meeting No. 25, June 11, 2009.
78
are women's groups, human rights activists, student leaders, unemployed people, and
just grandmothers and grandfathers and children who want freedom. They want hope.250
RECOMMENDATION 22
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
encourage the governments of the P5 plus 1 (the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) to include a
discussion of human rights issues in their negotiations with the Iranian
government regarding that country’s nuclear programs.
RECOMMENDATION 23
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
continue to fund the work of the Iran Human Rights Documentation
Centre and encourage the Centre to open an office in Canada.
RECOMMENDATION 24
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada
ensure that when federal grants and other assistance are made to
educational and other institutions that this assistance be contingent
on these institutions not accepting money from Iranian sources.
250 Evidence, Meeting No. 34, October 29, 2009.
79
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION 1
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to
provide moral support and should increase, if possible, its financial support for
Canadian and Iranian civil society organizations and other human rights groups
that document and report on human rights abuses committed by the Iranian
regime.
RECOMMENDATION 2
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada provide moral
and diplomatic support to the democratic movement in Iran.
RECOMMENDATION 3
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada demand, at
every appropriate opportunity, that the Iranian government grant access to
international human rights organizations within its borders and allow domestic
human rights organizations to operate without restriction or harassment.
RECOMMENDATION 4
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider
funding a research chair at a Canadian university dedicated to the study of
Canadian-Iranian relations, including the human rights situation in Iran.
RECOMMENDATION 5
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada encourage
Radio Canada International to consider programming in Farsi over its worldwide
shortwave service, over conventional AM/FM broadcasting in the Gulf region, and
over the Internet.
RECOMMENDATION 6
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada take appropriate
action to ensure that Iranian foreign offices, bureaus or media outlets in Canada
are not used by the Iranian regime as a source of threat and intimidation of the
Iranian Diaspora in Canada.
RECOMMENDATION 7
The Subcommittee recommends that, in communicating its condemnation of the
human rights violations of the Iranian regime against its own people, the
Government of Canada:
• Use all available tools, already authorized under Canada’s existing
immigration and visa legislation, to ensure that high-ranking members of
the regime are not able to access direct or indirect support from within
Canadian territory.
80
• Reduce high-level interaction with Iranian Government officials and make
any invitations extended to Iranian officials conditional upon effective
actions taken by the Iranian government to improve the human rights
situation in Iran.
RECOMMENDATION 8
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, in
communicating its condemnation of the human rights violations perpetrated by
members of Iran’s state security agencies against the Iranian people, use all
available tools, authorized by existing immigration and visa policies and
legislation, to deny entry to Canada to members of Iran’s security agencies,
including members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij
militia.
RECOMMENDATION 9
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada ensure sufficient
resources are available to the Department of Justice, the Canada Border Services
Agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police to ensure that they are able to make accurate decisions related to
recommendations 7 and 8.
RECOMMENDATION 10
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada institute
targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against those
individuals within the Iranian government and state security forces who are
known to have committed human rights violations.
RECOMMENDATION 11
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to
display public disapproval of the Iranian regime and its leadership and continue
to make active interventions during any bilateral meetings with Iranian
government officials as well as at the United Nations Human Rights Council, the
United Nations General Assembly and other international organisations regarding
Iran’s poor human rights record.
RECOMMENDATION 12
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada work
multilaterally with other member states of the United Nations Human Rights
Council to re-establish a position for a country-specific rapporteur on human

rights in Iran.
RECOMMENDATION 13
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada completely
remove immunity for foreign governmental officials in cases of gross violations
of international human rights law, including torture, from the State Immunity Act
allowing Canadians who are victims of such human rights violations judicial
remedy within Canada’s domestic legal system.
81
RECOMMENDATION 14
The Subcommittee recommends that, as a member of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the Government of Canada should use every opportunity
to encourage the IAEA to continue its efforts to inspect Iranian nuclear
production facilities.
RECOMMENDATION 15
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to work
with the United Nations and members of the international community to add
sanctions to those already imposed against Iran. In particular, the Subcommittee
recommends that the Government of Canada move in concert with its
international partners to implement the necessary regulations under the Special
Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and/or Export and Import Permits Act to impose:
• A ban on all goods exported from Canada to Iran, excepting humanitarian
goods such as food and medicine, and a ban on all goods imported from
Iran to Canada;
• A ban on businesses or their subsidiaries operating in Canada from
exporting gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran or
facilitating such export (i.e. the shipping and insurance industries);
• A ban on new investment in Iran or the introduction of incentives to
prevent such investments, particularly with regards to Iran’s energy
infrastructure, by Canadian persons and companies (as well as foreign
companies or their subsidiaries operating in Canada) and including
related industries such as shipping, insurance and construction
companies;
• A prohibition on the provision of financial services to and from Iran,
particularly regarding any transactions with the Iranian Central Bank, by
businesses or their subsidiaries operating in Canada;
• A prohibition on the export of any technologies to Iran, particularly those
that enable the Iranian regime to violate the human rights of its own
people (including but not limited to surveillance equipment);
• A prohibition on Canadian-registered ships from docking in Iran and on
Iranian-registered ships from docking in Canada and passing through
Canadian waters.
RECOMMENDATION 16
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada call upon United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to refer the matter of Iran’s genocidal
incitement to the Security Council pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter of the
United Nations, on the basis that Iran poses a threat to international peace and
security.
82
RECOMMENDATION 17
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada include Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a listed entity for its role in supporting
international terrorist organizations in accordance with Canadian law.
RECOMMENDATION 18
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada assist with the
enforcement of standing international arrest warrants that have been filed against
Iranian government officials.
RECOMMENDATION 19
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada initiate an interstate
complaint against the Government of Iran before the International Court of
Justice, under Article 9 of the Genocide Convention, calling Iran to account for its
violations of the Convention, including its failure to punish the incitement to
genocide perpetrated by its officials.
RECOMMENDATION 20
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, in accordance
with Canada’s responsibilities under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention and
the prohibition against incitement to genocide in Article 3 of the Convention,
invite the United Nations Security Council to consider referring to the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court the case of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
and those Iranian leaders participating with him in direct and public incitement to
genocide, for investigation and prospective prosecution.
RECOMMENDATION 21
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada petition the
United Nations Security Council, in accordance with Canada’s responsibilities
under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention and the prohibition against
incitement to genocide in Article 3 of the Convention, to take appropriate action
and to hold Iran to account.
RECOMMENDATION 22
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada encourage the
governments of the P5 plus 1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Russia, and China) to include a discussion of human rights issues in
their negotiations with the Iranian government regarding that country’s nuclear
programs.
RECOMMENDATION 23
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to fund
the work of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre and encourage the
Centre to open an office in Canada.
83
RECOMMENDATION 24
The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada ensure that
when federal grants and other assistance are made to educational and other
institutions that this assistance be contingent on these institutions not accepting
money from Iranian sources.

85
APPENDIX A
LIST OF WITNESSES WHO APPEARED
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Organizations and Individuals Date Meeting
40th Parliament, 3rd Session
As an Individual
Shirin Ebadi, Iranian Lawyer
2010/04/27 10
40th Parliament, 2nd Session
Amnesty International
Keith Rimstad, Campaigner
2009/03/10 6
Human Rights Watch
Joe Stork, Deputy Director,
Middle East and North Africa
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Jared Genser, Lecturer in Law
Association for Defence of Azerbaijani Political
Prisoners in Iran
Fakhteh Luna Zamani, President
2009/03/24 8
Human Rights Activists in Iran
Ahmad Batebi, Spokesperson
University of North Dakota
Gregory Gordon, Director,
Center for Human Rights and Genocide Studies
2009/03/31 10
B'nai Brith Canada
David Matas, Senior Legal Counsel
2009/04/02 11
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan
Sharif Behruz, Member
2009/04/21 12
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director of Research
2009/04/23 14
86
Organizations and Individuals Date Meeting
As an individual
François J. Larocque, Associate Professor and Director,
National Program, Faculty of Law,
Common Law Section, University of Ottawa
2009/04/30 15
Kurt A. Johnson, Lawyer,
Irving Mitchell Kalichman
Mark H. Arnold, Lawyer,
Gardiner Miller Arnold
Mathieu Bouchard, Lawyer,
Irving Mitchell Kalichman
Stephan Kazemi
Canadian Centre for International Justice
Jayne Stoyles, Executive Director
Genocide Watch
Gregory H. Stanton, President
2009/05/05 16
Transatlantic Institute
Emanuele Ottolenghi, Executive Director
As an individual
Alan M. Dershowitz, Professor of Law
2009/05/07 17
Department of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness
Lynda Clairmont, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Emergency Management and National Security
2009/05/12 18
Paul MacKinnon, Director General,
National Security Policy
Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation
Roya Boroumand, Executive Director
2009/06/09 24
As an individual
Victor Comras, Attorney
2009/06/11 25
Royal Military College of Canada
Houchang Hassan-Yari, Professor and Head,
Politics and Economics Department
House of Commons
Hon. Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P., Mount Royal
University of Western Ontario
Robert Ivan Martin, Professor
2009/06/18 27
87
Organizations and Individuals Date Meeting
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
David J. Angell, Director General,
International Organizations Bureau
2009/10/20 31
Shawn Caza, Deputy Director,
Nuclear Cooperation and Compliance
Jeffrey K. McLaren, Director,
Gulf and Maghreb Relations
As an individual
Abbas Milani, Director of Iranian Studies,
Stanford University
2009/10/22 32
As an individual
Mojtaba Mahdavi, Assistant Professor,
Department of Political Science, University of Alberta
2009/10/27 33
Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
Renee C. Redman, Executive Director
As an individual
Payam Akhavan, Professor of International Law at McGill
University, and Former Member of the Board of Directors at
Rights & Democracy
2009/10/29 34
39th Parliament, 2nd Session
As an individual
Shirin Ebadi, Iranian Lawyer
2008/03/06 02

89
APPENDIX B
LIST OF BRIEFS SUBMITTED
TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Organizations and Individuals
40th Parliament, 2nd Session
Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation
Amnesty International
Association for Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran
B'nai Brith Canada
Canadian Centre for International Justice
Cotler, Irwin
Human Rights Activists in Iran
Human Rights Watch
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

91
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings of the Committee (Meetings Nos. 29, 36
and 38) is tabled and a copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings of the
Subcommittee on International Human Rights (40th Parliament, 3rd Session: Meetings
Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 24), (40th Parliament, 2nd Session: Meetings Nos. 6, 8, 10 to 12,
14 to 18, 24, 25, 27, 31 to 34, 37 to 44) and (39th Parliament, 2nd Session: Meeting No.
2) is tabled.
Respectfully submitted,
Dean Allison, MP
Chair

93
REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee requests that the government table a
comprehensive response to this Report.
A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (Meetings Nos. 29, 36 and 38) is tabled.
Respectfully submitted,
Dean Allison, MP
Chair