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Clinton: Iran Remains an Extremist Regime

Clinton: Iran Remains an Extremist Regime


Speaking at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee policy conference in Washington, D.C. on Monday, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed to the “existential danger” that would occur if Iran had a nuclear weapon and warned that Iran “remains an extremist regime that threatens to annihilate Israel.”
Clinton said this in explaining her support for the nuclear deal that the Obama administration made with the Iranian regime.
“For many years, we've all been rightly focused on the existential danger of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon,” Clinton said. “After all, this remains an extremist regime that threatens to annihilate Israel. That's why I led the diplomacy to impose crippling sanctions and force Iran to the negotiating table, and why I ultimately supported the agreement that has put a lid on its nuclear program.”
Here is an excerpt from Clinton’s speech:
“For many years, we've all been rightly focused on the existential danger of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. After all, this remains an extremist regime that threatens to annihilate Israel. That's why I led the diplomacy to impose crippling sanctions and force Iran to the negotiating table, and why I ultimately supported the agreement that has put a lid on its nuclear program.
“Today, Iran's enriched uranium is all but gone, thousands of centrifuges have stopped spinning, Iran's potential breakout time has increased and new verification measures are in place to help us deter and detect any cheating. I really believe the United States, Israel and the world are safer as a result.
“But still, as I laid out at a speech at the Brookings Institution last year, it's not good enough to trust and verify. Our approach must be distrust and verify.
“This deal must come with vigorous enforcement, strong monitoring, clear consequences for any violations and a broader strategy to confront Iran's aggression across the region. We cannot forget that Tehran's fingerprints are on nearly every conflict across the Middle East, from Syria to Lebanon to Yemen.
“The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies are attempting to establish a position on the Golan from which to threaten Israel, and they continue to fund Palestinian terrorists. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is amassing an arsenal of increasingly sophisticated rockets and artillery that well may be able to hit every city in Israel.
“Tonight, you will hear a lot of rhetoric from the other candidates about Iran, but there's a big difference between talking about holding Tehran accountable and actually doing it. Our next president has to be able to hold together our global coalition and impose real consequences for even the smallest violations of this agreement.
“We must maintain the legal and diplomatic architecture to turn all the sanctions back on if needed. If I'm elected the leaders of Iran will have no doubt that if we see any indication that they are violating their commitments not to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons, the United States will act to stop it, and that we will do so with force if necessary.
“Iranian provocations, like the recent ballistic missile tests, are also unacceptable and should be answered firmly and quickly including with more sanctions.
“Those missiles were stamped with words declaring, and I quote, ‘Israel should be wiped from the pages of history.’ We know they could reach Israel or hit the tens of thousands of American troops stationed in the Middle East. This is a serious danger and it demands a serious response.
“The United States must also continue to enforce existing sanctions and impose additional sanctions as needed on Iran and the Revolutionary Guard for their sponsorship of terrorism, illegal arms transfers, human rights violations and other illicit behaviors like cyber attacks. We should continue to demand the safe return of Robert Levinson and all American citizens unjustly held in Iranian prisons.”


Sourse : CNSNews.com

How Iran's mafia-like Revolutionary Guard rules the country's black market


Saeed Ghasseminejad, Contributor - Dec. 10, 2015, 5:18 PM
The revolutionary children of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Pasdaran, were the poor, marginalized thugs of the Shah's era, people with a huge appetite for violence. They founded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, and became the main tool of oppression in the hands of Iran's theocratic regime .
Over the past three decades, the Guard has evolved and built a powerful military-industrial-financial complex. And they have not limited themselves to the normal economy. The IRGC has expanded Iran’s underground economy and its own control over it, building a mafia cartel in the process. Consequently, it is not surprising that in its 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, the Quds Force, the IRGC's external operations wing, sought the help of Mexican drug cartels .
A close look at the IRGC’s involvement in Iran’s underground economy shows that the Guards are no strangers to the underworld. They control it .
Globally, the underground economy covers a considerable portion of the world's economic activities. As the IMF explains, deficient rule of law in a country is correlated with a larger underground economy .
Iran has notably weak rule of law — and its underground economy is thriving. The IRGC is the major player in this shadow economy. For the IRGC, the underground is an unobservable source of wealth that is nevertheless important to understanding the Guard's abilities and behavior .
The underground economy, as the IRS defines it, “represents income earned under the table and off the books." It can include legal income laundered to avoid taxation, and also the trade in explicitly illegal goods, like drugs or weapons .
The value of the underground economy is not known and the estimation process is much more difficult than for other economic metrics, like GDP. The IMF’s study suggests that the value of an underground economy for developing countries is an amount equivalent to between 35 and 44% of their stated GDP. There are different measurements of the size of Iran’s underground economy, with some estimations of illicit activity reaching a total that's equivalent to 36 percent of Iran’s GDP .
One can assume that the amount increased during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency (2005-2013), an era in which international sanctions crippled Iran’s economy and sanctions-busting became central to Iran’s import-export operation. Reports and court cases on corruption and off-the-record deals that happened during Ahmadinejad’s presidency reveal the importance of the underground economy during that time .
Iran’s Ministry of Finance recently estimated that the businesses accounting for 20-25% of Iran’s GDP do not pay taxes. Assuming a conservative 25% estimate for the ratio of Iran’s underground economy to its GDP, the value of Iran’s shadow economy, based on Iran’s current GDP level, is estimated to be $100 billion. If we calculate based on the the 35% ratio suggested by the IMF’s study, the value of Iran’s underground economy would be around $140 billion .
It is impossible to precisely estimate how much of this $100-140 billion goes to the IRGC. However, a close look at the IRGC’s activities strongly suggests that the Guard reaps a substantial benefit from illicit trade .
The IRGC is Iran's chief smuggler. In the early 2000s, Mehdi Karroubi, the former speaker of parliament, complained about unauthorized ports under IRGC control that are used to smuggle goods. Ahmadinejad, who is Karroubi's arch politically enemy, also called the IRGC “our smuggler brothers" .
The IRGC controls Iran's sea, air, and land borders. It controls ports, airports, and roads, and does not shy away from using them to smuggle goods and line its pockets
The value of smuggled imported goods in Iran is between $20-30 billion, according to various sources such as Iran’s Custom Administration and the Parliament. Iran, which is one of the world's major oil producers, also suffers from the illegal export of fuel, caused by the lower price of fuel in Iran compared with its neighbors. Iranian officials believe that at least 20 million liters of fuel are smuggled out of the country per year .
Over the last few years, the dollar value of oil smuggling in Iran estimated to be around $7 billion per year. The IRGC is also the main producer of arms in Iran — and, at the same time, Iran's main smuggler, channeling weapons to Iranian proxy groups like Hezbollah .
Drug trafficking is another major area of the underground economy that the IRGC controls. Iran’s long border with Pakistan and Afghanistan is one of the the world's busiest drug smuggling corridors .
Iran’s interior minister recently declared that the value of narcotic drug sales in Iran is $3 billion per year, not including commission from transporting the drugs from Afghanistan to other transit points, like the Balkans. The US Department of the Treasury has placed Quds Force Commander Esmail Baghbani on the US sanctions list for his role in drug trafficking. The IRGC also has close ties with the drug cartels in the South and Central America through Hezbollah .
The IRGC is the main player in Iran’s underground economy, which is a valuable source of income for the Guards. This income provides the Guards with financial independence from Iran's civil politicians. It also puts the IRGC in charge of Iran’s underworld and its criminal gangs .
For example, General Hossein Hamedani, who was recently killed in Syria explained in an interview how the IRGC organized criminal gangs during the "Green Revolution" anti-regime uprising in 2009 in order to crack down on street demonstrations .
The IRGC’s involvement in the underground economy allows the Guards to expand their financial, political, and operational capabilities in Iran and around the world. The IRGC, which is perhaps the most equipped and sophisticated terrorist group of our time, has the will and capability to build a worldwide illicit network .
The US government must treat those helping the IRGC and its business empire as members and accomplices of a terrorist entity — and make sure the IRGC cannot recruit from the US underworld .
Saeed Ghasseminejad is an associate fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance .


http://www.businessinsider.com/how-irans-mafia-like-revolutionary-guard-rules-the-countrys-black-market-2015-12#comments

"Not just an attack on France... it's an attack on all of humanity," Barack Obama speaks on #Paris terrorist attacks: http://cnn.it/1MO4sGU

Posted by The Situation Room on Freitag, 13. November 2015
Syria’s only hope of peace is if Assad is removed

Syria’s only hope of peace is if Assad is removed


Mouaz al-Khatib, Ahmad al-Assi Jarba, Hadi al-Bahra, Khaled Khoja
Friday 20 November 2015 13.21 GMT
Terror has returned to the streets of Paris. So, too, has the realisation that international efforts to defeat terrorism are failing. Islamic State is emboldened. Terror attacks continue. And innocent civilians pay the ultimate price. As the presidents of Syria’s main opposition group — the Syrian National Coalition — we’ve watched the violence in Syria destroy our nation, infest the region, and now, threaten peace and security in Europe. Today we say “enough is enough”. It’s time to face the facts: the haphazard approach to the crisis in Syria has been a disaster. Comprehensive solutions are needed that can end the war in Syria and destroy terrorist groups such as Isis once and for all. This week, we have a chance to achieve precisely that.
A new round of Syria peace talks are under way in Vienna. If properly conducted, these talks could help achieve a sustainable end to the crisis in Syria, and an effective approach to tackling Isis. But to do so, world leaders must recognise that the two come hand-in-hand. To achieve a political solution we must defeat Isis, and to defeat Isis we must achieve a political transition in Syria.
The Syrian National Coalition has long maintained that to achieve a transition in Syria, we must have an effective plan to fight terrorism. That is why during peace talks in Geneva in 2014, we stated clearly that we were ready and willing to conduct parallel and simultaneous talks on the two key issues of forming a transitional governing body and fighting terrorism. But then — as now — Assad was not interested. Despite his claims to want to counter terror, he did everything in his power to scuttle the talks and increase the scale of the killing across Syria. As he did, the threat posed by terrorists grew, and Syria subsequently became a safe-haven for Isis.
Let us be clear: Assad never has been, nor will ever be, an alternative to Isis. He will never bring peace to Syria, nor will he ever be capable of taking on extremists. There is no capacity on the regime’s side to regain control and restore stability to the country. Moderate forces of the opposition are the only forces that have proved capable of combating Isis and winning back territory, as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) did in 2013. But, thanks to the failure of our western partners, Syria’s moderates are deeply under-resourced. Despite our repeated appeals, we never received the support needed from our friends.
The only way to effectively take on Isis is to create a ground force capable of fighting terror and stabilising the country. With proper support, such a force could eradicate the Isis terror nest in Raqqa. But this will only happen when we formulate a political plan that ensures a transition away from Syria’s current leadership and state clearly that the end game is Assad’s exit from power. By exit we mean a genuine end to the Assad family’s rule and a consistent plan for the transformation of Syria’s deeply corrupt security sector - in stark contrast to the precedent set by Yemen, where Ali Abdullah Saleh was allowed to remain head of his political party and in de facto charge of the security apparatus, with terrible consequences for the country.
Under the aforementioned conditions, the opposition would work with Syrian government organisations to restore basic services and the FSA would willingly concentrate its efforts on defeating Isis. De facto cooperation would occur with the units of the Syrian national army that are not tied directly to the Assad family. The FSA, together with these army units from which identified criminal officers have been removed, would form the two natural components of an indigenous force dedicated to fighting Isis and any combination of forces that aims to destabilise the country. Such a force would provide the international community’s best chance to defeat Isis. But to do so, Russia must stop its targeting of Syrian moderate opposition strongholds and end its attacks on FSA forces - attacks that have only made Isis stronger and served to kill innocent civilians. Russia must also stop its misguided insistence on keeping Assad in power. If and when Russia abandons this position, it will find the political opposition ready to cooperate. A powerful, effective centrist grouping of opposition members and institutions of government could be formed without Assad and his immediate cronies, capable of stabilising the country and carrying on the fight against Isis.
Underpinning this approach – and in order to make the path to political transition viable – is the urgent necessity to stop the indiscriminate aerial bombardments that remain the primary driver of insecurity across Syria. The protection of civilians must be at the centre of any political process, including at Vienna. So too must Syrians themselves. It will be up to Syrians to implement a peace, and so it should up to Syrians to lead the political process. And Syrians are abundantly clear: Assad cannot be part of a future, democratic Syria. Only by removing Assad can we save what remains of the Syrian state and effectively tackle terrorism so that Syria - and the world - can be safe once more.
The authors of this article are the current and the three former presidents of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces


http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/20/syria-peace-assad-removed-russia-isis

The Shady Family Behind America’s Iran Lobby

The Shady Family Behind America’s Iran Lobby


[h2 How one enterprising Iranian expat family and its allies successfully pushed for U.S.-Iran rapprochement—and now stands to make a fortune from sanctions relief .
When the world’s major powers struck a deal over Iran’s nuclear program in Vienna in July, it represented a victory not just for the Islamic Republic, which has now been granted international legitimacy as a nuclear threshold state, but also for a small but increasingly influential lobby in America, one which has long sought rapprochement between Washington and Tehran and now seeks to leverage a successfully concluded nuclear deal as a means to that end .
This Iran lobby, publicly represented by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), has become a staunch institutional ally of the White House selling the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the nuclear deal is known. But while NIAC has done the heavy-lifting—the ad-buying, the leafleting, and congressional meet-and-greets, all designed to sell lawmakers on the Iran deal—its political efforts also underwrite the economic interests of one very well connected but low-profile Iranian family, the Namazis, who played a key role as intellectual architects of NIAC.
Little known to the American press, the Namazis have rarely acted as spokespersons for their own cause. In fact, attempts to reach various members of the family for comment on this story were met with increasing levels of hostility and threats of legal action. Yet in many ways, the Namazi clan is the perfect embodiment of Iranian power politics, at least as it has played out among the Iranian diaspora. Those close to the Namazis say that they are savvy financial operators rather than ideologues, eager to do business with the West and enjoy all of its political freedoms and perquisites, and yet ever mindful that they’re straddling the delicate fault-line between cashing in with a theocratic dictatorship and being frozen out entirely. They have stayed on the right side of international law if not always on the right side of prevailing political interests in the Islamic Republic .
Nor did they begin their rise to prominence as supporters of the Islamic Revolution. Mohammad Bagher Namazi, also known as Baquer Namazi, is the patriarch of the family and formerly the governor under the Shah of the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. Despite his relationship with the ancien régime, Baquer Namazi was not persecuted by the Khomeinists after they seized power in 1979, and he and his family were allowed to emigrate in 1983 to the United States. There he raised two well-educated and Americanized sons, Babak and Siamak, while his niece, Pari Namazi, married Bijan Khajehpour, another Iranian expatriate .
The 1980s were the years of the fiery-eyed Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran’s ferocious war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Iranian-backed terrorism in Lebanon included the bombing of the U.S. embassy and the Marine barracks there, while Iranian “hit teams” hunted down and murdered opponents of the regime in exile. Iran’s Hezbollah clients kidnapped Europeans and Americans, and in the Irangate scandal the Reagan administration was exposed trading weapons systems for hostages. Afterward it effectively went to war against Iran on the waters of the Gulf, and in the process blew an Iranian civilian airliner out of the sky. There seemed no possibility of improved relations between Washington and the theocracy in Tehran. But after the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988 and Khomeini died in 1989, new possibilities for rapprochement—and huge deals for international companies—started to emerge .
Doing serious business in Iran has always required some measure of political protection. The Islamic Republic is a web of rival economic interests. Broadly speaking, the three largest are those tied through various semi-clandestine fronts to Khomeini’s successor as “supreme leader,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; those linked to the regime’s praetorian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC); and those associated with Iran’s president, who may hold the most conspicuous position in the country’s political life, but whose official powers are limited. Typically, to get things moving in the mire of Iran’s notorious bureaucracy, businesses have to have connections in one or more of these groups .
From 1989 to 1997, the president of Iran was Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, known as “the Shark,” an Iranian reference to a beardless man. He was also famous for getting rid of his rivals and political competitors one by one, like a great white shark. In addition, Rafsanjani had a reputation for corruption and taking advantage of power .
In this environment of increased willingness to do business with the West, the stage was set for a return of the Namazis. In 1993, Pari Namazi and her husband, Bijan Khajehpour, founded a company in Tehran called Atieh Bahar Consulting (AB). It offered a range of legal and industrial services to foreign enterprises, most importantly the access it provided to the regime, and the advice it dispensed on how best to navigate the vagaries of the regime’s entrenched factions and competitive interests .
At the time, it looked like Iran might even be opening up to big American-based oil companies, then unencumbered by any sanctions regime on the Islamic Republic. But after an announcement in 1995 that Iran had given Conoco a contract to develop an offshore gas field, and an uproar in the U.S. Congress, the Clinton administration imposed unilateral sanctions and barred U.S. companies from doing business there .
Eventually Siamak Namazi, who had worked from 1994 to 1996 at Iran’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, also joined AB. So did his brother Babak, a lawyer. And the AB client list just kept growing. Plenty of companies based outside the U.S. were more than happy to do business in Iran once they had the right connections. As Siamak eventually told Lebanon’s Daily Star newspaper, “If oil companies want to operate in the Iranian market they need to link up with a local partner, and this is where we step in and help them to find the right partner" .
With the surprise election of the “reformist” presidential candidate Mohammad Khatami in 1997, political and economic enthusiasm for better Iranian relations with the West grew dramatically. Meanwhile the “pragmatist” Rafsanjani took other powerful positions in the regime. In those optimistic times, AB’s non-American clients—free from any sanctions regime—included the German engineering giant Siemens; major oil companies BP, Statoil, and Shell; car companies Toyota, BMW, Daimler, Chrysler, and Honda; telecom giants MTN, Nokia, Alcatel; and international banks such as HSBC .
But the political winds were shifting. A nuclear cloud darkened the horizon, and the United States, slowly but surely, found ways to broaden the sanctions against Iran, forcing many international companies to dial back on their investments there or pull out altogether .
The Namazis, of course, had every reason to want to bring them back
Atieh Bahar Consultancy had aligned itself with Rafsanjani’s faction early on by forging an especially close relationship with Rafsanjani’s influential son, Mehdi .
From 1993 to 2005, Mehdi Hashemi was employed at the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the state-owned entity that controls almost all oil and gas production in a country that has the world’s largest gas reserves and third-largest oil reserves .
But Mehdi Hashemi brought serious problems to the relationship. In 2004, Norway’s Statoil was caught paying bribes to a prominent Iranian official using the company Horton Investment, an entity run by a Mehdi Hashemi confidant, as intermediary. Hashemi would later be imprisoned for his complicity in the bribery, along with two other charges, and ordered to pay a total of $10.4 million; $5.2 million of the bribe money, plus an additional $5.2 million in fines. Abbas Yazdanpanah Yazdi, a confidant of Hashemi, meanwhile, was allegedly kidnapped in the UAE in 2013 and has since “disappeared" .
The scandal came just as the elder Rafsanjani was plotting a presidential comeback in the 2005 elections, and it gave substance to the rumors of corruption that always swirled around him and his son. (Mehdi Hashemi denied the Statoil bribery allegation and said it was designed to hurt his father’s reputation.) He managed to make it into the second and final round, but finally lost to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who staked out a position as a “clean” populist who would give money to the poor and who didn’t give a damn about foreign business interests .
After Ahmadinejad came into office, the nuclear cloud grew much darker
In 2003, the United States had led the invasion and occupation of neighboring Iraq, eliminating Iran’s old enemy Saddam Hussein to be sure that he had no weapons of mass destruction. And, as it turned out, by then he did not. A few months earlier in 2002, however, Israeli intelligence turned up evidence that Iran, a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, had developed a secret uranium enrichment operation at a site called Natanz. (The first public airing of this intelligence came from a militant Iranian dissident group that had been nurtured by Saddam Hussein) .
This did not distract from the march to war with Iraq, but a few months later Iran was declared in material breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and, under threat of heightened sanctions, a process of negotiations began between Iran and the European Union to limit the nascent enrichment program. At the time Iran had only 160 of the centrifuges needed to enrich uranium, and thousands would be required to get it to the point where it could produce fissile material for a bomb. U.S. intelligence estimates eventually concluded “with high confidence” that the Iranians also had a secret nuclear weapons program, in addition to enrichment, but shut it down in the fall of 2003 .
When Ahmadinejad took over in 2005, he ditched all pretense of willingness to compromise over Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear program, an intransigence that led Western countries to tighten sanctions, making foreign investment ever more difficult. And what was worse for AB and the Namazis, Ahmadinejad went after his political rivals, particularly the Rafsanjani faction, with a vengeance. Mehdi Hashemi, naturally, was a prominent target. Ahmadinejad barred him from conducting any business in relation to Iran’s oil and gas sector. Ten years later, the courts actually sentenced him to a collective 25 years—and 50 lashes—in Tehran’s notorious Evin prison for all three charges against him including the Statoil corruption case. In reality, he will only serve 10 years .
AB needed to shore up new alliances and bide its time. Co-founder Bijan Khajehpour worked for a leading Iranian politician named Hassan Rouhani who had served under the Khatami government as Iran’s nuclear negotiator. Rouhani also was the president of a think tank called the Center for Strategic Research (CSR). But relations with Iran in the middle of the last decade were almost as bleak as they had been after the 1979 hostage crisis and the grim terror and counter-terror campaigns of the 1980s .
By 2006, Iran, was in effect at war with the U.S. in Iraq. The Revolutionary Guards’s expeditionary Quds Force led by Qasem Soleimani had been training, financing, and arming Shia militias killing U.S. soldiers .
Moreover, the West was growing more alarmed about Iran’s nuclear program, which it seemed powerless to stop. Ahmadinejad had declared the resumption of uranium enrichment “irreversible” just as the country’s nuclear scientists had mastered the fuel cycle. He’d appointed conservative Ali Larijani as chief negotiator with the European Union (before Iran withdrew from talks altogether), and he said he’d “wipe [his] nose” on international sanctions .
A war with Iran, most likely started by Israel with the United States drawn in, began to seem possible, then probable, and almost inevitable. The International Atomic Energy Agency referred Iran to the UN Security Council for action, forcing it to curtail its nuclear activities .
Out of this dark morass, the Namazis struggled to keep alive hopes of rapprochement and trade while avoiding a war at all costs. And by then they had in place the architecture for convincing a war-weary U.S. policy establishment that not only was avoiding a military confrontation with Iran possible, but the Islamic Republic was really just a friend America had yet to make .
In November 1999, when Khatami was still president, Siamak Namazi got together with a Swedish-Iranian expat named Trita Parsi at a conference in Cyprus. The conference, titled, “Dialogue and Action Between the People of Iran and America,” was convened jointly by the Centre for World Dialogue, a Cypriot non-governmental organization, and by Hamyaran, an Iranian non-governmental resource center for other NGOs, which was chaired by Mohammad Bagher Namazi, the family patriarch. Namazi fils and Parsi there presented an influential white paper (PDF), “Iran-Americans: The bridge between two nations,” which called for three steps to ameliorate U.S.-Iranian relations in advance of reconciliation :
1 - Hold “seminars in lobbying for Iranian-American youth and intern opportunities in Washington DC" .
2 - Increase “awareness amongst Iranian-Americans and Americans about the effects of sanctions, both at home and in Iran" .
3 - End “the taboo of working for a new approach on Iran”—i.e., end the then-two-decade-old U.S. policy of containment .
Namazi and Parsi wrote that “the fear of coming across as a lackey of the Iranian regime is still prohibiting many Iranian Americans from fully engaging in the debate on the future of Iran-U.S. relations.” The way around this, they submitted, was to mobilize the Iranian-American community and enlist “Americans of non-Iranian background” to lessen the adversarial posture of both nations .
The white paper led to the creation two years later, in 2001, of NIAC, a Washington, D.C.-based organization which Parsi founded and currently heads. During the formative period preceding NIAC’s launch, Parsi had sought advice and guidance from numerous sources, including and especially Mohammad Bagher, as was disclosed in documents (PDF) obtained during a defamation law suit brought by NIAC and Parsi against one of their most outspoken critics .
Parsi was extremely well-placed to front the Iran lobby. He had obtained a doctorate at Johns Hopkins on a subject intimately tied to the lobby’s central thesis—the relationship between Israel and Iran and how the former hindered the latter’s acceptance in the U.S. He even studied under Francis Fukuyama, a onetime neoconservative policy intellectual who abandoned his ideological comrades when the Iraq war went south. Finally, Parsi had gained valuable political experience on the Hill by working for Republican Congressman Bob Ney, a connection he has not included in his curriculum vitae and official website. (Ney went to jail in 2007 for accepting bribes from mega-lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s Native American casino clients) .
While serving as president of NIAC, Parsi also wrote intelligence briefings as an “affiliate analyst in Washington, D.C.” for AB, focusing on such topics as whether or not the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) would revive its anti-Iran campaigning on the eve of the Iraq war, or on efforts by the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MeK), the militant Iranian opposition group that exposed Natanz in 2002 would get itself de-listed as a terrorist entity by the U.S. State Department. Parsi was paid for his work for the consultancy, as disclosed by an email sent from Bijan Khajehpour to him, dated September 22, 2002, an employment that Parsi did not mention when fulsomely praising Khajehpour in The Huffington Post as an ideal Iranian businessman .
Although it has only 5,000 dues-paying members, a mere 1 percent of the estimated 470,000 Iranian-Americans, NIAC’s network of activists and event attendees is said to extend into the tens of thousands. In June of this year, as the Iran deal looked likely, NIAC inaugurated an official “lobbying” arm called NIAC Action registered with the Internal Revenue Service as a 501(c)(4) organization, but for years, internally, the group has described its activities (PDF) as lobbying. NIAC Action is explicitly meant to counter the influence of AIPAC, which has spent millions to block the Iran deal’s passage in Congress by securing a veto-proof bipartisan majority of senators opposed to it—an effort that now appears close to failure .
Since its founding, NIAC has also proved a useful finishing school for rapprochement-minded Iranian-Americans, many of whom have either come from positions in U.S. government or graduated into them. Its current research director, for instance, is Reza Marashi, an Iranian-American dual national, who worked for Atieh Bahar until 2006 when he landed a job at the U.S. government’s Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, which acts as a research center for the Pentagon. Marashi then went to work for the Office of Iranian Affairs at the U.S. State Department as a desk officer overseeing Iran democracy and human-rights programs .
Marashi is very outspoken on social media against any critics of NIAC’s agenda. Along with the rest of his organization’s staff, he has accused Jewish opponents of the Iran deal of being dual loyalists. “Shame on Chuck Schumer for putting #Israel’s interests ahead of America’s interests,” he tweeted after the New York senator’s decision to come out as the senior-most Democrat against the deal .
Given the obvious connection between NIAC and the Namazi family, Marashi makes no mention of his job at AB in his biography on NIAC’s official website. Nor did he respond to The Daily Beast’s repeated requests for comment on this story .
Perhaps NIAC’s most accomplished alum is Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, who is now National Security Council director for Iran in the Obama administration and therefore the top U.S. official for Iran policy, bringing together the various departments of government working on U.S. strategy toward the country. She is also, after the White House principals, one of the leading advisers to President Obama on Iran. No doubt owing to the sensitivity (and influence) of her government role, Nowrouzzadeh has maintained a low profile, but her work at NIAC is publicly available. She drafted one of the organization’s annual reports for 2002-2003 (PDF) and was referred to by Dokhi Fassihian, then executive director, as a “staff member” (DOC). The Obama administration insists that Nowrouzzadeh was only ever an intern with NIAC, and Nowrouzzadeh does not seem eager to play up her affiliation with the group. According to her LinkedIn profile, she has worked at the State Department and the Department of Defense. The profile doesn’t mention NIAC at all .
Such inconspicuousness stands in notable contrast to how other Obama administration officials who emerged NIAC’s nemesis—the pro-Israel lobbying establishment—tend to invoke their past credentials as a means of establishing their diplomatic bona fides .
But then, Israel is a longtime and “sacrosanct” American ally, as Obama has stated. Iran, on the other hand, has been a pariah state where crowds are encouraged to chant “Death to America" .
On NIAC’s website, in its mailings and in media interviews, NIAC rarely criticizes the IRGC or the Quds Force, a U.S.-designated terrorist entity. Parsi characterizes the Iranian regime, of which the Quds Force is the main military enforcer, as a U.S. ally in the war against the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS. But neither he nor NIAC has discussed the Quds Force’s military role in Syria, where it plays a key role in targeting U.S.-backed rebels deemed the best bulwark against both Assad and ISIS and, more broadly, organizing the savage defense of the Assad dynasty, for which several of the Quds Force’s personnel have been sanctioned by the U.S. government.
NIAC publicly opposes designating the IRGC as a whole as a terrorist entity because doing so would only conform to part of a pattern of failed sanctions, “further entrenching U.S.-Iran relations in a paradigm of enmity" .
Instead, campaigning against any U.S. sanctions on Iran has been the mainstay of NIAC’s endeavors, and this held even when the Obama administration thought sanctions the most effective way to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table. NIAC has maintained (PDF) that sanctions have cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of job opportunities .
Parsi’s activism won him praise from the Iranian regime during the very dark days a decade ago. Former ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarif, who is now the heavily spotlighted foreign minister, wrote to Parsi in 2006, “Your help is always welcome,” and, after catching part of a Parsi interview on the BBC the same year, Zarif called his performance “Great" .
In March 2006 (at the height of the covert Iranian war with the U.S. in Iraq), Parsi told a colleague not to worry about a trip to Tehran, “NIAC has a good name in Iran and your association with it will not harm you.” When the colleague was briefly questioned by the regime, then released, he reported back (PDF) to Parsi that he’d been told the reason he was let go was “that they knew NIAC had never done anything seriously bad against the Islamic Republic" .
In 2009, Sen. Mark Kirk called NIAC Iranian “Regime Sympathizers” (PDF), stating “they came to Capitol Hill urging members of Congress to cut off U.S. funding for democracy programs in Iran.” NIAC had sought to eliminate the Bush administration’s “Democracy Fund” for programs in Iran, which it saw as nothing more than a vehicle for attempted regime change. NIAC responded to Kirk by calling the $75 million fund a “brainchild” of the Bush administration’s “disastrous Middle East policy,” which aimed to finance Iranian NGOs seeking overthrow the government of Iran .
And NIAC does some name-calling of its own, calling organizations it doesn’t like (i.e., those too critical of the Islamic Republic) “neocon puppets,” and warmongers. Indeed, it has also tried to define the parameters of acceptable Iranian civil society groups (i.e., ones that never really undermined the regime) by partnership with Hamyaran, described by NIAC as an “NGO umbrella organization” (PDF). In reality, however, it was conceived as more of a governmental non-governmental organization and launched by those close to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami—its board member was Hossein Malek Afzali, a deputy minister in Khatami’s government). By NIAC’s own admission, the organization (PDF) “operates independently, but with the implicit permission of the Iranian government.” Hamyaran’s board of directors was also once chaired by Namazi paterfamilias Mohammed Bagher .
Hamyaran obtained support from the congressionally funded National Endowment for Democracy—as did NIAC, which received Endowment funding in 2002, 2005, and 2006 in the collective amount of close to $200,000. NIAC described Hamyaran to the Endowment in 2004 as its “main partner in Iran.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, among those civil society groups selected for NIAC and Hamyaran's “Digital Film Production Workshop Report,” a training program for Iranian activists to learn how to use digital media, were those described as having been “contracted by the Iranian government” or “worked closely with the Iranian government" .
As for NIAC, Carl Gershman, the president of the National Endowment for Democracy, told The Daily Beast, “We’re not supporting NIAC now and we have nothing to do with them" .
"Back then there were people arguing, ‘Try to get into Iran’ and we thought this was a way forward,” Gershman said. “We weren’t aware when these grants were made that NIAC were presenting themselves as a lobby. We didn’t know that. Our effort was to work with emerging space in Iran. We were trying something that might be a way to help people on the inside. But that quickly became unworkable; the grant didn’t work. Then NIAC showed itself as a lobby organization, so we have nothing to do with them anymore. Not every grant works out the way you want it to.” Asked if that meant that NED regretted working with NIAC , Gershman answered: “Yes, I think that’s true" .
At the same time it was taking U.S. taxpayer money, NIAC wanted to end U.S. government support for NGOs which categorically opposed the Islamic Republic. In April 2007, NIAC held a strategy meeting with international human-rights groups including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). The HRW representative was himself a former NIAC board member, Hadi Ghaemi, who had (PDF) worked for NIAC in Iran, and then served HRW from 2004 to 2008. During the meeting, according to an email sent by Parsi afterward, Ghaemi “noted that certain groups being funded by the state dept [sic] are covers for regime change and that we need to be careful. Many groups misrepresent themselves as wanting to improve human rights and democracy in Iran.” Ghaemi did not specify which groups. When The Daily Beast contacted Ghaemi via email, he replied that he could not confirm the meeting in question. He was unavailable for further comment after The Daily Beast showed him Parsi’s email asking if that refreshed his memory .
In 2008, NIAC made a strategic mistake, waging a not-so-quiet campaign against the Voice of America’s Persian service, a U.S. government-funded broadcast medium. Both NIAC and the Namazis were aggravated by the frequent appearances of Hassan Dai, an Arizona-based Iranian exile, who lambasted NIAC as a regime mouthpiece .
Siamak Namazi (PDF) called for Dai to be banned from VOA in February 2007. NIAC chief lobbyist Emily Blout petitioned (PDF) Congress in September 2007 for an “independent review” of VOA Persian. After Dai appeared again on VOA in 2009, Parsi (PDF) remarked that its hosting of a NIAC critic “won’t change until the VOA leadership changes.” He was right. Today the editor-in-chief of VOA Persian is Mohammad Manzarpour, a former employee of Atieh Bahar Consultancy .
But serious damage to NIAC’s reputation was done, and much of it was self-inflicted. In 2008, Parsi and NIAC had brought a defamation suit against Hassan Dai, alleging that he had made “numerous false and defamatory statements that characterize plaintiffs as agents of the Iranian government.” Parsi and NIAC lost the case in 2012, with the judge rejecting their self-portrayal as critics of Tehran. “That Parsi occasionally made statements reflecting a balanced, shared blame approach is not inconsistent with the idea that he was first and foremost an advocate for the regime,” U.S. District Court Judge John D. Bates (PDF) wrote in his judgment. “After all, any moderately intelligent agent for the Iranian regime would not want to be seen as unremittingly pro-regime, given the regime’s reputation in the United States" .
Nor did NIAC do itself any favors during the trial and on appeal. Three circuit judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals found its behavior (PDF) “dilatory, dishonest, and intransigent” and accused it of engaging in a “disturbing pattern of delay and intransigence. Seemingly at every turn, NIAC and Parsi deferred producing relevant documents, withheld them, or denied their existence altogether. Even worse, the Appellants also misrepresented to the District Court that they did not possess key documents [Dai] sought. Most troublingly, they flouted multiple court orders… A court without the authority to sanction conduct that so plainly abuses the judicial process cannot function" .
Unsurprisingly, then, NIAC and Parsi lost their appeal and were ordered to pay $183,480.09 in monetary sanctions in February 2015 .
"NIAC and Parsi filed the lawsuit to break me under the financial burdens and silence other critics, but they totally failed,” Dai told The Daily Beast. “The lawsuit, which lasted nearly seven years, showed the deceptive character of an organization that lobbies in favor of the mullahs’ theocratic regime but represents itself as a defender of peace" .
The fortunes of the entire Namazi clan waned after 2009, when a popular uprising against Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election was met with murder, mass arrests, and torture .
Bijan Khajehpour was imprisoned because of the struggle raging in the regime between the Supreme Leader and the IRGC on one side, and the Rafsanjani camp on the other. And while praising the Obama administration for not speaking up on behalf of those who resisted the stealing of the 2009 election, the so-called Green Movement, on the grounds that doing so would have only given the regime an excuse to murder and torture more people, Parsi rushed to the defense of his friend and former employer Khajehpour, “who neither participated in the protests nor had any involvement with the opposition” but was instead a “self-made man” and “top-notch consultant drawing the attention of multinational and local firms to investment opportunities in the country" .
In The Huffington Post Parsi wrote as an acquaintance or friend of Khajehpour, nowhere disclosing his past business relationship writing reports for Atieh Bahar Consulting .
Khajehpour subsequently was released from prison and he and his wife, Pari Namazi, moved to Vienna .
Siamak Namazi also faced harassment after the 2009 election and the subsequent unrest. He left Iran for the United Arab Emirates and is currently the head of Strategic Planning at the UAE-based Crescent Petroleum, an oil and gas company based in Abu Dhabi .
Business in Iran was drying up. Ahmadinejad may have held onto power after he broke the Green Movement, but his drive toward nuclear “self-sufficiency” raised so many alarms that the Obama administration was able to persuade the four other members of the UN Security Council to impose draconian sanctions on the regime. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of assets were frozen, and international commerce ground toward a halt .
Then, in 2013, Khajehpour’s former employer Hassan Rouhani, the former nuclear negotiator, the Rafsanjani-style “pragmatist,” was elected Iran’s new president. The ever affable-seeming former UN ambassador, Javad Zarif, was appointed foreign minister. Suddenly the door looked like it was open wide to a new relationship with the West of just the sort the Iran Lobby had worked for so hard and for so long. Rouhani was avuncular, good-humored, and had made it his goal to open Iran for business, if only the nuclear issue could be dealt with .
By the time serious talks with Washington were opened, Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program had built almost 14,000 centrifuges, and Iran was within a year, by some estimates within months, of producing enough fissile material to build a bomb, at least in theory .
Although there was talk in Washington about compelling Iran to dismantle the whole program, there was never really any question of that, and the deal as finally signed merely buys time—pushing Iran’s possibility of producing a potential nuclear weapon back from months to as many as 15 years .
As these pieces fell into place in the age of Obama, Parsi and NIAC found themselves in the unlikely position of power brokers. One prominent faction of the Iranian regime—Rafsanjani’s—sees them as convenient conduits for disseminating a pro-Iranian line in U.S. politics, while the “hardline” Iranian security services have classified their activities as benign to the interests of the Islamic Republic .
The U.S. government, meanwhile, has adopted many of NIAC’s talking points. Both Parsi and Atieh International, one of the companies in the Atieh Group, were fixtures on the sidelines of the Geneva and Vienna negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. In fact, Atieh International held a joint briefing with NIAC at the Marriott in Vienna on June 29 to discuss a most pressing topic—renewed economic possibilities for the West once a deal was inked. The speakers were Bijan Khajehpour and Trita Parsi .
The Namazis’s alignment with Rafsanjani and Rouhani can now pay off. Because they were attacked so often and sometimes so viciously by “hard liners”—the very Iranian officials the Obama White House claims constitutes the only Iranian opposition to the nuclear deal—the Namazis and NIAC, the think tank and lobby they helped create, have gained great renewed credibility in the West, even promoting the idea that they can liberalize what remains by and large a fanatical theocracy and a fiercely competitive kleptocracy. At the same time, they can present themselves in today’s Iran as the best go-betweens with, well, with the not-so-Great Satan, who loves to listen to their advice .
— Alex Shirazi is a pseudonym for a well-known Iranian dissident who requested that The Daily Beast keep his identity concealed for fear of what might happen to his family in Iran in retaliation for this article .]
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/15/the-shady-family-behind-america-s-iran-lobby.html

Erodoğan and Netanyahu Declare War

Erodoğan and Netanyahu Declare War


07.31.2015 :: Middle East
James Petras …

Introduction: The rulers of the two most powerful authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are launching major wars to reconfigure the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared war by proxy on Iran, announcing full-scale military mobilization within Israel (July 27 -29) and organizing the biggest political campaign of ultra Zionist Jews in Washington.



The purpose of this two-pronged propaganda blitz is to defeat the recently signed US-Iranian agreement and start another major Middle East war. Ultimately, Netanyahu intends to take care of his ‘Palestinian Problem’ for good: complete the conquest and occupation of Palestine and expelling the Palestinian people from their homeland – the single most important foreign policy and domestic goal of the Jewish state. In order to do this, Israeli leaders have had to systematically campaign for the destruction of the Palestinians regional supporters and sympathizers – Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon and Iran.

Erodogan’ s Multiple Wars

At the same time, Turkish Prime Minister Erodogan has launched a major war against the Kurdish people and their aspirations for a Kurdish state. This has followed closely on several recent incidents beginning with the bombing (with cooperation from Turkish intelligence ) of a Kurdish youth camp, killing and wounding scores of young secular activists. Within days of the massacre of Turkish-Kurdish youth, Erodogan ordered his air force to bomb and strafe Kurdish bases within the sovereign territories of Iraq and Syria and Turkish security police have assaulted and arrested thousands of Kurdish nationalists and Turkish leftist sympathizers throughout the country. This has all occurred with the support of the US and NATO who provide cover for Erodogan’s plans to seize Syrian territory, displace Kurdish civilians and fighters and colonize the northern border of Syria – under the pretext of needing a ‘buffer zone’ to protect Turkish sovereignty. Such a massive land grab of hundreds of square kilometers will end the long standing support and interaction among Syrian, Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish populations who have been among the most effective opponents of radical Islamist groups.

Erdogan’s newly declared war on the Kurds has complex domestic and regional components (Financial Times 7/28/15, p 9): Within Turkey, the repression is directed against the emerging electoral-political power of the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party. Erodogan plans to discredit or outright ban this political party, which had won a surprising number of seats in the recent parliamentary election, call for new elections, secure a ‘majority’ in Parliament and assume dictatorial ‘executive powers’.

Regionally, Erodogan’s invasion of Syria is part of his strategy to expand Turkey’s borders southward and westward and to provide a platform from which Turkey’s favorite jihadi clients can launch assaults on the secular government in Damascus and Aleppo. The bombing of Kurdish villages and camps in Iraq and Syria are designed to reverse the Kurd’s military victories against ISIS and will justify greater repression of Kurdish activists backing autonomy in southeastern Turkey.

Erodogan is counting on Turkey’s agreements with the US and NATO for overt and covert collaboration against the Kurds and against Syrian national sovereignty.

Netanyahu’s Proxy Wars

Netanyahu’s multifaceted political offensive is designed to drag the US into a war with Iran. His strategy operates at many levels and in complex complimentary ways. The immediate target is the nuclear agreement recently signed between the White House and Iran. Part of longer-term strategy to destroy Iran includes the formation of a coalition of Middle East states, especially Gulf monarchies, to encircle, confront and provoke war with Iran. This political-military strategy is being pushed by leading Zionists within the highest circles of the US Government.

All the major Israeli political parties, and most Israeli voters support this dangerous policy against Iran. The Presidents of the 52 Major American Jewish Organizations in the US have been mobilized to bully, bribe and bludgeon the majority of Congress into following Netanyahu’s dictates. Every US Congressperson is being ‘visited’ and presented with propaganda sheets by leaders, activists and full time functionaries of AIPAC, the Jewish Confederations and their billionaire political donors. All the major US press and TV media parrot Netanyahu’s call for ‘war on the peace accord’ despite massive US public opinion against any escalation of the conflict.

At the highest levels of US Executive decision-making top Zionist officials avoid association with AIPAC’s public polemics and thuggish bluster, all the while promoting their own political-military ‘final solution’ …for eliminating Iran as an adversary to Israeli-Jewish supremacy in the Middle East. In the State Department and Departments of Commerce, Defense and Treasury, US-Israeli agents acting as special Middle East advisers, ambassadors and insiders push Netanyahu’s policies to undermine any normalization of relations between the US and Iran.

A recent proposal written by Professor Phillip Zelikow in the Financial Times (7/23/15, p. 9 ) entitled “To Balance (sic) the Nuclear Deal, Defeat ISIS and Confront Iran” is chilling.

The former ‘Executive Director of the ‘9/11 Commission Investigation Report’, uber-insider Zelikow promotes the formation of an ingenious coalition, in the name of fighting ISIS, but whose real purpose is to “confront Iranian ambitions”. Zelikow’s “coalition” includes Turkey, which will be assigned to attack Iran’s regional allies in Syria and Lebanon (Hezbollah) – all in the name of “fighting ISIS”.

The bland, bespectacled and most respectable Professor Zelikow lays out Netanyahu’s own bloody hit list down to the most minute detail – but tidied up with a thin veneer of ‘confronting ISIS’ to obscure his real agenda. This is no blustering AIPAC thug or open Neo-Con war monger beating the drums…

Zelikow’s ‘anti-ISIS coalition’ will ultimately go after the Iraqi Shia militia and their main supporters among Iran’s Revolutionary Guard – hewing closely to Netanyahu’s strategy!

Zelikow was a major inside advocate of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Twelve years after the US invaded, occupied and destroyed Iraq, Zelikow pops up again to promote a policy of sending US combat troops to serve Israel’s regional interest. He writes, “The military side (of the ‘coalition’) will need more Americans on the ground to offer meaningful combat support among the coalition”. (FT ibid).

Zelikow is clearly aware of US public opinion in favor of diplomacy with Iran and against the US engaging in more ground wars in the Middle East, when he writes that a ‘military effort is not an alternative to diplomacy.” Zelikow and his bosses in the Israeli Foreign Office know any US military intervention with such a “coalition” would lead to the destruction of the US-Iran Agreement and another major ground war with US troops fighting for Israel once again!

Considering his position as a highly connected insider, Zelikow’s attempts to sabotage the Iran-US agreement presents a far greater danger to world peace than all the noisy lobbying by the 52 Zionist organizations active in Congress.

Zelikow has been a highly influential security adviser to the US Executive and State Department since the early 1980’s under Reagan. He was appointed ‘special adviser to the State Department’ in 2007, a position held earlier by Neo-Con operative Wendy Sherman and followed by war-monger, Victoria Nuland. In 2011 President Obama appointed him to the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

He came to national prominence when President Bush appointed him Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission where he directed the highly controversial (and highly censored) 9/11 Commission Report against much public opposition. The appointment was made after Bush first choice of Henry Kissinger had created a media storm – Kissinger was never a serious choice with an insider-gatekeeper like Zelikow waiting in the wings. He was a controversial choice because of his role as intimate advisor to Condaleeza Rice and his authorship of the notorious Bush national security strategy promoting pre-emptive war, published in September 2002.

Phillip Zelikow suppressed any discussion of Israel’s role as a major catalyst for US involvements in the Afghan and Iraq wars. As executive-director of the 9/11 Commission Report, Zelikow assumed the role of editor and censor. He ignored the history of Israeli Mossad operations in the US, especially in the run-up to the attack on September 11, 2001. The report made no mention the fake ‘moving’ van filled with Israeli spies arrested on September 11, 2001 while celebrating and photographing the destruction of the World Trade Center complex. Nor did he discuss the quiet ‘deportation’ of the Israeli agents. The report contains no discussion of the scores of phony Israel “art students” who operated in South Florida around US military installations and in the vicinity of the apartment of the alleged 9-11 hijackers. They too were quietly arrested and deported.

He also suppressed discussion of the Defense Department’s ‘Able Danger Project’, which showed US intelligence awareness of the hijackers presence and activities much earlier dating back to 1997.

In October 2001, the first ‘anthrax attack’ occurred – first sickening and killing a photojournalist at a scandal sheet in Florida. National news programs featured an interview with… the re-packaged ‘al Qaeda’ and ‘bioterrorism’ expert Professor Zelikow (his lack of Arabic and scientific credentials notwithstanding…) who declared the anthrax to be ‘weapons grade’ and ‘definitely from a state sponsored military lab’, implying Iraq. (He was correct in the ‘military lab’ part of his declaration – only the facility was the US Weapons Lab at Fort Detrick. Zelikow’s role in accusing the embargoed and beleaguered regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of the anthrax hysteria was crucial in the public build-up for the case to invade Iraq, echoed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s call for the destruction of Iraq. Master-performance complete, ‘scientist’ Zelikow’s interview (among others) has disappeared from the ‘web’.

Zelikow’s ‘expertise’ (such as it is) and usefulness to Israel derives from his articles on the political usefulness of ‘false flags’ and catastrophes – events concocted or instigated by imperialist powers to push a traumatized public into unpopular wars and draconian domestic police state policies. His work has centered on the manipulation and exploitation of ‘events’ to push public policy – and include the Cuban Missile Crisis, the re-unification of Germany, policing Northern Ireland, (but not Middle East studies or bio-weaponry’). His expertise is in the historical use of the ‘public myth’- whether the Riechstag Fire or Pearl Harbor. In Foreign Affairs, November-December 1998, he co-authored an article with the current US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, entitled Catastrophe Terrorism where a ‘watershed event’ could result in ‘horror and chaos’ pushing the US public to accept the destruction of ‘their civil liberties, wide-spread surveillance, detention and use of deadly force…’

Zelikow continues to push the “false flag” script: In 2001 with the “anthrax hysteria” and now with the “Iran threat hysteria” . . . What is not surprising is that in both instances he hews closely to Israel’s strategic goal of utterly destroying countries, which have opposed Israel’s dispossession, occupation and expulsion of Palestinians – Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and now Iran.

Zelikow is a long-term, major asset for Israel, working quietly and effectively while the AIPAC bullies break down the doors of Congress. He never held a prominent position in the Cabinet or White House post like the brazen Zion-Cons Wolfowitz, Feith, Libby, Perle, Abrams and Levey who aggressively pushed the country into war with Iraq. Wolfowitz and company have scuttle back into obscurity under the cover of lucrative private positions while Zelikow continues to work inside pushing the Iran war agenda out of the limelight.

Zelikow’s role is far more discrete and important to Israel over the long haul than the loudmouths and thugs of AIPAC and other Zionist fronts. On the surface he pursues his academic and university administrative career (an excellent cover) while repeatedly inserting himself into crucial public discussions and quietly assuming strategic positions to advise on events or policies which have ‘turning point’ consequences and where his deep ties to Israel are never discussed.

Zelikow has one asset, which his bullying and blustering Zionist comrades lack and another which he shares with them. Zelikow is a great con-man - claiming knowledge about anthrax, Middle East relations, and military strategy. He spouts …. pure unadulterated rubbish with authoritative finesse!.. Claiming legal and investigative expertise he controlled the 9/11 Commission Report and denied the American people any open and relevant discussion of the event. He even likened the Commission Report skeptics to ‘an infection’ within American public opinion – apparently relying on his ‘expertise’ in biological warfare…

What Zelikow does have in common with the raging bulls of Zionism is his constant resort to vituperation against any country or movement identified as a target by Israel. He consistently refers to the secular government of Syria (under attack by jihadi terrorists) as a “terrorist regime”. He calls the Iraqi militia fighting ISIS “Shia torture squads”. This is part of a build-up to push the US into ground war for Israel against Iran and its allies.

Unlike Turkey’s Erodogan who uses his own armed forces to launch an all-out war to dispossess, terrorize and colonize ethnic Kurdish territories in Syria, Iraq and Turkey, Israel’s Netanyahu relys on his overseas (US) high level operatives to set in motion the wheels of war. Within days of attacks of September 11, 2001, Israel’s leading mouthpiece in the US Senate, Joseph Lieberman presented the roadmap for US wars for the next decade and a half – declaring that “the US must declare war on Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Iran”, despite the complete absence of these countries’ involvement in the event.

Is he a prophet or just a highly successful agent? Zelikow will push for a ‘coalition’ of Middle East dictators and monarchs to fulfill Israel’s dream as dictated by Joseph Lieberman in September 2001. This is a dream of waging devastating war against Iran leading to its partition, similar to the de facto partition of Iraq, Syria and Libya, resulting in a Middle East forever ravaged by sectarian strife, foreign occupations, balkanized and devoid of any possibility of regaining civilized life. Israel can then carry out its brutal final solution: the dispossession and expulsion of all Palestinians and establishment an expanded, purely Jewish state – surrounded by unspeakable destruction and destitution…

Conclusion

Erodogan expands ‘Turkoman frontier’ into Syria and Iraq – despite the fact that Turkey has never shown any interest in the Turkoman minorities. To that end, he allies with ISIS terrorists to uproot Kurds, everywhere extending into Turkey. Erodogan, like, Netanyahu, wants a ‘pure’ ethnic state – one Jewish, the other Turkish! Both brutal leaders have no regard for the sovereignty of neighboring states, let alone the security of their civilian populations. Both depend on the military support of the US. Both are in the process of igniting wider and more destructive wars in the Middle East. Netanyahu and Erodogan want to reconfigure the Middle East: Turkey seizes Kurdistan and Syria; Netanyahu expands military dominance in the Persian Gulf through the destruction of Iran.

These two leaders appear to hate each other because they are so similar in arrogance and action… But according to Professor Zelikow, the US will step in ‘god-like’ to ‘mediate’ the different power grabs among what he mindlessly refers to as the ‘partners of the coalition’.

Erodoğan and Netanyahu Declare War – the James Petras …

Syria continuing to build chemical weapons

Syria continuing to build chemical weapons


Published July 24th 2015 04:50pm

US intelligence officials fear chemical weapons may be given to Hezbollah or fall into hands of IS
The Syrian government has continued to build up their chemical weapons arsenal, including developing new chlorine bombs, The Wall Street Journal reported Friday .
The mission to remove chemical weapons from Syria last year not only failed, the report said, but the regime hid "caches of even deadlier nerve agents" .
Under the UN-backed deal agreed last year, Syria's government agreed to give up its entire stock of deadly chemicals by April 27, after missing several key deadlines.
According to the WSJ, the regime was able to hide the extent of the regime's chemical-weapons facilities from Western weapons inspectors, due in part to the extremely restrictive conditions the inspectors were allowed into the country .
The inspectors told the WSJ that they felt that to demand more access would antagonize the Assad regime, and if they went to areas not under government control, they feared they would be targeted by rebels .
"Because the regime was responsible for providing security, it had an effective veto over inspectors’ movements. The team decided it couldn’t afford to antagonize its hosts, explains one of the inspectors, or it ‘would lose all access to all sites.’ And the inspectors decided they couldn’t visit some sites in contested areas, fearing rebels would attack them," the report said .
"Under the terms of their deployment, the inspectors had access only to sites that the Assad regime had declared were part of its chemical-weapons program. The US and other powers had the right to demand access to undeclared sites if they had evidence they were part of the chemical-weapons program. But that right was never exercised, in part, inspectors and Western officials say, because their governments didn’t want a standoff with the regime" .
Even though the inspectors suspected the regime of hiding other sites, they did not push to see them as they did not want to "comprise their primary objective of getting the regime to surrender the 1,300 tons of chemicals it admitted to having" .
A total of 1,300 metric tonnes of chemical weapons have already been removed from Syria but earlier in June, opposition figures in Syria had accused the Assad regime of hiding chemical weapons in its remote northwestern region .
There is a fear by US intelligence officials quoted in the report that "Assad may be poised to use his secret chemical reserves to defend regime strongholds. Another danger is that he could lose control of the chemicals, or give them to Hezbollah. If the regime collapses outright, such chemical weapons could fall into the hands of Islamic State, or another terror group" .
Syrian government says too early for more UN-backed peace talks
Meanwhile, Syria's foreign minister said on Friday it was too early to hold another United Nations-backed peace conference on Syria, indicating the dim prospects for diplomacy as a U.N. envoy wraps up three months of consultations on the war .
Walid al-Moualem also reiterated his government's view that Iran's support for Damascus would continue after its nuclear deal with world powers including the United States, which says President Bashar al-Assad must leave power .
He was speaking at a "conference against terrorism" in Damascus, sharing the podium with the visiting Iranian minister of culture and Islamic guidance and the deputy head of the Lebanese group Hezbollah, which is fighting alongside the Syrian army in the four-year-old war .
UN Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura, who met Moualem in Damascus on Thursday, is due to brief the Security Council next week about his discussions with parties involved in the war .
The UN has hosted two major conferences on Syria since 2011, the last of which brought together the government and representatives of the opposition. Those talks ended in failure early last year .
"We think that going to Geneva 3 is premature unless the Syrians address their issues among themselves," Moualem told a televised conference in Damascus .
He said the Syrian government welcomed the idea of more talks with members of the Syrian opposition hosted by Russia. Two such rounds of talks were held in Moscow earlier this year but were not attended by the main Western-backed opposition coalition or any of the armed groups fighting Assad .
In Brussels, members of that coalition and another opposition group said they were working on their own a "roadmap" for ending the war .
"The international community needs to force the regime to the negotiating table," said Hadi al-Bahra, a member of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces .
Bahra said an international communique on Syria agreed three years ago - which called for political transition but left Assad's role unresolved - needed to be revitalized .
http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/79546-150724-syria-continuing-to-build-chemical-weapons-wsj


14.07.1512:02
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna,
. 14 July 2015



Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Vienna, 14 July 2015
PREFACE
The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.
The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3’s concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.
The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.
vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.
ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.

x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.
xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices.
xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.
xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.
xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.
xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.



I.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes

NUCLEAR

A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES
1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.
B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.
11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

SANCTIONS
18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.[1]
19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:
i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran;
vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;
ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;
xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;
xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.
20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:
i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);
ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;
v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;
ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;
xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
xiii. Transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’s automotive sector;
xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and
xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 – 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.
22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.
23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.
24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.
25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.
26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear- related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.
28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements[2]. The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.
29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.
30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.
31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.
32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.
33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:
i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.

iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.

iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.
37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

________________________________________
[1] The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.
[2] 'Government officials' for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.

Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. GENERAL

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR
2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisation.
3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research reactor.
4. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak reactor as described in this Annex. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation. The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will aim to complete its review and endorsement within three months after the submission of the final design. If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement within three months, Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.
6. The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the approved final design.
7. As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction efforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation.
E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the mechanism established by this JCPOA, as well as through exploration of relevant funding contributions.
8. E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, upon request by Iran, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and financial assistance, supply of required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.
9. The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO2 with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO2 in a full core load, with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside Iran. The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor. Destructive and non-destructive testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take place in one of the participating countries outside of Iran and that country will work with Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned reactor under IAEA monitoring.
10. Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernised Arak reactor.
11. All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3 countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient party, within one year from the unloading from the reactor or whenever deemed to be safe for transfer by the recipient country.
12. Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme. The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring.
13. Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor.

C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT
14. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years. Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.
15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.

D. OTHER REACTORS
16. Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of necessary fuel.
17. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES
18. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex, spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel.
19. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
20. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
21. For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.
22. The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, for 15 years.
23. For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or industrial radioisotopes.
24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.
25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.
26. If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission.

F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

27. Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.
28. Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years.
29. Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring:
29. All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a one-for-one basis.
29. UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps.
30. For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal.
31. For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified under this JCPOA.

G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
32. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8. Iran will build or test, with or without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.
33. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
34. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
35. Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.
36. Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.
37. Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
38. Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
39. For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA.
40. For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran Research Centre.
41. For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated infrastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space in line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme.
42. Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPoA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF6 pipework (including removal of all sub headers except as agreed as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale testing.
43. Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations, including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint Commission is needed.

H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT
44. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow.
45. Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15 years.
46. For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing of the FFEP of which:
46. Two cascades that have not experienced UF6 before will be modified for the production of stable isotopes. The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF6 feed main header, and move cascade UF6 pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at FFEP.
46. For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning. The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon completion of the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.
47. Iran will:
47. remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all centrifuges and cascade UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.
47. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
48. Iran will:
48. remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal of all centrifuges and UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converters, and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.
48. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets, vacuum umps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
49. Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.
50. Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing these IR-1 centrifuges.
51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily as requested by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.

I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT
52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol.[1] The IAEA will confirm on an annual basis, for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan.
53. Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP after year 10.
54. An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by implementation day.
55. An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day.
J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS
56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for 15 years.
57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg UF6 in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.
58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) for TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to Iran. For 15 years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF6.
59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also, within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.
60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for the purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in increments no greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be provided only when the previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into enriched uranium targets. Iran will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.

K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING
61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will only engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.
62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA, the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.
63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to mee

Part 2
63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at Natanz in an above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they are needed for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.

L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1
64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).

65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.

M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN
66. Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues”, as verified by the IAEA in its regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this Roadmap.

N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA
67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years or longer, for the specified verification measures:
67. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites.
67. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.
67. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran, consistent with its laws and regulations.

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)
68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.
69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.

P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT
70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.
71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.
72. For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.
73. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For 15 years, Iran will only engage, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research and development activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.

Q. ACCESS
74. Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for the purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are without prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEA will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge.
75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.
76. If Iran’s explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.
77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.
78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY
79. Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.
80. In this context:
80. Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inventory by item counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges.
80. Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.

S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES
81. For 10 years, Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology.[2] Iran will permit IAEA access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D activities are consistent with this Annex.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
82. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
82. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.
Attachment: Arak conceptual design
Fundamental Principles:
• Maximize use of the current infrastructure of original design of Arak research reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40, according to their respective ratings.
• Modernizing of the original design in order to be a multi-purpose research reactor comprising radio-isotope production, structural materials and fuel (pins and assembly prototypes) testing and able to conduct other neutronic experiments which demand high neutron fluxes (more than 1014).
• Using heavy water as coolant, moderator and reflector. Light water would be utilized as an annular ring around the compact new core for safety reasons if necessary.
• Around 78 fuel assemblies in a tight hexagonal grid spacing with the following preliminary characteristics will be loaded.
• Up to 3.67 percent enriched UO2, in the improved assembly design, will be used as fuel.
• Power will not exceed to 20 MWth.
• Adding different types of beam tubes to the existing beam tubes which being extended to the edge of the new compact core.
• Having one central channel in the center of the new core with passive cooling system for the purpose of structural materials and fuel pins and assembly prototypes testing with neutron flux beyond 2•1014, twelve in-core irradiation channels (IIC) inside the core and twelve lateral irradiation chennals (LIC) just next to the outer ring of fuel assemblies.
• The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed and fixed to meet the best anticipated performances.
• Consistent with relevant section of Annex 1, sibsidiary laboratories are part of the modernization project of the Arak Research Reactor. In Addition, Annex III reinforce design and construction of subsidiary laboratoties.
• The highest tolerable pressure for the first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (at the interance of the reactor pit).
• The highest possible flow rate for coolant is 610 kg/s at the pressure of 0.33 MPa in the main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same conditions.
Preliminary Characteristics:
Core Parameters Values
Power (MW) 20
Number of fuel assemblies ~ 78
Active length (cm) ~ 110
Lattice configuration Hexagonal
Fuel pellets Material UO2
Fuel enrichment level Up to 3.67 %
Clad material Zr Alloys
Burnable poison Yes, if necessary
Lattice pitch (cm) ~ 11
Coolant medium D2O
Moderator medium D2O
Reflector medium D2O
Reflector thickness (cm) ~ 50
Purity of D2O ~ 99.8%
Mass of D2O (mtons) ~ 60-70
Yearly makeup Yes
Keff < 1.25
Core Excess reactivity (pcm) < 20000
Cycle length (days) approximatly ~ 250
239Pu at EoC (g) ~ 850
239Pu purity at EoC ~ 78%
235U consumption ~ 60%
Maximum Thermal Flux , E<0.625ev ~ 3•1014
Maximum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev ~ 1•1014
Minimum Thermal Flux , E<0.625ev ~ 1•1014
Minimum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev ~ 1•1014
Fluid velocity in channels (m/s) ~ 3.8
Channel mass flow rate (kg/s) ~ 2.4
Working pressure (MPa) 0.33
Fluid inlet temperature (oC) ~ 47
Fluid outlet temperature (oC) ~ 78
Core material Mainly S.S. 304
Core wall Thichness (mm) ~ 30
Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm) ~ 0.65
Inner Clad Diameter (cm) ~ 0.67
Outer Clad Diameter (cm) ~ 0.8
Number of pins per assembly 12
Mass of UO2 in full core load (Kg) ~ 350
Core diameter (cm) ~ 240




________________________________________
[1] Iran will permit the IAEA to share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, as submitted as part of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants.
[2] For the purpose of this Annex, non-gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production will include laser isotope separation systems, electromagnetic isotope separation systems, chemical exchange systems, gaseous diffusion systems, vortex and aerodynamic systems, and other such processes that separate uranium isotopes.

Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments

The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V (Implementation Plan) to this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
A. European Union[1]
1. The EU and EU Member States commit to terminate all provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (as subsequently amended) implementing all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, to terminate all provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended), as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, and to terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required, in accordance with Annex V:
1. Financial, banking and insurance measures[2]
1. Prohibition and authorisation regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran (Article 10 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 30, 30a, 30b and 31 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on banking activities (Article 11 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 33 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on insurance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 35 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on financial messaging services (Article 20(12) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on financial support for trade with Iran (Article 8 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
1. Sanctions on grants, financial assistance and concessional loans (Article 9 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
1. Sanctions on Government of Iran public-guaranteed bonds (Article 13 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 34 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services[3] for each of the categories above (see the references above).
1. Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

1. Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 11, 12 and 14a, and Annexes IV and IVA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products (Articles 3b and 3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 13 and 14, and Annex V of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 4, 4a and 4b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 8, 9 and 10, and Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 6, 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 17(1), 17(2)(b) and (c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(5), 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
1. Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors
1. Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, 8a, 18a and 18b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10a, 10b, 10c, 37a, and 37b, and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
1. Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
1. Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage
1. Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage (Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15 and 16, and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
1. Nuclear proliferation-related measures
1. Sanctions related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities (goods and technology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(1) (a), (b), (d), (e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 17(1) and (2)(a), 18, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II and III of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
1. Metals
1. Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and 15c, and Annex VIIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
1. Software
1. Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10d, 10e and 10f, and Annex VIIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
1. Arms
1. Sanctions on arms (Articles 1(1)(c), (3) and (4), and 3 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), 17(1) and (2)(a), and 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
1. Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban)
1. Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:
1. listed Iranian banks and financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran;
2. listed persons, entities and bodies related to the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
3. listed persons, entities and bodies related to shipping, shipbuilding and transport;
4. other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile- related activities;
5. listed persons, entities and bodies related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities; and
6. entities and individuals listed by the UN Security Council,
as set out in Attachment 1, part I to this Annex for categories 1.9.1.1-1.9.1.4, Attachment 2, part I to this Annex for category 1.9.1.5, and Parts II of Attachments 1 and 2 to this Annex for category 1.9.1.6 (Articles 19 and 20, and Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28a, 28b and 29, and Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).
1. Other provisions
1. The commitment in Section 1 covers all remaining provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 not specified above.
1. Definitions (Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
1. General and final provisions (Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 26a, 27 and 28 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 43a, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and Annex X of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).
2. The EU represents that the provisions listed in Section 1 above constitute the full and complete list of all EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. These sanctions or restrictive measures will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.
3. Effects of the lifting of EU economic and financial sanctions
3. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 1 above, the following activities, including associated services, will be allowed, beginning on implementation day, in accordance with this JCPOA and provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with EU and EU Member States’ laws and regulations in effect:[4]
3. Financial, banking and insurance measures (See Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.8)
1. Transfers of funds between EU persons, entities or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and Iranian persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions, without the requirement for authorisation or notification;
1. Opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States; and the establishment of new joint ventures, or the taking of an ownership interest or the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by Iranian banks with EU banks; and opening by EU persons, including EU financial and credit institutions, of representative offices, subsidiaries, joint ventures or bank accounts in Iran;
1. Provision of insurance or reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran, an Iranian legal person, entity or body, or a natural person or a legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction;
1. Supply of specialised financial messaging services to any Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including those listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex;
1. Entering into commitments by EU Member States to provide financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance; and into commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran; and
1. Sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and financial institutions or persons acting on their behalf.
3. Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.5)
1. Import, purchase, swap or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, natural gas or petrochemical products and related financing;
1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment or technology, technical assistance, including training, used in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering exploration, production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran; and
1. Granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran.
3. Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors (See Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3)
1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels;
1. Access to the airports under the jurisdiction of EU Member States of all cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran;
1. Cessation of inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their territories with regard to items which are no longer prohibited; and
1. Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items; and the provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying prohibited items.
3. Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage (See Sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.2)
1. Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of Iran; and
1. Delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and coinage to, or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran.
3. Metals (See Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.2)
1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals, such as aluminum and steel to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
3. Software (See Sections 1.7.1 to 1.7.2)
1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of software for integrating industrial processes, including updates, to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA,
3. Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) (See Section 1.9.1)
1. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, releasing of all funds and economic resources which belong to, and making available funds or economic resources to, the persons, entities and bodies, including Iranian banks and financial institutions, the Central Bank of Iran, listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex; and
3.8.2. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, entry into, or transit through the territories of EU Member States of individuals listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex.
B. United States[5]
4. The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions[6] as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V.[7]

4.1. Financial and banking measures

4.1.1. Sanctions on transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),[8] Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and other specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control; and certain designated individuals and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)(I); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1245(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.1.2. Sanctions on the Iranian Rial (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 1(a), 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.1.3. Sanctions on the provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.1.4. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including limitations on their transfer (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.1.5. Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) Section 213(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.1.6. Sanctions on financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 220; IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.1.7. Sanctions on associated services[9] for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.2. Insurance measures

4.2.1. Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex (Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645).

4.3. Energy and petrochemical sectors

4.3.1. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian crude oil (ISA Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.2. Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors (ISA Sections 5(a)(1)-(2) and (4)-(8); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Section 1 of E.O. 13590, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i)-(iii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.3. Sanctions on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.4. Sanctions on the export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran (ISA Section 5(a)(3); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.5. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's energy sector including with NIOC, NICO and NITC (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); TRA Section 212(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.3.6. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.4. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors

4.4.1. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators including IRISL, South Shipping Line, and NITC, and the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas[10] (TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d); 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.5. Gold and other precious metals

4.5.1. Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold and other precious metals (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(A) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.6. Software and metals

4.6.1. Sanctions on trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B)-(C) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.7. Automotive sector

4.7.1. Sanctions on the sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i), 3(a)(i)-(ii), 5 and 6 of E.O. 13645); and

4.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.8. Designations and other sanctions listings

4.8.1. Removal of individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List (Removal of designations and/or sanctions imposed under ISA Section 5(a), IFCA Section 1244(d)(1) and TRA Section 212; and removals pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of certain persons listed pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622, and E.O. 13645).

4.9. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

4.9.1. Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT;
1. Sanctions on joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium (ISA Section 5(b)(2)); and
1. Exclusion of Iranian citizens from higher education coursework related to careers in nuclear science, nuclear engineering or the energy sector (TRA Section 501).
5. Other trade measures

5.1. The United States commits to: [11]

5.1.1. Allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran by licensing the (i) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, (ii) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (iii) provision of associated serviced, including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation;[12]

5.1.2. License non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person[13] to engage in activities with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA; and

5.1.3. License the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.

6. The United States represents that the provisions listed in Section 4 above constitute the full and complete list of all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions. These sanctions will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.

7. Effects of the lifting of U.S. economic and financial sanctions:
7. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 4 above, beginning on implementation day such sanctions, including associated services, would not apply to non-U.S. persons who carry out the following or that:[14]
7. Financial and banking measures[15] (See Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7)
Engage in activities, including financial and banking transactions, with the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian financial institutions and other Iranian persons specified in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including the provision of loans, transfers, accounts (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions), investments, securities, guarantees, foreign exchange (including Rial related transactions), letters of credit and commodity futures or options, the provision of specialised financial messaging services and facilitation of direct or indirect access thereto, the purchase or acquisition by the Government of Iran of U.S. bank notes, and the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.[16]
7. Insurance measures (See Section 4.2.1)
Provide underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), or for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical products to or from Iran.
7. Energy and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6)
Are part of the energy sector of Iran; purchase, acquire, sell, transport or market petroleum, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; provide to Iran support, investment (including through joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services) and technology that can be used in connection with Iran’s energy sector, the development of its petroleum resources, its domestic production of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products; or engage in activities with Iran’s energy sector, including NIOC, NITC, and NICO).
7. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors (See Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2)
Are part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; own, operate, control or insure a vessel used to transport crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; operate a port in Iran, engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and services used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran (including the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas[17]), including port services, such as bunkering and inspection, classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels to Iran, including to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), NITC, and South Shipping Line Iran or their affiliates.
7. Gold and other precious metals (See Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.2)
Sell, supply, export or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold and other precious metals, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing including security, insurance and transportation.
7. Software and metals (See Sections 4.6.1 to 4.6.2)
Sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, to or from Iran in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, and the sale, supply, or transfer of such materials to the energy, petrochemical, shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, and Iranian ports, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing, including insurance and transportation.
7. Automotive sector (See Sections 4.7.1 to 4.7.2)
Conduct or facilitate financial or other transactions for the sale, supply or transfer to Iran of goods and services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.
7. Designations and other sanctions listings (See Section 4.8.1)
The removal of designations and/or sanctions as described in Section 4.8.1, ceasing the application of secondary sanctions for transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex; and unblocking of property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction for individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex.



________________________________________
[1] For the purposes of EU legislation, “Iranian person, entity or body” means:
i. the State of Iran or any public authority thereof;
ii. any natural person in, or resident in, Iran;
iii. any legal person, entity or body having its registered office in Iran;
iv. any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside Iran, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more of the above mentioned persons or bodies.
[2] The headings and subheadings in this Annex are for descriptive purposes only.
[3] For the purposes of this Annex, the term "associated services" means any service – including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to this JCPOA.
[4] Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on EU sanctions.
[5] For the purposes of U.S. legislation, “Iranian person” means (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; and (B) an entity organised under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
[6] The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed towards non-U.S. persons. For the purposes of Sections 4 and 6-7 of this JCPOA, the term “non-U.S. person” means any individual or entity, excluding (i) any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organised under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States, and (ii) any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person. For the purposes of (ii) of the preceding sentence, an entity is “owned or controlled” by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised to do so by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
[7] All citations to statutes and Executive orders included in this JCPOA refer to the statute or Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including: the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 201-207 and 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA); CISADA, as amended by Sections 214-216, 222, 224, 311-312, 402-403 and 605 of TRA and Section 1249 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of IFCA; Executive Order (E.O.) 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of E.O. 13645. The citations listed in Section 4 include authorities under which secondary sanctions will no longer apply as a result of actions described in Section 4.8.1.
[8] Removal of NIOC from the SDN List, as provided for in Section 4.8.1, will include resolution of related designations and determinations.
[9] See footnote 3 for the meaning of "associated services".
[10] This commitment in Section 4.4.1 is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.
[11] To give effect to the measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license activities that do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.
[12] Licenses issued in furtherance of Section 5.1.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or re-transferred to, any person on the SDN list. Should the United States determine that licensed aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation end-use, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1.1 in whole or in part.
[13] For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, a non-U.S. entity is owned or controlled by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.
[14] Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons on the SDN List and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on U.S. sanctions.
[15] For the purposes of the cessation of application of the provisions set out in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.7, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S. jurisdiction of international financial institutions.
[16] Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.
[17] The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

ACENA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ADVANCE NOVEL
AGHAJARI OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
AGHAZADEH, Reza
AHMADIAN, Mohammad
AKHAVAN-FARD, Massoud
ALPHA EFFORT LTD
ALPHA KARA NAVIGATION LIMITED
ALPHA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
ARIAN BANK
ARVANDAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
ASHTEAD SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
ASPASIS MARINE CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION LTD
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
AVRASYA CONTAINER SHIPPING LINES
AZARAB INDUSTRIES
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY ALIAS AZORES SHIPPING FZE LLC
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO CA
BANK KARGOSHAE
BANK MELLAT
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO
BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY
BANK MELLI,
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE
BANK REFAH KARGARAN
BANK TEJARAT
BATENI, Naser
BEST PRECISE LTD
BETA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
BIS MARITIME LIMITED
BONAB RESEARCH CENTER
BRAIT HOLDING SA
BRIGHT JYOTI SHIPPING
BRIGHT SHIP FZC
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN
CHAPLET SHIPPING LIMITED
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CONCEPT GIANT LTD
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
DAMALIS MARINE CORPORATION
DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
DARYA DELALAN SEFID KHAZAR SHIPPING COMPANY
DELTA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
DELTA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
DIAMOND SHIPPING SERVICES
DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EAST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
ELBRUS LTD
ELCHO HOLDING LTD
ELEGANT TARGET DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
EMKA COMPANY
EPSILON NARI NAVIGATION LTD
E-SAIL A.K.A.E-SAIL SHIPPING COMPANY
ETA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
ETERNAL EXPERT LTD.
EUROPÄISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK
EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN
FAIRWAY SHIPPING
FAQIHIAN, Dr Hoseyn
FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
FASIRUS MARINE CORPORATION
FATSA
FIFTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK
FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST PERSIAN EQUITY FUND
FOURTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FUTURE BANK BSC
GACHSARAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
GALLIOT MARITIME INCORPORATION
GAMMA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
GIANT KING LIMITED
GOLDEN CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLDEN SUMMIT INVESTMENTS LTD.
GOLDEN WAGON DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLPARVAR, Gholam Hossein
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING COMPANY LLC
GRAND TRINITY LTD.
GREAT EQUITY INVESTMENTS LTD.
GREAT METHOD LTD
GREAT PROSPECT INTERNATIONAL LTD.
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES
HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST & SHIPPING GMBH
HARVEST SUPREME LTD.
HARZARU SHIPPING
HELIOTROPE SHIPPING LIMITED
HELIX SHIPPING LIMITED
HK INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD
HONG TU LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
IFOLD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
INDUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT & RENOVATION ORGANIZATION
INSIGHT WORLD LTD
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
IOTA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
IRAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY
IRAN FUEL CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY
IRAN LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS CO.
IRANIAN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY LIMITED
IRANIAN OIL PIPELINES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (IOPTC)
IRANIAN OIL TERMINALS COMPANY
IRANO MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
IRINVESTSHIP LTD
IRISL (MALTA) LTD
IRISL EUROPE GMBH
IRISL MARINE SERVICES AND ENGINEERING COMPANY
IRISL MARITIME TRAINING INSTITUTE
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL
ISI MARITIME LIMITED
ISIM AMIN LIMITED
ISIM ATR LIMITED
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
ISIM SAT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LTD
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LTD
ISIM SININ LIMITED
ISIM TAJ MAHAL LTD
ISIM TOUR COMPANY LIMITED
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
JACKMAN SHIPPING COMPANY
KALA NAFT
KALAN KISH SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
KAPPA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
KARA SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH
KAROON OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
KAVERI MARITIME INCORPORATION
KAVERI SHIPPING LLC
KEY CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
KHALILIPOUR, Said Esmail
KHANCHI, Ali Reza
KHAZAR EXPL & PROD CO
KHAZAR SHIPPING LINES
KHEIBAR COMPANY
KING PROSPER INVESTMENTS LTD.
KINGDOM NEW LTD
KINGSWOOD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
KISH SHIPPING LINE MANNING COMPANY
LAMBDA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
LANCING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
LOGISTIC SMART LTD
LOWESWATER LTD
MACHINE SAZI ARAK
MAGNA CARTA LIMITED
MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY
MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
MAROUN OIL & GAS COMPANY
MASJED-SOLEYMAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
MASTER SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY PJS
MELLI BANK PLC
MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
MELODIOUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
METRO SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
MIDHURST SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (MALTA)
MILL DENE LTD
MINISTRY OF ENERGY
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
MODALITY LTD
MODERN ELEGANT DEVELOPMENT LTD.
MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INCORPORATION
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY
NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY SRL
NAMJOO, Majid
NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
NARMADA SHIPPING
NATIONAL IRANIAN DRILLING COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY NEDERLAND (A.K.A.: NIOC NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATION OFFICE)
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LIMITED
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (NIOEC)
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (NIOPDC)
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL REFINING AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
NEUMAN LTD
NEW DESIRE LTD
NEW SYNERGY
NEWHAVEN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
NOOR AFZA GOSTAR
NORTH DRILLING COMPANY
NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT COMPANY
OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
OCEAN EXPRESS AGENCIES PRIVATE LIMITED
ONERBANK ZAO
OXTED SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
PACIFIC SHIPPING
PARS SPECIAL ECONOMIC ENERGY ZONE
PARTNER CENTURY LTD
PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD
PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
PETRO SUISSE
PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD
PETROLEUM ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE
PETROPARS IRAN COMPANY
PETROPARS LTD.
PETROPARS OILFIELD SERVICES COMPANY
PETROPARS OPERATION & MANAGEMENT COMPANY
PETROPARS RESOURCES ENGINEERING LTD
PETROPARS UK LIMITED
PETWORTH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
POST BANK OF IRAN
POWER PLANTS' EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY (SAAKHTE TAJHIZATE NIROOGAHI)
PROSPER METRO INVESTMENTS LTD.
RASTKHAH, Engineer Naser
REIGATE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammad Reza
RISHI MARITIME INCORPORATION
SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LTD
SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
SALEHI, Ali Akbar
SANFORD GROUP
SANTEXLINES
SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SHALLON LTD
SHEMAL CEMENT COMPANY
SHINE STAR LIMITED
SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
SILVER UNIVERSE INTERNATIONAL LTD.
SINA BANK
SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS
SINOSE MARITIME
SISCO SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
SIXTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SIXTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
SMART DAY HOLDINGS LTD
SOLTANI, Behzad
SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT)
SOROUSH SARAMIN ASATIR
SOUTH WAY SHIPPING AGENCY CO. LTD
SOUTH ZAGROS OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
SPARKLE BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
STATIRA MARITIME INCORPORATION
SUREH (NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY)
SYSTEM WISE LTD
TAMALARIS CONSOLIDATED LTD
TENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
TEU FEEDER LIMITED
THETA NARI NAVIGATION
THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
THIRTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
TRADE CAPITAL BANK
TRADE TREASURE
TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LTD
TULIP SHIPPING INC
TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITATION UTL
VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE
WEST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
WESTERN SURGE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
WISE LING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ZANJANI, Babak
ZETA NERI NAVIGATION
AGHA-JANI, Dawood
ALAI, Amir Moayyed
ASGARPOUR, Behman
ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
BAKHTIAR, Haleh
BEHZAD, Morteza
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
IRISL BENELUX NV
JABBER IBN HAYAN
KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
MOHAMMADI, Jafar
MONAJEMI, Ehsan
NOBARI, Houshang
NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
PARS TRASH COMPANY
PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
QANNADI, Mohammad
RAHIMI, Amir
RAHIQI, Javad
RASHIDI, Abbas
SABET, M. Javad Karimi
SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
TAMAS COMPANY
AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION, AIO
AL YASIN, Javad
ALUMINAT
ANSAR BANK
ARAN MODERN DEVICES
ARAS FARAYANDE
ARFA PAINT COMPANY
ARFEH COMPANY
ARIA NIKAN,
ARMED FORCES GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION
ASHTIAN TABLO
BABAEI, Davoud
BALS ALMAN
BANK SADERAT IRAN
BANK SADERAT PLC
BARGH AZARAKSH
BEHNAM SAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY
BONYAD TAAVON SEPAH
BORBORUDI, Sayed Shamsuddin
DANESHJOO, Kamran
DARVISH-VAND, IRGC Brigadier-General Javad
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES
ESNICO (EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER FOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION)
ETEMAD AMIN INVEST CO MOBIN
EYVAZ TECHNIC
FADAVI, Rear Admiral Ali
FAJR AVIATION COMPOSITE INDUSTRIES
FARAHI, IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi
FARASEPEHR ENGINEERING COMPANY
FATAH, Parviz
GHANI SAZI URANIUM COMPANY
HAERI, Engineer Mojtaba
HIRBOD CO
HOSEYNITASH, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
HOSSEINI NEJAD TRADING CO.
INSTITUTE OF APPLIED PHYSICS
IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
IRAN COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
IRAN COMPOSITES INSTITUTE
IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
IRAN MARINE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
IRAN POOYA
IRAN SAFFRON COMPANY OR IRANSAFFRON CO.
IRANIAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION
IRGC AIR FORCE
IRGC QODS FORCE
IRGC-AIR FORCE AL-GHADIR MISSILE COMMAND
ISFAHAN OPTICS
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
JAFARI, Milad
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
JELVESAZAN COMPANY
KARANIR
KARIMIAN, Ali
KHALA AFARIN PARS
KHANSARI, Majid
MAAA SYNERGY
MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC
MAHMUDZADEH, Ebrahim
MARINE INDUSTRIES
MAROU SANAT
MATSA (MOHANDESI TOSEH SOKHT ATOMI COMPANY)
MECHANIC INDUSTRIES GROUP
MEHR BANK
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS
MOBIN SANJESH
MODERN TECHNOLOGIES FZC
MOHAMMADI, Mohammad
MOHAMMADLU, Brigadier-General Beik
MOVASAGHNIA, Mohammad Reza
MULTIMAT LC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI
NACCACHE, Anis
NADERI, Brigadier-General Mohammad
NAJJAR, IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad
NAQDI, BrigGen Mohammad Reza
NASERI, Mohammad Sadegh
NASERIN VAHID
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
NEKA NOVIN
NOAVARAN POOYAMOJ
NOURI, Ali Ashraf
OIL INDUSTRY PENSION FUND INVESTMENT COMPANY
ORGANISATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
PAKPUR, BrigGen Mohammad
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARTO SANAT CO
PASSIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
PAYA PARTO
QASEMI, Rostam (a.k.a. Rostam GHASEMI)
RAAD IRAN
RAKA
RESEARCH CENTRE FOR EXPLOSION AND IMPACT
ROSMACHIN
SAIDI, Hojatoleslam Ali
SALAMI, BrigGen Hossein
SAMAN NASB ZAYENDEH ROOD; SAMAN NASBZAINDE ROOD
SAMAN TOSE'E ASIA
SAMEN INDUSTRIES
SCHILLER NOVIN
SEPANIR OIL AND GAS ENERGY ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHAFI'I RUDSARI, Rear Admiral Mohammad
SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
SHAKHESE BEHBUD SANAT
SHAMS, Abolghassem Mozaffari
SHAMSHIRI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
SHETAB G.
SHETAB GAMAN
SHETAB TRADING
SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
SIMATEC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
SOLAT SANA, Abdollah
SOLTANI, Hamid
STATE PURCHASING ORGANISATION
STEP STANDART TEKNIK PARCA SAN VE TIC A.S.
SUN MIDDLE EAST FZ COMPANY
SURENA (A.K.A. SAKHD VA RAH-AN- DA-ZI)
TABA (IRAN CUTTING TOOLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY - TABA TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN)
TAGHTIRAN
TAJHIZ SANAT SHAYAN
TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OFFICE OF THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
TEST TAFSIR
TIDEWATER
TOSSE SILOOHA
TURBINE ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING
VAHIDI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad
WEST SUN TRADE GMBH
Y.A.S. CO. LTD
YARSANAT
YASA PART
ZADEH, Amir Ali Haji
7TH OF TIR.
ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ABZAR BORESH KAVEH CO.
AGHAJANI, Azim
AHMADIAN, Ali Akbar
AMIN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
AMMUNITION AND METALLURGY INDUSTRIES GROUP
ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES GROUP
BAHMANYAR, Bahmanyar Morteza
BANK SEPAH
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL
BARZAGANI TEJARAT TAVANMAD SACCAL COMPANIES
BEHINEH TRADING CO.
CRUISE MISSILE INDUSTRY GROUP
DASTJERDI, Ahmad Vahid
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION (DIO)
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER
DERAKHSHANDEH, Ahmad
DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
ELECTRO SANAM COMPANY
ESLAMI, Mohammad
ESMAELI, Reza-Gholi
ETTEHAD TECHNICAL GROUP
FAJR INDUSTRIAL GROUP
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARASAKHT INDUSTRIES
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FATER (OR FAATER) INSTITUTE
GHARAGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM
GHORB KARBALA
GHORB NOOH
HARA COMPANY
HEJAZI, Mohammad
HOJATI, Mohsen
IMENSAZAN CONSULTANT ENGINEERS INSTITUTE
INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES OF PRECISION (IFP) MACHINERY
JOZA INDUSTRIAL CO.
KALA-ELECTRIC
KAVEH CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY
KETABACHI, Mehrdada Akhlaghi
KHATAM AL-ANBIYA CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS
KHORASAN METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES
MAKIN
MALEK ASHTAR UNIVERSITY
MALEKI, Naser
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
MIZAN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING A.K.A.: 3MG
NAQDI, Mohammad Reza
NEJAD NOURI, Mohammad Mehdi
NIRU BATTERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
OMRAN SAHEL
ORIENTAL OIL KISH
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARS AVIATION SERVICES COMPANY
PEJMAN INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
QODS AERONAUTICS INDUSTRIES
RAH SAHEL
RAHAB ENGINEERING INSTITUTE
REZAIE, Morteza
SABALAN COMPANY
SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY
SAFARI, Morteza
SAFAVI, Yahya Rahim
SAFETY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT (SEP)
SAHAND ALUMINUM PARTS INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS
SALIMI, Hosein
SANAM INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SEPANIR
SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHAHID BAGHERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SBIG)
SHAHID HEMMAT INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SHIG)
SHAHID KARRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SATARRI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SAYYADE SHIRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHO’A’ AVIATION.
SOLEIMANI, Qasem
SPECIAL INDUSTRIES GROUP
TABATABAEI, Ali Akbar
TIZ PARS
YA MAHDI INDUSTRIES GROUP
YAS AIR
YAZD METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
ZAHEDI, Mohammad Reza
ZOLQADR, General
AA ENERGY FZCO[*]
ABAN AIR
ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED
AFZALI, Ali

Free Syrian Army to &lsquo;Post&rsquo;: Our struggle is increasingly against Iran

Free Syrian Army to ‘Post’: Our struggle is increasingly against Iran



“The current military situation in the Quneitra area has resulted in the Syrian regime forces being cut off under blows from the opposition, and we are turning toward an active system of defense and attack instead of hunkering down,” Ayas Ghalib, director of the political bureau of the Revolutionary Command Council in Quneitra and Golan, told The Jerusalem Post in an email interview.

Ghalib responded to questions this week about the situation facing the Syrian rebels in areas adjoining the Golan Heights.

Increased attention has been drawn to the situation on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights since a mob killed a Syrian man in Majdal Shams, on the Israeli side of the Heights, on June 22. In a meeting with reporters on June 29, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said that Israel was in contact with Syrian rebels and that medical aid was being provided to them. But the condition for that aid was that the border remain quiet and that the rebels do not harm the Druse in Syria.

After the lynch of the Syrian who was being transported for treatment by an IDF ambulance, the Facebook page of the Revolutionary Command Council in Quneitra and the Golan on June 25 released a picture purported to be the victim.

“Munther Khalil was killed by Druse in Majdal Shams, Israel; God bless and accept this martyr.”

The photo of Khalil shows a young man with a newly grown, scruffy beard holding an M-16 rifle. Comments on the picture condemned Druse for killing the man and blessed him for his aid in the fight against the Assad regime.

The Revolutionary Command Council, which has been active in the area since 2013, is one of many anti-Assad groups operating near the border with Israel in a Syrian civil war marked by often-changing circumstances. The Revolutionary Command Council’s leader is Abdullah al-Bashir al-Noemi, who is also the current chief of staff of the Supreme Military Council, the central body of the Free Syrian Army.

A former Syrian army general, he is from the Noeimi tribe prominent in the Quneitra area, and according to reports his son was killed fighting in the area in 2013. He was appointed to his position with the Supreme Military Council in February 2014.

The Revolutionary Command Council, like the larger umbrella FSA it is in coalition with, presents itself as non-Islamist and opposed to the policies of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaida affiliate.

In the last week the rebels have launched Operation Southern Storm to push President Bashar Assad’s forces out of the area of Deraa about 80 km. southeast of Quneitra on the Jordanian border. The Quneitra area is thus just one of many sectors, each with its own local groups, affecting the outcome of the Syrian civil war.

According to the statement from another representative of the Revolutionary Command Council, Khalil was “on his way to receive treatment (in Israel) after being hit in fighting against Syrian regime forces,” on June 22. He said that supporters of the Syrian regime spread disinformation that Israel was aiding Nusra Front wounded, when in fact Khalil and others being transported for treatment are members of the Free Syrian Army’s local allies.

According to the spokesman, the Syrian rebels in the area of Quneitra are running into increasing pressure from Assad and his allies. “We face many problems, including a lack of ground defenses to repel attacks from the air force, and a lack of presence of field hospitals for the wounded. We have many refugees that require food and educational needs.”

He noted, however, that over the last year Assad’s regular army has been “completely worn out fighting the dissidents and opposition.” The rebels have observed Assad’s loyalists killed in the fighting and those who remain fleeing the area and refusing to participate in the fighting against the rebels. “The current system (Assad employs) depends mainly on the Iranian militias and Hezbollah. This was made clear several months ago by the killing of Iranians and Hezbollah in Quneitra,” the spokesman said.

He argued that media reports on the persecution of the Druse by anti-Assad forces mischaracterize the situation. “There is no such thing as a cause relating just to the Druse villages as a purely sectarian issue. This is because there are Druse fighters among the opposition (rebels).

But the case in fact is that there are(Druse)militias belonging to the(regime) system and there are others from Lebanon within the Druse villages who support the opposition fighters.”

This complex mosaic is the result of, among things, the support for the rebels by Druse figures such as Walid Jumblatt in Lebanon.

According to the Revolutionary Command Council, the Assad regime and its allies are weakening in the area adjoining the Golan. “They have lost many soldiers and (Iranian) advisers during the battles; the existence of the regime and its allies has become fragile in Quneitra.” The council hopes that a “state of freedom and justice” will emerge, and “it is the only way for Syria after getting rid of the dictatorial regime.” The anger over Iranian involvement is palpable; the background on the group’s Facebook page shows an Iranian octopus whose tentacles stretch from Yemen to Syria and Iraq.

The updates provided on the group’s webpage provide an insight into the struggle developing on Israel’s border.

“The province of Quneitra has seen intermittent shelling targeting villages today, including mortars and barrel bombs and heavy machine gun fire.”

The updates refer to the use of helicopters against the rebels.

They also reference statements by Ya’alon: “Israel has required the Syrian rebels not to attack the Druse there in exchange for Israel helping them.”

More mundane humanitarian issues are mentioned, such as the rising cost of filtrated drinking water, lack of healthcare, basic medical supplies and cooking fuel, and frequent power outages.

Our contacts with the group were not able to furnish more information on the Syrian rebel who was lynched, but stressed the main thing the Revolutionary Command Council rebels near the Golan need from outside parties is financial aid to continue the war against Assad.

march to justice
Dear ANCA Supporter,

The White House is reviewing its Armenian Genocide policy for the first time since the President broke his promise six years ago. So, there's still time for you to make a difference.


That's the good news.
So is the global awareness generated by Pope Francis, the European Parliament, System of a Down, and the Kardashians. We're seeing unprecedented major media coverage. Leading editorial boards are calling for the President to speak honestly about this crime.
The bad news is that Ankara and its allies are hitting back hard. Erdogan's throwing a temper tantrum, calling the Pope evil and Europe racist.
This Monday, he'll send his Foreign Minister to DC to bully, bribe, or barter the U.S. government into silence.
This is our chance. Now's the time to raise your voice.
Click to ask President Obama to speak the truth on April 24th.
Sincerely,
Aram signature
Aram Suren Hamparian
Executive Director,
Armenian National Committee of America
P.S. - Then tell your friends about #MarchtoJustice, and share our posts on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram or other social networks.


anca logo

A project of the
Armenian National Committee of America
1711 N Street NW | Washington, DC 20036
www.marchtojustice.org | info@marchtojustice.org http://bit.ly/1FZGnde

Dutch Parliament recognizes Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides

April 10, 2015

Dutch Parliament recognizes Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides -


The Hague (AINA) -- The Dutch Parliament passed a binding resolution yesterday recognizing the genocide of Assyrians, Greeks and Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War One. The resolution, tabled by MP Joel Voordewind from the Christian Union party, enjoyed wide support from the various parties, including Christian Union, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, Christian Democratic Appeal, Reformed Political Party and Labor Party. The resolution was strongly opposed by two Turkish members of the Parliament but passed by a strong majority vote.
"The aim of this motion is to recognize the Armenian as well as the Assyrian genocide," said Joel Voordewind, "and to bring the Turkish government closer to Armenia. This is an important signal from the Dutch Parliament to the Turkish government to acknowledge its past actions. I hope in the end this will bring both countries to a better understanding and reconciliation with each other."
Armenia recognized the Assyrian Genocide on March 24 (AINA2015-03-24. In 2007 the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) recognized the Assyrian and Greek genocides (AINA 2007-12-15). In 2010 Sweden recognized the Assyrian, Greek and Armenian Genocide (AINA 2010-03-12).
The genocide of Assyrians, Greeks and Armenians was committed by Ottoman Turks during World War One, between 1915 and 1923. The genocide claimed the lives of 750,000 Assyrians (75%), 500,000 Greeks and 1.5 million Armenians.
While the Armenian genocide is widely known and recognized, the Assyrian and Greek genocides are lesser known. But these genocides cannot be separated from the Armenian genocide, as they were perpetrated at the same time and by the same policy. The genocide of the Assyrians, Greeks and Armenians is one and the same. It was a genocide against Christians.
Assyrians have worked with Greeks and Armenians to pressure Turkey to recognize the genocide of World War One.

http://bit.ly/1I29e3l

Petraeus: Iran, Shiite Militias Bigger Threat To Iraq Than ISIS


Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, says the "foremost threat to Iraq's long-term stability" is not the self-described Islamic State but Shiite militias backed, and sometimes guided, by Iran .
Petraeus' comments, which were made to The Washington Post in an interview published Friday, came at a conference in Sulaimaniya, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Petraeus oversaw the "surge" of troops into Iraq in 2007 and 2008, which succeeded in quelling the bloody Sunni rebellion after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime .
But since the end of combat operations in Iraq, violence in Iraq has spiked, a development Petraeus called a "tragedy — for the Iraqi people, for the region and for the entire world" .
"It is tragic foremost because it didn't have to turn out this way," he said .
Petraeus added :
"The hard-earned progress of the Surge was sustained for over three years. What transpired after that, starting in late 2011, came about as a result of mistakes and misjudgments whose consequences were predictable. And there is plenty of blame to go around for that. "Yet despite that history and the legacy it has left, I think Iraq and the coalition forces are making considerable progress against the Islamic State. In fact, I would argue that the foremost threat to Iraq's long-term stability and the broader regional equilibrium is not the Islamic State; rather, it is Shiite militias, many backed by — and some guided by — Iran" .
Petraeus, who headed the CIA before his resignation amid scandal in 2012, said: "Longer term, Iranian-backed Shia militia could emerge as the pre-eminent power in the country, one that is outside the control of the government and instead answerable to Tehran" .
Indeed, Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, has toured the battlefield in which Shiite militias have waged a bloody battle against the Islamic State, which controls portions of Iraq territory .
Petraeus' comments may also be significant as the Obama administration works to conclude an agreement with Iran on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. The talks themselves have been opposed by some U.S. allies, including Israel, as well as lawmakers from both parties in Congress .
"The current Iranian regime is not our ally in the Middle East," Petraeus told The Post. "It is ultimately part of the problem, not the solution" .
He added: "Iranian power in the Middle East is thus a double problem. It is foremost problematic because it is deeply hostile to us and our friends. But it is also dangerous because, the more it is felt, the more it sets off reactions that are also harmful to our interests — Sunni radicalism and, if we aren't careful, the prospect of nuclear proliferation as well" .
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/mar/20/petraeus-iran-shiite-militias-bigger-threat-to

Petraeus: Iran, Shiite Militias Bigger Threat To Iraq Than ISIS


Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, says the "foremost threat to Iraq's long-term stability" is not the self-described Islamic State but Shiite militias backed, and sometimes guided, by Iran .
Petraeus' comments, which were made to The Washington Post in an interview published Friday, came at a conference in Sulaimaniya, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Petraeus oversaw the "surge" of troops into Iraq in 2007 and 2008, which succeeded in quelling the bloody Sunni rebellion after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime .
But since the end of combat operations in Iraq, violence in Iraq has spiked, a development Petraeus called a "tragedy — for the Iraqi people, for the region and for the entire world" .
"It is tragic foremost because it didn't have to turn out this way," he said .
Petraeus added :
"The hard-earned progress of the Surge was sustained for over three years. What transpired after that, starting in late 2011, came about as a result of mistakes and misjudgments whose consequences were predictable. And there is plenty of blame to go around for that. "Yet despite that history and the legacy it has left, I think Iraq and the coalition forces are making considerable progress against the Islamic State. In fact, I would argue that the foremost threat to Iraq's long-term stability and the broader regional equilibrium is not the Islamic State; rather, it is Shiite militias, many backed by — and some guided by — Iran" .
Petraeus, who headed the CIA before his resignation amid scandal in 2012, said: "Longer term, Iranian-backed Shia militia could emerge as the pre-eminent power in the country, one that is outside the control of the government and instead answerable to Tehran" .
Indeed, Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, has toured the battlefield in which Shiite militias have waged a bloody battle against the Islamic State, which controls portions of Iraq territory .
Petraeus' comments may also be significant as the Obama administration works to conclude an agreement with Iran on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. The talks themselves have been opposed by some U.S. allies, including Israel, as well as lawmakers from both parties in Congress .
"The current Iranian regime is not our ally in the Middle East," Petraeus told The Post. "It is ultimately part of the problem, not the solution" .
He added: "Iranian power in the Middle East is thus a double problem. It is foremost problematic because it is deeply hostile to us and our friends. But it is also dangerous because, the more it is felt, the more it sets off reactions that are also harmful to our interests — Sunni radicalism and, if we aren't careful, the prospect of nuclear proliferation as well" .
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/mar/20/petraeus-iran-shiite-militias-bigger-threat-to

 Noam Chomsky: U.S. Has Been &quot;Torturing&quot; Iran for 60 Years, Since 1953 CIA-Led Coup

SEPTEMBER 11, 2013

Noam Chomsky: U.S. Has Been "Torturing" Iran for 60 Years, Since 1953 CIA-Led Coup



In this web-only exclusive, MIT Professor Emeritus Noam Chomsky talks about the past 60 years of U.S.-Iranian relations since the 1953 coup organized by the CIA. "The crucial fact about Iran, which we should begin with, is that for the past 60 years not a day has passed in which the U.S. has not been torturing Iranians," Chomsky says. "It began with a military coup which overthrew the parliamentary regime in 1953."

read more...

Iran And Turkey: Faces Of Change


Iran And Turkey: Faces Of Change


By Farooque Chowdhury
17 July, 2013

Despite a lot of dissimilarities between Iran and Turkey the two countries are now facing an emerging broad similarity. With visible signs an approach to change is steadily emerging in these two societies

read more...


Wednesday 29 May 2013

'The US or Israel — who should strike Iran ?'


The Times of Israel

A position paper weighing US and Israeli military options against Iran, written by retired US Marine Corps general James Cartwright and Amos Yadlin, former IAF head and military intelligence chief, posits that a US-led strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities would be preferable from a military standpoint, while an Israeli strike might not be able to disable Iran’s nuclear capabilities but would have less international fallout .

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How U.S. Can Break Up Iran’s Long Nuclear Game ?


There has been a lot of talk about Iran making a sudden dash for the bomb. The fear is that, with its thousands of gas centrifuges and its tons of enriched uranium, Iran might be able to make a bomb’s worth of nuclear fuel before the U.S. or any other country could intervene to stop it .

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Henry Kissinger: &quot;If You Can&#039;t Hear the Drums of War You Must Be Deaf&quot;

Henry Kissinger: "If You Can't Hear the Drums of War You Must Be Deaf"

By Alfred Heinz 27/11/2011 09:40:00
Font size:

Henry Kissinger, the most famous living practitioner of international statecraft
NEW YORK - USA - In a remarkable admission by former Nixon era Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, reveals what is happening at the moment in the world and particularly the Middle East.

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Iran Hints at Shift in Advance of Nuclear Talks


By ALAN COWELL
Published: April 9, 2012

LONDON — In the diplomatic shadowboxing in advance of a planned resumption of nuclear talks between global powers and Iran, a senior official in Tehran was quoted on Monday as hinting at what seemed to be a modest compromise to partially meet some Western concerns about the country’s uranium enrichment program.

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U.S. Defines Its Demands for New Round of Talks With Iran

U.S. Defines Its Demands for New Round of Talks With Iran


By DAVID E. SANGER and STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: April 7, 2012

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration and its European allies plan to open new negotiations with Iran by demanding the immediate closing and ultimate dismantling of a recently completed nuclear facility deep under a mountain, according to American and European diplomats.

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Obama’s signal to Iran

By David Ignatius, Published: April 6

President Obama has signaled Iran that the United States would accept an Iranian civilian nuclear program if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can back up his recent public claim that his nation “will never pursue nuclear weapons.”

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America, Persia, And Israel Are Being Sacrificed For A One World Order


http://www.infowars.com/

Saman Mohammadi
Infowars.com
February 19, 2012

“If the Washington/Tel Aviv-promoted hysteria is already at fever pitch, wait for March 20, when the Iranian oil bourse will start trading oil in other currencies apart from the US dollar, heralding the arrival of a new oil marker to be denominated in euro, yen, yuan, rupee or a basket of currencies.

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&lsquo;Less equal civilizations&rsquo;: French Minister stirs xenophobic controversy

‘Less equal civilizations’: French Minister stirs xenophobic controversy


story to a friend print version
Published: 06 February, 2012, 23:47

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French cabinet walks out of parliament over Nazi claim

World news
France

French cabinet walks out of parliament over Nazi claim

Opposition MP Serge Letchimy accuses rightwing interior minister Claude Guéant of flirting with Nazi ideology
Angelique Chrisafis in Paris
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 7 February 2012 19.18 GMT
Article history

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In the face of economic sanctions and international condemnation, Iran remains defiant over its nuclear energy program.

(CNN) --

In the face of economic sanctions and international condemnation, Iran remains defiant over its nuclear energy program.

It has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a major passageway for much of the world's oil, in retaliation for any embargo.

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David Miliband: Attacking Iran would increase the risk of nuclear war

David Miliband has strongly spoken out against the risks of sleepwalking into a war with Iran .
Writing for the Financial Times, Miliband argued : (£)

read more...

Tuesday 20 December 2011

North Korea leader will damage ties with Iran`s islamic regime

2011 has been a bad year for dictators, whether those, like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, whose stay in power was convenient for Israel or those, like Syria's Bashar Assad, who are Israel's enemies.

read more...

EU criticised for lifting travel bans on Iranian officials

EU criticised for lifting travel bans on Iranian officials

The European Union has been criticised for lifting travel bans on three senior Iranian officials after they were promoted .

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BEIJING&mdash;Chinese telecommunications-equipment maker Huawei Technologies Co.

Scale Back Business in Iran`s dictatorship regime

BEIJING—Chinese telecommunications-equipment maker Huawei Technologies Co. said Friday it plans to scale back its business in Iran, where the company provides services to government-controlled telecom operators, in the wake of reports that Iranian police were using mobile network technology to trace and arrest dissidents .

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Iran&#039;s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) is welcomed by Venezuela&#039;s President Hugo Chavez (R)

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) is welcomed by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez (R)

at Miraflores Palace in Caracas January 9, 2012.
Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

(CARACAS, Venezuela) — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defended his country's nuclear program as he began a four-nation tour of Latin America, joining his ally Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in accusing the U.S. and its allies of using the dispute to unjustly threaten Iran.

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Iranian president expected to visit Latin America

Iranian president expected to visit Latin America

January 4, 2012 | 5:03 pm
increase text size decrease text size
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

REPORTING FROM QUITO, ECUADOR, AND BOGOTA, COLOMBIA -- Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad plans a four-nation tour of Latin America beginning Sunday in an apparent effort to show he is not a universal pariah despite increasing tension between Tehran and the West.

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NY judge  Iran`s Islamic regime, Taliban, al-Qaida liable for 9/11

Friday 23 December 2011

NY judge: Iran`s Islamic regime, Taliban, al-Qaida liable for 9/11

NEW YORK— A federal judge has signed a default judgment finding Iran, the Taliban and al-Qaida liable in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks .
Judge George Daniels in Manhattan signed the judgment Thursday, a week after hearing testimony in the 10-year-old case. The signed ruling, which he promised last week, came in a $100 billion lawsuit brought by family members of victims of the attacks.

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Iranian Political prisoners: &#039;Don&#039;t give legitimacy to elections&quot;under Islamic regime

Thursday 22 December 2011

Iranian Political prisoners: 'Don't give legitimacy to elections"under Islamic regime

Iranians are witnessing an “undeclared martial law” in their country, according to a group of political prisoners held in the notorious Evin Prison .

read more...

North Korea leader will damage ties with Iran`s islamic regime

Tuesday 20 December 2011

North Korea leader will damage ties with Iran`s islamic regime

2011 has been a bad year for dictators, whether those, like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, whose stay in power was convenient for Israel or those, like Syria's Bashar Assad, who are Israel's enemies.

read more...

U.S. wants Canadian crackdown on Iranian agents

Saturday 10 December 2011

U.S. wants Canadian crackdown on Iranian agents

Washington wants Ottawa to prosecute Iranian procurement agents who are sending banned military and mechanical goods to their homeland from Canada .

read more...

Iran`s Islamic regime Blocks New U.S. 'Virtual Embassy"

WASHINGTON – The U.S.

launched a "virtual embassy" for Tehran in a bid to reach out to ordinary Iranians isolated by strict censorship -- but it was promptly blocked by the Islamic regime .

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Half could support Iran attack

Half could support Iran attack

Wednesday 23 November 2011

Ron Poll: Half could support Iran attack
A majority of American voters believe economic sanctions to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons won’t work and half say the United States should take military action if sanctions fail, a new poll shows .

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Gadafi received shells for chemical weapons from Iran`s Islamic regime

Gadafi received shells for chemical weapons from Iran`s Islamic regime

FOX NEWS

The U.S. government has launched an investigation into whether Iran supplied Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan regime with artillery shells that were subsequently filled with a highly toxic mustard agent, The Washington Post reported .

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15:00 11/03/2011

Israel Will Not Attack Iran. Period.


By Uri Avnery

Everybody knows the scene from school: a small boy quarrels with a bigger boy. 'Hold me back!' he shouts to his comrades, 'Before I break his bones!'
Our government seems to be behaving in this way. Every day, via all channels, it shouts that it is going, any minute now, to break the bones of Iran.

read more...

Israel Will Not Attack Iran. Period.



http://www.palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=17219
15:00 11/03/2011

Israel Will Not Attack Iran. Period.
By Uri Avnery
Everybody knows the scene from school: a small boy quarrels with a bigger boy. 'Hold me back!' he shouts to his comrades, 'Before I break his bones!'
Our government seems to be behaving in this way. Every day, via all channels, it shouts that it is going, any minute now, to break the bones of Iran.

read more...

&quot;I can&#039;t stand him any more, he&#039;s a liar,&quot; Mr Sarkozy said in French.

Sarkozy called Israeli PM Netanyahu 'liar'

The comments - embarrassing for President Sarkozy - have only just emerged
Continue reading the main story
Related Stories
Sarkozy exposed by Israel gaffe
G20 agrees to boost IMF resources
US hits Unesco with funding cut
French President Nicolas Sarkozy called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a "liar" in remarks to US President Barack Obama overheard by journalists.

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Iran to &#039;temporarily&#039; import petrol: report

Tuesday 23 August 2011

Iran to 'temporarily' import petrol: report

AFP - Iran is to "temporarily" import petrol to meet its daily consumption needs and compensate for the poor quality of its domestically produced fuel, a top MP told Mehr news agency on Monday.

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Iraq – Afghanistan – Libya NOW IRAN


LIES, LIES & MORE PENTAGON LIES!

SIGN THE ONLINE PETITION DEMANDING AN END TO THE PHONY WAR HYPE FABRICATED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST IRAN! at stopwaroniran.org/petition.shtml
A worsening economic crisis; three disastrous wars that have killed millions of people and cost trillions of dollars stolen from essential programs for OIL, OIL, OIL and the U.S. corporate drive for markets, profit and empire – this is why the U.S. government has FALSELY accused the Iranian government of sponsoring a terrorist plot in the United States.

read more...

(No. 305 - October 18, 2011 - 3:10 p.m. ET)

Canada Imposes Sanctions on Five Iranian Nationals:

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today issued the following statement in response to the recently foiled plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States:

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McCain accuses Iran of &lsquo;reckless behavior&rsquo;

McCain accuses Iran of ‘reckless behavior’

Associated Press

Thursday, October 13, 2011
Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican (AP Photo)Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican (AP
Who do you think will win the Republican nomination for president?

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EU moves towards further sanctions on Syria, Iran

EU moves towards further sanctions on Syria, Iran


Wednesday 05 October 2011

EU moves towards further sanctions on Syria, Iran
- The European Union is set next week to consider blacklisting the Syrian central bank as well as imposing sanctions against more Iranian individuals, according to sources on Wednesday familiar with the situation .

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lobby forces of the Pasdaran work in usa for Terrorist

lobby forces of the Pasdaran work in usa for Terrorist

NIAC and its president TritaParsi have

launched a large scale campaign to prevent removing MEK from the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO).

read more...


Terrorism victims can garnish money sprint owes Iran

Terrorism victims can garnish money sprint owes Iran

A federal judge ruled Wednesday that a group of terrorism victims owed hundreds of millions of dollars from Iran can garnish funds that Sprint Nextel Corp. (S) owes to a state-owned Iranian telecommunications company.
The Sprint payments to be seized are small: $613,000. But U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth in Washington said the ruling was "a step in the right direction" for victims of the 1996 truck bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, which housed U.S. military personnel. The blast killed 19 American servicemen and wounded many others.

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Iran&rsquo;s economic policy &lsquo;linked&rsquo; to unrest

Iran’s economic policy ‘linked’ to unrest

Wednesday, March 23, 2011
SAMUEL DOVERI VESTERBYE
ISTANBUL - Hürriyet Daily News
This file photo shows Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gesturing after addressing MPs during a parliamentary session where he presented the annual budget bill in Tehran on February 20, 2011. AFP photo.
This week’s statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on “Economic Jihad” highlights the regime’s attempts to mask their economic policies in ideological rhetoric, say experts who warn about increased government privatization and subsidy cuts that have angered trade unions and the lower-middle class in recent weeks.

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Are some countries abusing Interpol?

Are some countries abusing Interpol?


By Libby Lewis, CNN July 18, 2011
Editor's note: The following story was sponsored by the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists, a global network of reporters dedicated to investigating cross-border crime, corruption and the accountability of power. The group was founded in 1997 by the Center for Public Integrity, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that produces original investigative journalism about significant public issues.

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EuroParliament Condemns Azeri Human Rights Violations

European Parliament

EuroParliament Condemns Azeri Human Rights Violations


BRUSSELS—The European Parliament on Thursday passed a resolution unanimously condemning Azerbaijan continued human rights violations and Baku’s oppression of opposition forces and press during its plenary convened in Strasbourg, reported the European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy.
During oral discussion at the plenary session, representatives of all political factions strongly condemened Azerbaijan’s executive and judicial branches for their continued breach of human rights norms. The European Parliament also stressed that European Union should not bow to Aliyev’s regime because of Azerbaijan’s import of oil and gas.


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Obama’s Mideast Speech


Published: May 19, 2011
Following is a text of President Obama’s prepared speech on the Middle East, delivered on Thursday in Washington, as released by the White House:

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EU sanctions 32 Iran officials for human-rights violations


By BENJAMIN WEINTHAL, JERUSALEM POST CORRESPONDENT
04/15/2011 11:59
UK’s Hague protests excessive use of death penalty on vague charges in Iran; says 32 are "responsible, instrumental" in Tehran's policies.
Talkbacks (1)
BERLIN – The 27-member European Union slapped 32 Iranian officials on Tuesday with human-rights sanctions.

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IMF Rates Up Dictatorships Just Before Revolutions

IMF Rates Up Dictatorships Just Before Revolutions


Submitted by Michael Collins on Thu, 03/03/2011 - 01:35
Bahrain dictators Egypt exploitation globalism Greed imf Libya neoliberalism Oman the people tunisia yemen
By Michael Collins
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) made an embarrassing error just two days before the start of the Libyan people's revolution on February 17. This quote from an IMF country study appeared in a previous article: "The outlook for Libya’s economy remains favorable." IMF Feb 15 This advice was 180 degrees off target. The Libyan economy has ceased functioning as protests and popular demands imploded the Gaddafi regime. (Image)

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Neocon Analysts Push for Invasion of Libya


Kurt Nimmo
Infowars.com
February 25, 2011
CNN reports the Pentagon and NATO are ready to send troops into Libya under the cover of
humanitarian assistance. CNN underscores the situation by stating that reports say Gaddafi will
fight to the end and will seek martyrdom.
Military intervention “is something which I hope doesn‟t happen, but it looks as though at some
point that it should happen,” Simon Henderson, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, told CNN.

read more...

Sayeh Hassan:

While Egyptians celebrated, Tehran’s mullahs lost face


REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad condemns Israel while marking the 32nd anniversary of the revolution that put his regime in power.

February 11 marked the 32nd anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to the world’s focus on Egypt, the event went unnoticed by most, but it was not forgotten. Every February 11th sees anti-government demonstrations in Iran and worldwide, at which pro-democracy activists chant anti-government slogans against the entirety of the Islamic Regime, including not only the leadership, but the reformers. It’s not enough to reform the theocratic regime, say the protesters. It has to be torn down.

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US was Cheerleader for Massacre Wikileaks Cables on Israel's Gaza Onslaught

By Kathleen Christison January 19, 2011 "Counterpunch" -- CounterPunch has accessed Wikileaks‘ file of cables on Israel‘s Gaza assault two years ago (Operation Cast Lead, December 27, 2008 through January 18, 2009).

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Obama Officials Caught Deceiving About WikiLeaks


By Glenn Greenwald January 19, 2011 "Salon" --- Whenever the U.S. Government wants to demonize a person or group in order to justify attacks on them, it follows the same playbook: it manufactures falsehoods about them, baselessly warns that they pose Grave Dangers and are severely harming our National Security, peppers all that with personality smears to render the targeted individuals repellent on a personal level, and feeds it all to the establishment American media, which then dutifully amplifies and mindlessly disseminates it all.

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Rights group: Iran executes one person per eight hours
Rights group decries 'execution binge' in Iran


(AP) – 2 days ago
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Iranian authorities have unleashed an "execution binge" with an average rate of one person hanged every eight hours since the beginning of the year, a rights group monitoring the Islamic Republic said Sunday.
"The Iranian Judiciary is on an execution binge orchestrated by the intelligence and security agencies," stated Aaron Rhodes, a spokesman for the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS CANADA

HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA
AHMADINEJAD’S IRAN: A THREAT TO PEACE,HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Developmentread more...

Little progress seen as talks with Iran come to end



GENEVA - When two days of talks between Iran and major powers ended here Tuesday, with few signs of progress except an agreement to meet again next month in Istanbul, the dueling news conferences by both sides laid bare the difficulties ahead.

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Iran Blasts Arab's Claim over Iranian Islands


TEHRAN (FNA)- Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast rejected the baseless claims raised by the UAE and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) officials on the three Iranian islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb.

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UNITED NATIONS Working Paper

Historical, Geographical and Legal Validity of the Name: PERSIAN GULF
Prepared Working Group on Exonyms, Iran


UNITED NATIONS Working Paper


GROUP OF EXPERTS ON No. 61
GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES
Twenty-third Session
Vienna, 28 March – 4 April 2006
Item 14 of the Provisional Agenda:

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Where To Go From Wikileaks
The Peace Movement Responds
By Cindy Sheehan
December 01, 2010 "Information Clearing House" --- - Oakland, Ca:


While only a tiny fraction of the U.S. diplomatic cables scheduled for
publication by Wikileaks have thus far been made available, some
conclusions can already be drawn. These cables and the Iraq and Afghan
War Diaries provide an opportunity for Americans to see our government
for what it is.


[link politics/wikileaksthepe.html read more...

Rights Group Says Torture, Abuses Routine In Iraqi Prisons

Rights Group Says Torture, Abuses Routine In Iraqi Prisons



Amnesty International says tens of thousands of detainees are being held in Iraqi prisons without trial -- and that many are facing physical and psychological abuse or other mistreatment.

The London-based human rights watchdog issued a 59-page report today that lists several men the group says were subjected to torture or died in Iraqi prison. The report is titled "New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq."

Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International's Middle East and North Africa program director, says that Iraqi authorities have failed to take effective action to stop torture and punish the perpetrators of torture, despite overwhelming evidence that torture is being used.

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> <
Worldview: Moral bankruptcy in Iran

Worldview: Moral bankruptcy in Iran


The regime's mistreatment of innocent Americans and its own citizens makes a mockery of its
By Trudy Rubin
Inquirer Opinion Columnist
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad likes to boast about the superiority of Iranian moral values to those of the West

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Obama, G8 leaders boost pressure on North Korea, Iran

Obama, G8 leaders boost pressure on North Korea, Iran


Ontario (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama led the Group of Eight rich nations on Saturday deploring what they said was North Korea's sinking of a South Korean warship, and Obama said there must be consequences for such irresponsible action.

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Citing Iran&rsquo;s failure to clarify nuclear ambitions, UN imposes additional sanctions

Citing Iran’s failure to clarify nuclear ambitions, UN imposes additional sanctions


9 June 2010 – The Security Council voted today to impose a fourth round of United Nations sanctions against Iran, while demanding that the country suspend its enrichment activities and peacefully resolve outstanding concerns over the nature of its nuclear programme.

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New York    Sixty-fourth General Assembly   Plenary   71st Meeting (PM)     General Assembly Recognizes 21 March as International Day of Nowruz, Also Changes to 23-24 March Dialogue on Financing for Development

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York
Sixty-fourth General Assembly
Plenary
71st Meeting (PM)

General Assembly Recognizes 21 March as International Day of Nowruz.

The General Assembly this afternoon recognized the International Day of Nowruz, a spring festival of Persian origin, and moved back the dates of the next high-level dialogue on Financing for Development, as it continued its sixty-fourth session.

According to the preamble of the resolution on the International Day (document A/64/L.30/Rev.2), Nowruz, which means new day, is celebrated on 21 March, the day of the vernal equinox, by more than 300 million people worldwide as the beginning of the new year. It has been celebrated for over 3,000 years in the Balkans, the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and other regions.

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How much has Israeli control of American foreign policy cost the people of the United States? The government and media has worked mightily to keep the American people from fully realizing that the...

filename (204 Bytes)

Free Julian Assange! Hands off WikiLeaks!


By Bill Van Auken

December 08, 2010 "WSWS" -- Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, was jailed in Britain Tuesday on charges that are nothing more than a pretext for an act of political repression dictated by the US government.
The aim of this judicial travesty is, in the first instance, to punish Assange for having made public secret cables exposing crimes and conspiracies carried out by US officials. Second, by throwing Assange into London’s Wandsworth prison, the US and British authorities hope not only to silence
WikiLeaks but also to intimidate anyone else from daring to lift the lid on government secrets and lies.

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Citing Iran’s failure to clarify nuclear ambitions, UN imposes additional sanctions


9 June 2010 – The Security Council voted today to impose a fourth round of United Nations sanctions against Iran, while demanding that the country suspend its enrichment activities and peacefully resolve outstanding concerns over the nature of its nuclear programme.

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 Iran nuclear fuel deal could be a positive step, says Ban

Iran nuclear fuel deal could be a positive step, says Ban
Spent nuclear fuel


18 May 2010 – Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the initiative by Brazil and Turkey regarding nuclear fuel for an Iranian reactor could be a positive step, and underscored the need for bolstered transparency to help resolve concerns over Tehran’s nuclear programme.

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Ban tells Iran&#039;s Ahmadinejad to restore global trust in nuclear programme

Ban tells Iran's Ahmadinejad to restore global trust in nuclear programme


3 May 2010 – Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today personally urged Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to restore international trust in the peaceful nature of his country's nuclear programme by adhering to the resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency.

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Print this article Email this article ShareThis. Nuclear forum at UN offers Iran chance to reassure world &ndash; official

Print this article Email this article ShareThis. Nuclear forum at UN offers Iran chance to reassure world – official


29 April 2010 – Iran can use next week’s global gathering on disarmament at United Nations Headquarters to reassure other States of its peaceful nuclear intentions, the forum’s chair said today as he urged countries to exchange ideas on how to cut the world’s stockpile of nuclear weapons.

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 THE PERSIAN GULF IS THE PERSIAN GULF

THE PERSIAN GULF IS THE PERSIAN GULF


From Focus on Iran publication By Dr. Assad Homayoun
“…When the American, like the British before them, grow weary of their imperial duties and sail away, Iran will dominate the Persian Gulf . It is ordained. No nation in the region can match Iran ’s size, population or power…The question is: what kind of Iran shall it be? “ Patrick Buchanan- The Washington Times , Commentary, January 14, 1998

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Persian Gulf

Persian Gulf


Brief Description
(Ref: Wikipedia)
The Persian Gulf is an extension of the Gulf of Oman in between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. This inland sea of some 233,000 km² is connected to the Gulf of Oman in the east by the Strait of Hormuz, and its western end is marked by the major river delta of the Arvand-Rood, which carries the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris.

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Recent events in Iran have exposed serious rifts between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Plus, reports claim the U.S. is, inexplicably, still trying to talk the Iranians back from the nuclear brink

.

News of an open confrontation between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has come to light, revealing infighting over the dismissal of the minister of Intelligence by Ahmadinejad. Khamenei opposed the firing.

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   IAEA turns up pressure on Syria, Iran


IAEA turns up pressure on Syria, Iran


Jun 6, 2011, 14:23 GMT
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano from Japan prior to a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, Austria, 06 June 2011. The topics for discussion for the board are the Implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic. EPA/ROLAND SCHLAGER

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It’s the Persian Gulf, Mr. Kissinger, not the Arabian Gulf


Friday, April 15,7:01 PM
By Dr. Assad Homayoun

The editorial page of the April 10 edition of the Washington Post published an excellent and thought-provoking article by former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker, entitled “The Grounds for U.S. Intervention”. That article, however, includes an inexcusable and egregious error, namely, a reference to the “Arabian/Persian Gulf”. Similarly, Mr. Baker used the same terminology in an interview with Fareed Zakaria of CNN on Sunday April 10. As discussed below, the correct title of the referenced geographic area is the “Persian Gulf” and any other term is historically inaccurate and smacks of an attempt to re-write geography based on short-term political preferences.

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There is growing concern about Iraq's ability to defend itself and counter Iranian influence after U.S. troops withdraw


text size A A A July 18, 2011

There is growing concern about Iraq's ability to defend itself and counter Iranian influence after U.S. troops withdraw. Jackson Diehl argues that too many in the White House mistakenly believe that "a stay-on force" is not a vital U.S. interest and risk alienating an important ally.
Copyright © 2011 National Public Radio®. For personal, noncommercial use only. See Terms of Use. For other uses, prior permission required.

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The Coming Dim Ages

We have a forest on our hands. Not just here in the US but across the globe. A dark, foreboding, evil-filled forest.
Unfortunately it's only the individual trees that get any media attention, even as the forest gobbles more of the globe each day. Without recognizing the forest, the individual trees seem unattached to the spreading forest.

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Read an Excellent Letter to President Obama

Here is a sensible letter from Ambassador Charles Cecil to President Barack Obama.
You may want to distribute this letter to your friends. You could also try to fax or e-mail
it, along with your own comments, to President Obama, the State Department,
Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice or your representatives. Some contact information is
listed below.

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Thursday 13 October 2011

US democratic Senator john Kerry: 'All options' open on Iran plot

AFP - Senior US Senator John Kerry left the door open Wednesday to military retaliation against Iran over an alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States .

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Canada faces grim choice over nuclear showdown in Iran

Walkom: Canada faces grim choice over nuclear showdown in Iran

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

By Thomas Walkom National Affairs Columnist
As the nuclear crisis over Iran heats up, Canada is veering toward a dangerous place.
Israel is again contemplating a military attack on Iran to prevent its developing atomic weapons. This time it’s not clear that U.S. President Barack Obama can forestall the Jewish state.

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The Importance Of Sanctioning Islamic republic Iran&#039;s Central Bank

Thursday 08 December 2011

The Importance Of Sanctioning Islamic republic Iran's Central Bank

Ever since the late October release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran, the White House has been working overtime to convince the world that it is, in fact, committed to preventing the Islamic Republic from going nuclear. Last month, responding to criticism of his Iran policy from Republican challengers, President Obama argued that the sanctions levied by his Administration to date have had “enormous bite".

read more...

Tuesday 20 December 2011

North Korea leader will damage ties with Iran`s islamic regime

2011 has been a bad year for dictators, whether those, like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, whose stay in power was convenient for Israel or those, like Syria's Bashar Assad, who are Israel's enemies.

read more...

Russia's Strategy in the Middle East

Natasha Mozgovaya, Alexey Malashenko, Marwan Muasher, Karim Sadjadpour, Matthew Rojansky Thursday, January 26, 2012 – Washington, D.C.

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The following is a 2011 article by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya for the Italian journal Eurasia about the manipulation of national constitutions as a neo-colonial means of modern empire-building.

The article presents an important overview of the U.S. empire-building process. The original print version was published in the Italian language and translated by Pietro Longo.

read more...

Netanyahu’s gift to Obama jeopardized the 2800-year-old bond between two peoples


Special to WorldTribune.com Á FreePressers.com
By Sheda Vasseghi
Thursday, March 15, 2012

During their most recent meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave President Barack Obama a copy of the Book of Esther as a symbol of his fears for Israel if the Islamic Republic of Iran becomes nuclear.

read more...

By Crispian Balmer and Dan Williams
JERUSALEM | Sun Apr 28, 2013 5:59am EDT

(Reuters) - Israel risks a loss of credibility over both its "red line" for Iran's nuclear program and its threat of military action, and its room for unilateral maneuver is shrinking.

After years of veiled warnings that Israel might strike the Islamic Republic, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out an ultimatum at the United Nations last September.

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JointComprehensivePlan (903.0 KB)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action


[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Vienna, 14 July 2015
PREFACE
The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this
historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s
nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in
their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA
will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran
reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any
nuclear weapons.
Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively
peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic
considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building
confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context,
the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be
followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for
exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation
norms.
The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively
allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s
programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent
with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear
programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the
E3/EU+3’s concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for
transparency and verification.
The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and
energy.
PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal
commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to
be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or
acquire any nuclear weapons.
iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right
to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and
the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of
any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and
energy.
vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a
constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any
action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would
undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from
imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the
sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on
the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24
November 2013.
ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to
monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions
provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising
from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the
provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and
verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The
IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors,
and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules
and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be
fully observed by all parties involved.
xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of
its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as
setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of
international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other
relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and
practices.
xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the
annexes to this document.
xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will
cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in
Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.
xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing
this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in
its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new
relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for
the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous
resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of
consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after
the Adoption Day.
xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective
durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier
if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate
decisions by consensus.
I.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as
detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes
NUCLEAR
A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES
1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium
enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain
limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8
years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next
stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described
in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its
own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of
the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement.
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,
Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed
uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and
enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA
continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not
accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years
will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and
Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of
uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8
centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges
after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or
assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace
failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture
advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.
From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to
manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without
rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA
continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment
and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium
enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the
Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%,
and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment
R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology
centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint
partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1
centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these
cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through
appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other
four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other
centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored
under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international
qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium
stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or
the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold
based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return
for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural
uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or
other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the
above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with
regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran,
including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting
international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All
remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated
into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for
the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.
B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in
Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in
a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The
reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for
medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will
not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the
activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the
redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be
shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership
will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may
be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as
the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day,
conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed
by the E3/EU+3 participants.
9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological
advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors
with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of
necessary fuel.
10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for
export to the international market.
11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and
research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in
relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any
spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel
reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel
reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed
exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from
irradiated enriched uranium targets.
C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament),
Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional
Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex
V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to
its Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present
Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address
past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised
in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full
implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be
completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will
provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past
and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their
capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the
Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue,
without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary
measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency
measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a
long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate
produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years;
containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use
of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line
enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to
ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in
Annex I.
16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium
or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this
JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.
SANCTIONS
18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all
provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear
issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929
(2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verified
implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish
specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.[1]
19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently
amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions,
including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified
implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in
Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following
areas, as described in Annex II:
i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial
institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking
relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks
in the territories of EU Member States;
iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons
and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of
Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the
Government of Iran;
vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical
products;
ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical
sectors;
x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;
xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and
export or software for integrating industrial processes;
xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in
Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.
20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU
proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after
Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all
nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in
accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect
simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclearrelated
measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the
following areas as described in Annex II:
i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions
as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified
individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the
opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at
non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and
letters of credit);
ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on
their transfer;
v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign
debt, including governmental bonds;
vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial
institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;
ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services,
information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas
and petrochemical sectors;
x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum,
petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical
products to Iran;
xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
xiii. Transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and
steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’s
automotive sector;
xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from
the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran
Sanctions Act List; and
xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 –
7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.
22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V,
allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and
services to Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S.
person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license
the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.
23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader
Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities,
whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may
be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the
sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related
commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to
be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under
the NPT.
24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of
all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in
accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of
sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the
Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or
restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the
sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question
will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that
lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA
participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to
resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the
Joint Commission.
25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the
implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United
States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities,
with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively
encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in
the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to
refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.
26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has
terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute
resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclearrelated
UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions
or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith
to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full
benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S.
Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and
the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions
specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without
prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The
U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President
and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran
has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the
sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related
sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in
whole or in part.
27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to
ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under
this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will
issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the
details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this
JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult
with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular
basis and whenever appropriate.
28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a
constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any
action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would
undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the
E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful
implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements[2]. The
E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from
imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements
in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.
29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their
respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and
adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran
inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful
implementation of this JCPOA.
30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or
entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for
in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with
E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under
this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible
infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable
national laws.
31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States
will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated
entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian
banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments
thereto. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will
remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals
listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the
attachments thereto.
32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint
projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the
field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research
reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion,
establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel
training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed
in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the
implementation of these projects.
33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of
trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible
areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this
context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to
facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to
the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as
follows:
i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded
among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the
resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without
delay.
ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN
Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent
of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this
JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make
necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA
commitments.
iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report
verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in
Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the
actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in
accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in
Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.
iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the
Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached
the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful
activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will
take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and
Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and
Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN
Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its
terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions
of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take
the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without
prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their
commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint
Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran
was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could
do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue,
unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission
consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers
would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended
by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu
of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the
participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be
considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one
each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent
member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the
compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not
resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory
Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has
not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the
complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant nonperformance,
then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part
and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes
significant non-performance.
37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described
above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to
exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security
Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to
continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been
adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN
Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security
Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with
retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian
individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the
activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent
with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions.
The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of
the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this
period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue
and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if
sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to
cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
[1] The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.
[2] 'Government officials' for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.
Annex I – Nuclear-related measures
A. GENERAL
1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified
in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise
specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.
B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR
2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear
research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will
redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached
to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and
purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural
materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to
produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned
reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that
the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary
adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned
purposes and principles of modernisation.
3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original
design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be
made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the
IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning
and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will
maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research
reactor.
4. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have
responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project, with
E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak
reactor as described in this Annex. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3
participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the
reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would
implement the Arak modernisation project. The Working Group could be enlarged to
include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and
Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their
strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation
Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would
define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently
contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide
assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with
their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely
construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the
modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by
Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor
can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and
operation. The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary
laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will aim
to complete its review and endorsement within three months after the submission of the
final design. If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement
within three months, Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution
mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.
6. The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for
confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the
approved final design.
7. As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction efforts.
E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative,
legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation.
E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of
necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and
technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the
mechanism established by this JCPOA, as well as through exploration of relevant
funding contributions.
8. E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the
modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, upon request by Iran, through
IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and
financial assistance, supply of required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art
instrumentation and control systems and equipment and support for licensing and
authorization.
9. The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO2
with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO2 in a full core load, with a fuel design to be
reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the
participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside
Iran. The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical
assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for
subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor. Destructive and nondestructive
testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take
place in one of the participating countries outside of Iran and that country will work with
Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned
reactor under IAEA monitoring.
10. Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which
are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor,
designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all
existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak
reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40
fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of
natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural
uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40
reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the
modernised Arak reactor.
11. All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of
the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3
countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in
relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient
party, within one year from the unloading from the reactor or whenever deemed to be
safe for transfer by the recipient country.
12. Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include
information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme.
The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring.
13. Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light
water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor.
C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT
14. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research
reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research
and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where
appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international
market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15
years. Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130
metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments
prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes
after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.
15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will
allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of
heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.
D. OTHER REACTORS
16. Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological
advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research
reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of
necessary fuel.
17. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and
research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant
contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.
E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES
18. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel
reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex,
spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel.
19. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except
for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and
peaceful industrial purposes.
20. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build
facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or
from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful
industrial purposes.
21. For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell
or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less
than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of
the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research
reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and
only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and
non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement
mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or
operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded
glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set
out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.
22. The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive
examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel
fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside
Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran will not develop, build, acquire
or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to
build/develop such a capability, for 15 years.
23. For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will
undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly
prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak
research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to
conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak
research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically
interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or
industrial radioisotopes.
24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals
or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy,
or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.
25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium
(defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for
use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.
26. If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities
after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by,
the Joint Commission.
F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
27. Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in
no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at
the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.
28. Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years.
29. Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with
5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under
IAEA continuous monitoring:
29. All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges
will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a
one-for-one basis.
29. UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level,
and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal
stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical
traps.
30. For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice
the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal.
31. For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related
infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or
stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified
under this JCPOA.
G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
32. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate
enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, Iran's
enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges.
Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only
on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8. Iran will build or test, with or
without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.
33. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade
at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of
implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these
machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz
in Hall B of FEP.
34. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade
at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of
implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these
machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz
in Hall B of FEP.
35. Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge
cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.
36. Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.
37. Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate
cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a
half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines
and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
38. Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on
single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the
testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of
year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate
cascades in a logical sequence.
39. For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched
and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded
pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of
enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA.
40. For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP.
Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran
Research Centre.
41. For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and
enrichment R&D plan, Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as
described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as
described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated
infrastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure
transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1)
centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the
removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers,
feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems
for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at
Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space in line No. 6
will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme.
42. Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will
maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and
intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines
(No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to
enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPoA. Adaptation will include
modification of all UF6 pipework (including removal of all sub headers except as agreed
as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible
with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale
testing.
43. Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to
continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations,
including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a prototype stage for
mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint
Commission is needed.
H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT
44. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and
technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of
research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that
will be undertaken at Fordow.
45. Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D
and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15
years.
46. For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing
of the FFEP of which:
46. Two cascades that have not experienced UF6 before will be modified for the production
of stable isotopes. The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at
FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on
the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades
for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production
by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF6 feed main header,
and move cascade UF6 pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain
vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint
Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope
production at FFEP.
46. For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that
enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.
The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope
production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon
completion of the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous
subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not
spinning.
47. Iran will:
47. remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all
centrifuges and cascade UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure
transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.
47. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control
cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be
stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
48. Iran will:
48. remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from
the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal of all centrifuges and UF6
pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and
frequency inverters and converters, and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.
48. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control
cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges
and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous
monitoring.
49. Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or
damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.
50. Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for
15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP.
The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and
monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing
these IR-1 centrifuges.
51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past
enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular
access, including daily as requested by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to
monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.
I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT
52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term
enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration
described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol.[1] The IAEA will confirm on an annual
basis, for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's
enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan.
53. Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP
after year 10.
54. An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-
6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by
implementation day.
55. An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data
needs to be accomplished by implementation day.
J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS
56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to
3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for
15 years.
57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or
the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level
or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return
for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an
entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in
excess of 300 kg UF6 in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will
facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran
may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in
Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.
58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates
for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction,
outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other
forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred,
based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of
3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) for
TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be
fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%,
will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an
enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be
transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial
transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to
Iran. For 15 years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or
scrap back to UF6.
59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied
reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in
fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear
research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for
the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the
fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, will
not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit. The Joint Commission will establish a
Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while
adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or
the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also,
within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether
fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6. Enriched
uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in
Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised
Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the
Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies
and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for
instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained
in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to
UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective
technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The
IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that
the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was
approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will also support
assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in
meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.
60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for the
purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate,
as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. In the case of lack of
conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75%
enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of
fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the
reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in increments no
greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be provided only when the
previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed
with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into enriched uranium targets. Iran
will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be
exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2
year period.
K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING
61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will only engage in
production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or
any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D
requirements of this Annex.
62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage,
which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1
centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines.
Whenever during the 10 year period from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA,
the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of
stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly
crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.


last update: 5/23/2016 12:22