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United Nations S/RES/1929 (2010)
Security Council Distr.: General
9 June 2010


10-39679 (E)
*1039679*
Resolution 1929 (2010)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on
9 June 2010
The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions
1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009)
and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and
II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14),
which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February
2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006
(GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007
(GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48),
15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008
(GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008
(GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35),
28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February
2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and
sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy
water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the
Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining
issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council 2
resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are
essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
Reaffirming that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built
in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran responding
positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have
made on Iran,
Noting with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic
Revolution”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006),
Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran’s
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems,
Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at
Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and
that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent
with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,
Also noting the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82),
which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the
facility’s purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to
confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or
authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been
declared to the IAEA,
Noting with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and
did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing
safeguards procedures,
Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify
design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified
Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the
IAEA’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which
is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material
at, a facility,
Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly
supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending the IAEA for
its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme,
Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for
exclusively peaceful purposes,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards
an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a
confidence-building measure, 3
Emphasizing also, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of
Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,
Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on
exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through
negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June
2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting the confirmation by these countries that
once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner
as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to
assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737
(2006) and 1803 (2008), and recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance
over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as
to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable
growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran’s
revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferationsensitive nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and
materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those
required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,
Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
Recalling that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean
activities,
Calling for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by
Iran at an early date,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007)
and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s
development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile
programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives
of these resolutions have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or
actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the
threat of force,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Affirms that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA
Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007) and 1803 (2008); 4
2. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which
are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear
programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns
raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its
obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further
affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph
2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
3. Reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding
issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military
dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access
without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the
IAEA, and stresses the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary
resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;
4. Requests the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the
Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;
5. Decides that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without
qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the
application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards
Agreement, calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on
18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and
reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including
modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and notes
that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the
provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;
6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous
resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related
activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment,
reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing
construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related
facility;
7. Decides that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity
in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials
and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uraniumenrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technologyrelated to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further
decides that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their
jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its
jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or
by entities owned or controlled by them;
8. Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or
transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals
subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not
originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or 5
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as
determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall
prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of
technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or
assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance
or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to
exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision,
manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;
9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic
missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the
transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;
10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D
and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of
resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security
Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006),
except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to
Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in
accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), underlines that nothing in
this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory,
and decides that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the
Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the
grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the
Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of
this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in
Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or
at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through
illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the
Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions
of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008) or this resolution;
12. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”)
individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities
acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by
them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance
over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems;
13. Decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be
superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and 6
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they
could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related
activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further
decides that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be
superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;
14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law
of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from
Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of
resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of
ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law
of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of
the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items
the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of
resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of
ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
16. Decides to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and
dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring
to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of
resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of
resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in
inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is
not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council
resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties
to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;
17. Requires any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to
paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an
initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the
inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was
provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, further requires such States
to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing
relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the
transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if
this information is not in the initial report;
18. Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or
from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or
other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including
chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is
prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of 7
resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9
of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian
purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed
of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal
economic activities;
19. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of
resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting
on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them,
including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to
have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of,
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
20. Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee any
information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air’s cargo division or vessels
owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other
companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in
violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or
this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and
requests the Committee to make that information widely available;
21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their obligations
pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution,
to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or
the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities
organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial
institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they
have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services,
assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by
freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that
hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that
hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or
activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in
accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to
their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their
jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in
Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and
any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities
owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could
contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their
territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of
Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint
ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining
correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision 8
of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
24. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial
institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening
representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services
could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
25. Deplores the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution
1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of
resolution 1747 (2007), and commends States that have taken action to respond to
these violations and report them to the Committee;
26. Directs the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the
measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate individuals and entities
who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in
violating the provisions of, these resolutions;
27. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full
implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance,
investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the
Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;
28. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008),
shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive
reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;
29. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year,
in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of
Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks:
(a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of
resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and
analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested
parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of
non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the
Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant
measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than
90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than
30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and
recommendations;
30. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested
parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular
by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the
measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; 9
31. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and
24;
32. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with
Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with
Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, longterm and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and
wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the
June 2008 proposal, and acknowledges with appreciation that the June 2008
proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;
33. Encourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of
political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant
proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks,
and encourages Iran to respond positively to such proposals;
34. Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009
proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the
Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for
Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of
Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded
constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to
continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in
furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;
35. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the
Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities
designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with
any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of
the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
this resolution;
36. Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA
on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian
compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with
other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council
for its consideration; 10
37. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to
in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend
the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichmentrelated and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified
by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and
mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2,
4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of
resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report
referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations
under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of
the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with
resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary;
38. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 11
Annex I
Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic
missile activities
Entities
1. Amin Industrial Complex: Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature
controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production
facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,
the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737
(2006).
Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage
Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran; Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St.,
Mashad, Iran
A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company
2. Armament Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG)
manufacturers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including
large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority
of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.
Location: Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10, Iran; Pasdaran Ave.,
P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
3. Defense Technology and Science Research Center: Defense Technology and
Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees
Iran’s defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.
Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
4. Doostan International Company: Doostan International Company (DICO)
supplies elements to Iran’s ballistic missile program.
5. Farasakht Industries: Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act
on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or
controlled by MODAFL.
Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran Freeway, Shahin
Shahr, Esfahan, Iran
6. First East Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank
Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian
nuclear, missile, and defense entities.
Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan,
Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number
LL06889 (Malaysia)
7. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company: Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO. 12
Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4
of Khalaj Road, End of Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549,
Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St.,
Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran
8. M. Babaie Industries: M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad
Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of
Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile
organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri
Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).
Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran
9. Malek Ashtar University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL.
This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center
(PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents
under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible
military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.
Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran
10. Ministry of Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export
(MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in
contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or
related materiel.
Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of
Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran
11. Mizan Machinery Manufacturing: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is
owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran
A.K.A.: 3MG
12. Modern Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique
Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy
water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of
the IR-40 heavy water reactor.
Location: Arak, Iran
A.K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company,
Rahkar Sanaye Novin
13. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine: The Nuclear
Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research
component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was
designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI’s center for the
development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.
Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran
A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji
Agricultural and Medical Research Center 13
14. Pejman Industrial Services Corporation: Pejman Industrial Services
Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran
15. Sabalan Company: Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
16. Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO): SAPICO is a
cover name for SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
17. Shahid Karrazi Industries: Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled
by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: Tehran, Iran
18. Shahid Satarri Industries: Shahid Sattari Industries is owned or controlled
by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: Southeast Tehran, Iran
A.K.A.: Shahid Sattari Group Equipment Industries
19. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries: Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries
(SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway,
Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835,
Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran
20. Special Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of
DIO.
Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
21. Tiz Pars: Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz
Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which
could make a material contribution to Iran’s missile program, on behalf of SHIG.
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
22. Yazd Metallurgy Industries: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a
subordinate of DIO.
Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran
16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd,
Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran
A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries,
Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries
Individuals
Javad Rahiqi: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB:
Marshad). 14
Annex II
Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps
1. Fater (or Faater) Institute: Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has
worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC
projects in Iran.
2. Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or
controlled by KAA.
3. Ghorb Karbala: Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.
4. Ghorb Nooh: Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA
5. Hara Company: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
6. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute: Owned or controlled by, or acts
on behalf of, KAA.
7. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters: Khatam al-Anbiya
Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large
scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It
undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects.
In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the
uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
8. Makin: Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a
subsidiary of KAA.
9. Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
10. Oriental Oil Kish: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on
behalf of KAA.
11. Rah Sahel: Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12. Rahab Engineering Institute: Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on
behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. Sahel Consultant Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
14. Sepanir: Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15. Sepasad Engineering Company: Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or
controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA. 15
Annex III
Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)
1. Irano Hind Shipping Company
Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Valie-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of
Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran
2. IRISL Benelux NV
Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number
BE480224531 (Belgium)
3. South Shipping Line Iran (SSL)
Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran;
Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran 16
Annex IV
Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France,
Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and
the European Union
Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran
Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran
In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian
nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building
further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the
table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China,
France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined
by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably
suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and
OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect
Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European
Union High Representative state their readiness:
to recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;
to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear
Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.
Nuclear Energy
– Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful
purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
– Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran’s
peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical
cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
– Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
– Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually
restored.
– Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
– Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Political
– Improving the six countries’ and the EU’s relations with Iran and building up
mutual trust.
– Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
– Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international
affairs. 17
– Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security
and stabilization issues.
– Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building
measures and regional security.
– Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
– Support for a conference on regional security issues.
– Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of
weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
– Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
– Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight
against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan
refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan;
cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.
Economic
Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving
Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical
support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade
Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran
and trade with Iran.
Energy Partnership
Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy:
establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between
Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical
applications/measures.
Agriculture
– Support for agricultural development in Iran.
Facilitation of Iran’s complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in
modern technology.
Environment, Infrastructure
– Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure,
science and technology, and high-tech:
– Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport
corridors.
– Support for modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure,
including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions. 18
Civil Aviation
– Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on
manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
– Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
– Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety
standards.
Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues
– Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social development
and humanitarian need.
– Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran:
– Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such
as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
– Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public
health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration,
history and philosophy.
– Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response
capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).
– Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among civilizations”.
Implementation mechanism
– Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future
agreement.

INF
INFCIRC/214
13 December 1974

International Atomic Energy Agency
INFORMATION CIRCULAR
GENERAL Distr.
Original: ENGLISH
THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE AGENCY FOR THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATIO OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. The text[1] of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[2] is
reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.
2. The Agreement entered into force on 15 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25.
__________
[1] The footnotes to the text have been added in the present information circular.
[2] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/140.
INFCIRC/214
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN
IRAN
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WHEREAS Iran is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty")[2] opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington
on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970:
WHEREAS paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty reads as follows:
"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the
safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable
material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is
outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere".
WHEREAS the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency")
is authorized, pursuant to Article III of its Statute, to conclude such agreements;
NOW THEREFORE the Government of Iran and the Agency have agreed as follows:
PART I
BASIC UNDERTAKING
Article 1
The Government of Iran undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to
accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its
control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 2
The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in
accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Iran, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its
control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
INFCIRC/214
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CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE AGENCY
Article 3
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the
safeguards provided for in this Agreement.
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 4
The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:
(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran or international
co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of
nuclear material;
(b) To avoid undue interference in Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the
operation of facilities; and
(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe
conduct of nuclear activities.
Article 5
(a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and
other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this
Agreement.
(b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person
any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this
Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof
may be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as
"the Board") and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by
reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent
necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing this
Agreement.
(ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly
concerned agree thereto.
Article 6
(a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take full
account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every
effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of
safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the
extent that present or future technology permits.
(b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such
means as:
(i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting
purposes;
INFCIRC/214
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(ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear
material, and
(iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle
involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and
minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on
condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under this
Agreement.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF MATERIALS CONTROL
Article 7
(a) The Government of Iran shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and
control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in
ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of Iran's system. The
Agency's verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations
conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II of this
Agreement. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical
effectiveness of Iran's system.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

Article 8
(a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, the
Government of Iran shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this
Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding
such material.
(b) (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data
consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.
(ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safe-guarding
nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
(c) If the Government of Iran so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on
premises of Iran design information which the Government of Iran regards as being of
particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency
provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on
premises of Iran.
AGENCY INSPECTORS
Article 9
(a) (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the Government of Iran to the designation
of Agency inspectors to Iran.
(ii) If the Government of Iran, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time
after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall
propose to the Government of Iran an alternative designation or designations.
INFCIRC/214
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(iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the Government of Iran to accept the
designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this
Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon
referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the
Director General”), with a view to its taking appropriate action.
(b) The Government of Iran shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors
can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement.
(c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:
(i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the
Government of Iran and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and
(ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information
coming to the inspectors’ knowledge.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Article 10
The Government of Iran shall accord to the Agency (including its property, funds and assets)
and to its inspectors and other officials, performing functions under this Agreement, the same privileges
and immunities as those set forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency[3].
TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 11
Consumption or dilution of nuclear material
Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency that the
material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any
nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practically irrecoverable.
Article 12
Transfer of nuclear material out of Iran
The Government of Iran shall give the Agency advance notification of intended transfers of
nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of Iran, in accordance with the
provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall terminate safeguards on nuclear
material under this Agreement when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as
provided for in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer
and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.
Article 13
Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities
Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear
activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Government of Iran shall agree with the
Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such
material may be terminated.
__________
[3] INFCIRC/9/Rev. 2.
INFCIRC/214
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NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE
USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES
Article 14
If the Government of Iran intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is
required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the
application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) The Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be
in conflict with an undertaking the Government of Iran may have given and in
respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a
peaceful nuclear activity; and
(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not
be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while
the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement
will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or
circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards
provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is
reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the
total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded material in Iran and of any export of
such material; and
(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be
given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal
and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval
or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material
therein.
FINANCE
Article 15
The Government of Iran and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in
implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Government of
Iran or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by
the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so.
In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors
may request.
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE
Article 16
The Government of Iran shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of
nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its
laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of
this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of Iran.
INFCIRC/214
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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Article 17
Any claim by the Government of Iran against the Agency or by the Agency against the
Government of Iran in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under
this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with
international law.
MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON-DIVERSION
Article 18
If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the Government of
Iran is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards
under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board
may call upon the Government of Iran to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether
procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this Agreement for the settlement of a dispute.
Article 19
If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General,
finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required
to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nucle ar weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may
make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter
referred to as "the Statute") and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in
that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided
by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the Government of Iran every
reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT
AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 20
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any
question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.
Article 21
The Government of Iran shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the
interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite the
Government of Iran to partic ipate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
Article 22
Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute
with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such
a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Government of Iran
and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows:
the Government of Iran and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so
designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for
arbitration, either the Government of Iran or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either the
Government of
INFCIRC/214
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Iran or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an
arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the
second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral
tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The
arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the
Government of Iran and the Agency.
SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS
UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS
Article 23
The application of Agency safeguards in Iran under other safeguards agreements with the
Agency shall be suspended while this Agreement is in force; provided, however, that Iran's undertaking
in those and other agreements not to use items which are subject thereto in such a way as to further
any military purpose shall continue to apply.[4]
AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
Article 24
(a) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each other
on amendment to this Agreement.
(b) All amendments shall require the agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency.
(c) Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force in the same conditions as entry into
force of the Agreement itself.
(d) The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any
amendment to this Agreement.
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
Article 25
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Agency receives from the
Government of Iran written notification that Iran’s statutory and constitutional requirements for entry
into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the
Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.
Article 26
This Agreement shall remain in force as long as Iran is party to the Treaty.
PART II
INTRODUCTION
Article 27
The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in the
implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.
__________
[4] In relation to this provision, see documents INFCIRC/97/Mod.1 and INFCIRC/127/Mod.1.
INFCIRC/214
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OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 28
The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is the timely
detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and
deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.
Article 29
For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material accountancy shall be
used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as
important complementary measures.
Article 30
The technical conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a statement, in respect
of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and
giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Article 31
Pursuant to Article 7 the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of
Iran’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of Iran's accounting and control activities.
Article 32
Iran’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under
this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provision, as
appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as:
(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material
received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities
on inventory;
(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of
measurement uncertainty;
(c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver
measurements;
(d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory;
(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured
losses;
(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of
nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out
of the material balance area;
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(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated
correctly; and
(h) Procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 59-69.
STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 33
Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing
activities.
Article 34
(a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the
nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is directly or indirectly exported to a nonnuclear-
weapon State, the Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of its quantity,
composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear
purposes;
(b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the
nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is imported, the Government of Iran shall
inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for
specifically non-nuclear purposes; and
(c) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for
isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or
when such nucle ar material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the
nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into Iran, the nuclear material shall become subject to the
other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement.
TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Article 35
(a) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of that
Article are not met, but the Government of Iran considers that the recovery of
safeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or
desirable, the Government of Iran and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate
safeguards measures to be applied.
(b) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that the Government of
Iran and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.
EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
Article 36
At the request of the Government of Iran, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from
safeguards, as follows:
(a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing
component in instruments;
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(b) Nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if
such nuclear material is recoverable; and
(c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutoniurrr-238 exceeding 80%.
Article 37
At the request of the Government of Iran the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear
material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards, provided that the total quantity of nuclear
material which has been exempted in Iran in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed:
(a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of
the following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0. 2 (20%) and above, taken account of by
multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium,
taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
(b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment
above 0. 005 (0. 50/6);
(c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0. 005 (0. 50/6) or below;
and
(d) Twenty metric tons of thorium;
or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application.
Article 38
If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject
to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the reapplication of safeguards
thereto.
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 39
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall
specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this
Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are
to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the
Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.
Article 40
The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible
after, the entry into force of this Agreement. The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make
every effort to achieve their entry into force within ninety days of the entry into force of this
Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between the Government of Iran and
the Agency. The Government of Iran shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required
for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements.
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Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures
laid down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 41,
even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into force.
INVENTORY
Article 41
On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 62, the Agency shall establish a unified
inventory of all nuclear material in Iran subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its
origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its
verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the Government of Iran at
intervals to be agreed.
DESIGN INFORMATION
General provisions

Article 42
Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the
Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for the provision of
design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and
such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new
facility.
Article 43
The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility,
when applicable:
(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity
and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business
purposes;
(b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent
feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of
important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;
(c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and
surveillance; and
(d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material
accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by
the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking.
Article 44
Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to the Agency
in respect of each facility, in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and
control. The Government of Iran shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the
health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall
comply at the facility.
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Article 45
The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification relevant for
safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided
to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when
necessary.
Article 46
Purposes of examination of design information
The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes:
(a) To identify the features of facilities and nucle ar material relevant to the application of
safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;
(b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to
select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to
determine flow and inventory of nuclear material, in determining such material balance
areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:
(i) The size of the material balance area shall be rela ted to the accuracy with which
the material balance can be established;
(ii) In determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any
opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of
flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to
concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;
(iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be
combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes
when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification
requirements; and
(iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the
Government of Iran around a process step involving commercially sensitive
information;
(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear
material for Agency accounting purposes;
(d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures;
(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of
nuclear material; and
(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and
techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.
The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary
Arrangements.
Article 47
Re-examination of design information
Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of
developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures,
with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to Article 46.
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Article 48
Verification of design information
The Agency, in co-operation with the Government of Iran, may send inspectors to facilities to
verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Articles 42-45, for the purposes stated
in Article 46.
INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE FACILITIES
Article 49
The Agency shall be provided with the following information when nuclear material is to be
customarily used outside facilities, as applicable:
(a) A general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the
user' s name and address for routine business purposes; and
(b) A general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material
accountancy and control, including organizational responsibility for material accountancy
and control.
The Agency shall be informed, on a timely basis, of any change in the information provided to it under
this Article.
Article 50
The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 49 may be used, to the extent
relevant, for the purposes set out in Article 46(b)-(f).
RECORDS SYSTEM
General provisions
Article 51
In establishing its system of materials control as referred to in Article 7, the Government of Iran
shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. The records to be kept
shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
Article 52
The Government of Iran shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by
inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English, French, Russian or Spanish.
Article 53
Records shall be retained for at least five years.
Article 54
Records shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement,
and
(b) Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.
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Article 55
The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are
based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such
standards.
Accounting records
Article 56
The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area:
(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time;
(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and
(c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes,
book inventories and physical inventories.

Article 57
For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each
batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The records shall account
for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory
change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area
and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.
Article 58
Operating record
The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area:
(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and
composition of nuclear material;
(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and
analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates
of random and systematic error;
(c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a
physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and
(d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any
accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.
REPORTS SYSTEM
General provisions
Article 59
The Government of Iran shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 60-69 in respect
of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
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Article 60
Reports shall be made in English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in
the Subsidiary Arrangements.
Article 61
Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 51-58 and shall consist,
as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.
Accounting reports
Article 62
The Agency shall be provided with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards
under this Agreement. The initial report shall be dispatched by the Government of Iran to the Agency
within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and
shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month.
Article 63
The Government of Iran shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each
material balance area:
(a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material. The
reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the
end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and
(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of
nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be
dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the physical
inventory has been taken.
The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later
date, as required.
Article 64
Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear
material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and
the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise
notes:
(a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the
operating records provided for under Article 58(a); and
(b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational
programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.
Article 65
The Government of Iran shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either
periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of
batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material,
such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory
change.
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Article 66
The Agency shall provide the Government of Iran with semi-annual statements of book
inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance
area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement.
Article 67
Material balance reports shall include the following entrie s, unless otherwise agreed by the
Government of Iran and the Agency:
(a) Beginning physical inventory;
(b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);
(c) Ending book inventory;
(d) Shipper/ receiver differences;
(e) Adjusted ending book inventory;
(f) Ending physical inventory; and
(g) Material unaccounted for.
A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material
identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report.
Article 68
Special reports
The Government of Iran shall make special reports without delay:
(a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the Government of Iran to believe that
there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for
this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or
(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary
Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become
possible.
Article 69
Amplification and clarification of reports
If the Agency so requests, the Government of Iran shall provide it with amplifications or
clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
INSPECTIONS
Article 70
General provisions
The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Articles 71-82.
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Purposes of inspections
Article 71
The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:
(a) Verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement,
(b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the
initial report; and
(c) Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material in
accordance with Articles 93 and 96, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into
Iran.
Article 72
The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:
(a) Verify that reports are consistent with records;
(b) Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement; and
(c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver
differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.
Article 73
Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 77, the Agency may make special inspections:
(a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or
(b) If the Agency considers that information made available by the Government of Iran
including explanations from the Government of Iran and information obtained from routine
inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this
Agreement.
An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort
provided for in Articles 78-82 or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access
specified in Article 76 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.
Scope of inspections
Article 74
For the purposes specified in Articles 71-73, the Agency may:
(a) Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 51-58;
(b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement;
(c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control
equipment;
(d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and
(e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible.
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Article 75
Within the scope of Article 74, the Agency shall be enabled:
(a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are
taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe
the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples;
(b) To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for
material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the
instruments and equipment involved;
(c) To make arrangements with the Government of Iran that, if necessary:
(i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency's
use;
(ii) The Agency's standard analytical samples are analysed:
(iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other
equipment; and
(iv) Other calibrations are carried out;
(d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and
if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to install such
equipment;
(e) To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if
so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
(f) To make arrangements with the Government of Iran for the shipping of samples taken for
the Agency's use.
Access for inspections
Article 76
(a) For the purposes specified in Article 71 (a) and (b) and until such time as the strategic
points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency inspectors shall
have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in
connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present;
(b) For the purposes specified in Article 71(c) the inspectors shall have access to any location
of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with Articles 92(d)(iii) or 95(d)(iii);
(c) For the purposes specified in Article 72 the inspectors shall have access only to the
strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained
pursuant to Articles 51-58; and
(d) In the event of the Government of Iran concluding that any unusual circumstances require
extended limitations on access by the Agency, the Government of Iran and the Agency
shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its
safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall
report each such arrangement to the Board.
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Article 77
In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 73
the Government of Iran and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the
Agency may:
(a) Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 78-82;
and
(b) Obtain access, in agreement with the Government of Iran, to information or locations in
addition to those specified in Article 76. Any disagreement concerning the need for
additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22; in case action
by the Government of Iran is essential and urgent, Article 18 shall apply.
Frequency and intensity of routine inspections
Article 78
The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying
optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards
procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most economical use of
inspection resources available to it.
Article 79
The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and material
balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear
material not exceeding five effective kilograms.
Article 80
The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities
with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be
determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more
intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory
of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be
determined as follows:
(a) For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per
year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such
facility;
(b) For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or
uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall
be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 x /E man-days of inspection per year,
where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater,
expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not,
however, be less than 1. 5 man-years of inspection; and
(c) For facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection
per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a man-year of
inspection plus 0. 4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or
annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective
kilograms.
The Government of Iran and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection
effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable.
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Article 81
Subject to Articles 78-80 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity,
duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility shall include:
(a) The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form
or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of
uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;
(b) The effectiveness of Iran's accounting and control system, including the extent to which
the operators of facilities are functionally independent of Iran’s accounting and control
system; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 32 have been implemented
by the Government of Iran; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their
consistency with the Agency's independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of
the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;
(c) Characteristics of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle , in particular, the number and types of facilities
containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such facilities
relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design
of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and
the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated;
(d) International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is
received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by
the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which Iran's nuclear activities are
interrelated with those of other States; and
(e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical
techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.
Article 82
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall consult if the Government of Iran considers that
the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.
Notice of inspections
Article 83
The Agency shall give advance notice to the Government of Iran before arrival of inspectors at
facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows:
(a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 71 (c), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to
Article 71 (a) and (b) as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at least one week;
(b) For special inspections pursuant to Article 73, as promptly as possible after the
Government of Iran and the Agency have consulted as provided for in Article 77, it being
understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and
(c) For routine inspections pursuant to Article 72, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities
referred to in Article 80(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or
uranium enriched to more than 516, and one week in all other cases,
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Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and
the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be
visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside Iran the Agency shall also give advance notice of
the place and time of their arrival in Iran.
Article 84
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 83, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure,
carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 80 in
accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the
Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided by the Government of Iran
pursuant to Article 64(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational
programme, it shall advise the Government of Iran periodically of its general programme of announced
and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying
out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical
difficulties for the Government of Iran and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions
of Articles 44 and 89. Similarly the Government of Iran shall make every effort to facilitate the task of
the inspectors.
Designation of inspectors
Article 85
The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors:
(a) The Director General shall inform the Government of Iran in writing of the name,
qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each
Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for Iran;
(b) The Government of Iran shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt
of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal;
(c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the
Government of Iran as one of the inspectors for Iran, and shall inform the Government of
Iran of such designations; and
(d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the Government of Iran or on his
own initiative, shall immediately inform the Government of Iran of the withdrawal of the
designation of any official as an inspector for Iran.
However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48 and to carry out
ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 71 (a) and (b) the designation procedures shall be completed if
possible within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears
impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.
Article 86
The Government of Iran shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where
required, for each inspector designated for Iran.
Conduct and visits of inspectors
Article 87
Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 48 and 71-75, shall carry out their
activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or
operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular inspectors shall not operate any facility
themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any
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operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of Articles 74 and 75, particular operations in a
facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.
Article 88
When inspectors require services available in Iran, including the use of equipment, in connection
with the performance of inspections, the Government of Iran shall facilitate the procurement of such
services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.
Article 89
The Government of Iran shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their
inspections by representatives of the Government of Iran, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be
delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
Article 90
The Agency shall inform the Government of Iran of:
(a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
(b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in Iran, in particular by means
of statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as soon as
possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a
material balance has been struck.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS
Article 91
General provisions
Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is
transferred internationally shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility
of the Government of Iran:
(a) In the case of import into Iran, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie 10 with
the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the material reaches its
destination; and
(b) In the case of export out of Iran, up to the time at which the recipient State assumes such
responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its
destination.
The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in accordance with
suitable arrangements to be made by the States concerned. Neither Iran nor any other State shall be
deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear
material is in transit on or over its territory, or that it is being transported on a ship under its flag or in its
aircraft.
INFCIRC/214
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Transfers out of Iran
Article 92
(a) The Government of Iran shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of Iran of
nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one
effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to
be made to the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which
exceeds one effective kilogram.
(b) Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual
arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear
material is to be prepared for shipping.
(c) The Government of Iran and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance
notification.
(d) The notification shall specify:
(i) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the
nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will
come;
(ii) The State for which the nuclear material is destined;
(iii) The dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for
shipping;
(iv) The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and
(v) At what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the
nuclear material fur the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which
that point will be reached.
Article 93
The notification referred to in Article 92 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if
necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the
nuclear material before it is transferred out of Iran and, if the Agency so wishes or the Government of
Iran so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping.
However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or
contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification.
Article 94
If the nuclear material will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State, the
Government of Iran shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive, within three months of the
time when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the nuclear material from Iran, confirmation by
the recipient State of the transfer.
Transfers into Iran
Article 95
(a) The Government of Iran shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into Iran of
nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment
exceeds one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate
shipments are to be received from the same State, each of less than one effective
kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram.
INFCIRC/214
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(b) The Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the
nuclear material, and in any case not later than the date on which the Government of Iran
assumes responsibility for the nuclear material.
(c) The Government of Iran and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance
notification.
(d) The notification shall specify:
(i) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the
nuclear material;
(ii) At what point of the transfer the Government of Iran will assume responsibility for
the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement and the probable date on
which that point will be reached; and
(iii) The expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the nuclear
material is intended to be unpacked.
Article 96
The notification referred to in Article 95 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if
necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the
nuclear material at the time the consignment is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by
any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification.
Article 97
Special reports
The Government of Iran shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 68 if any unusual
incident or circumstances lead the Government of Iran to believe that there is or may have been loss of
nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during an international transfer.
DEFINITIONS
Article 98
For the purposes of this Agreement:
A. Adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver
difference or material unaccounted for.
B. Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 79 and 80, the amount of nuclear material
transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.
C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key
measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of
specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of
separate items.
D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of
plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as
follows:
(a) Grams of contained plutonium;
(b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium
enriched in these isotopes; and
(c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.
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For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before
rounding to the nearest unit.
E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical
inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since
that physical inventory was taken.
F. Correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake
or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report.
Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains.
G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in
effective kilograms is obtained by taking:
(a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0. 01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms
multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5% its weight in
kilograms multiplied by 0. 0001; and
(d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its
weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-
235 to that of the total uranium in question.
I. Facility means:
(a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an
isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or
(b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is
customarily used.
J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a
material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:
(a) Increases:
(i) Import;
(ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a nonsafeguarded
(non-peaceful) activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards;
(iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and
(iv) De-exemption: re-application of safeguards on nuclear material previously
exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.
(b) Decreases:
(i) Export;
(ii) Domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for a
non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity;
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(iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s)
or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;
(iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the
basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for
further nuclear use;
(v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational
accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is
stored;
(vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or
quantity; and
(vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of
nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.
K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it
may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but
are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance
areas.
L. Man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 80, 300 man-days of inspection, a
man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of
not more than eight hours.
M. Material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that:
(a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area
can be determined; and
(b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be
determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures,
in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.
N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory.
0. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX
of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any
determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement
which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have
effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by Iran.
P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of
nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with
specified procedures.
Q. Shipper/ receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a
batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material
balance area.
R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive
empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may
include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific
gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings
and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated.
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S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under
normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the
information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and
verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material
balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.
DONE in Vienna on the 19th day of June 1973 in duplicate in the English language.
For the GOVERNMENT OF IRAN:
(signed) Dr. M. Sadri
For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:
(signed) Sigvard Eklund

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml

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